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Time to Act
Response to questions posed by the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance on
Fiduciary Obligation and Effective Climate-related Financial Disclosures
Janis Sarra and Cynthia Williams*
26 January 2019

Executive Summary
The Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance has been commissioned by the Canadian Government to
determine how best to generate sustainable finance, a significant challenge given the carbon intensity
of Canada’s economy. The Expert Panel has defined sustainable finance as capital flows, risk
management activities and financial processes that assimilate environmental and social factors as a
means of promoting sustainable economic growth and the long-term stability of the financial system.
While there are numerous strategies to be deployed to move Canada to a financially sustainable
future, this report addresses two critically important issues: fiduciary obligation of corporate- and
pension-fiduciaries, and national action on environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) financial
disclosure, including climate-related financial risk disclosure.
Our economy is facing significant challenges and disruptions in the transition to a lower carbon world.
Our view is that absent clear and innovative steps to ensure our corporations and financial institutions
act to address carbon emissions and other environmental, social and governance risks and
opportunities, we will be seriously prejudiced in a world that is rapidly moving towards greener and
more sustainable economic activity.
Our report offers a comprehensive set of recommendations on these fiduciary obligation and
disclosure. Our four top priorities are:
 Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act
to embed ESG factors, including climate-related risks and opportunities, in the fiduciary
obligation of directors and officers.
 Embed ESG matters in financial statements and enhance corporate disclosure on ESG,
including climate-related financial risk, in reporting requirements of publicly-listed
companies.
 Require institutional investors and asset managers, including pension funds and mutual
funds, to disclose how their portfolio management, voting and engagement activities are
contributing to a lower carbon economy.
 Endorse the TCFD disclosure framework and work with accounting standards setters and
securities authorities to align climate-related financial disclosure.

____________________
*Dr Janis Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor, University of British Columbia and Professor of Law, Peter
A Allard School of Law, UBC and Professor Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
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It is time for the federal government to act to build further on the fiduciary obligation that already
exists at Canadian common law and in corporate law with respect to directors and officers, as well as
to codify the obligations that already exist in order to provide greater transparency to the public. We
also make recommendations to align sustainability disclosure requirements with developments
nationally and internationally. It is the moment for Canada to show leadership on the issue of
transparency regarding factors that pose material risks and opportunities so that Canada will truly
transition to a greener economy. We want corporate boards to be identifying ESG material risks and
opportunities, and to be disclosing their thinking and activities on those risks and opportunities to
their stakeholders, without fear of liability when they are duly diligent in their consideration of these
issues.
There are currently 120 Canadian corporate and investment firm signatories to the UN Principles for
Responsible Investment, representing assets under management of over $4 trillion. These firms have
committed to the integration of ESG issues into corporate and investment analysis and decisionmaking processes. That level of support speaks to the growing recognition that effective corporate
governance includes addressing ESG risks and opportunities.
The Expert Panel has received opinions concerning many broad policy considerations and a great deal
of advice from participants in the financial sector. Our report is purposely very detailed as to the
precise statutory amendments that the federal government should enact now to meaningfully move
Canada forward on sustainable finance. Our 25 recommendations serve as a practical guide to
changes in statutory language that are required based on the type of legislation and area of fiduciary
obligation and disclosure discussed. The majority of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel will
not likely require legislative change, but rather, will require innovative thinking, new finance, a
principled commitment to a lower carbon economy backed by meaningful economic and
technological strategies, and strong partnerships between governments, the private sector, the notfor-profit and non-governmental organization sectors. Our recommendations are “legislatively
focused” in this submission because they build on existing statutory duties. The improvements
suggested are aimed at providing a baseline commitment, across the board, for all federally-regulated
corporations, financial institutions, investment funds and pension funds, to embed sustainable
thinking in the discharge of their fiduciary obligations. They are largely principles-based, setting
threshold standards, which directors and officers can then implement as they believe appropriate for
their organization. Our recommendations are timely and practical, and give specifics on how changes
can be accomplished at the federal level.
A priority is to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) to contain four new provisions
regarding directors’ fiduciary obligations. First, amend the statute to require directors and officers to
“consider” ESG factors with a view to the corporation’s best interest. In considering ESG factors,
directors and officers may conclude that ESG factors are or are not factors posing a material risk or
opportunity to the corporation. Corporate stakeholders would be confident that such factors have
been considered by directors and officers if there is a clear statutory obligation to do so. Second,
amend the CBCA to require directors and officers to address material ESG factors, an obligation that
arises only where ESG factors are material to the best interests of the corporation. One option for
wording, taken from federal environmental legislation, is that directors and officers are to “take all
reasonable care” to address material ESG issues, which would place a reasonableness standard on
these obligations.
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Third, we recommend codifying the common law in a new section 122(2) of the CBCA, enacting
specific wording based on Canadian judgments that directors and officers may consider the interest
of multiple stakeholders in making decisions. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that directors
and officers are to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, “having regard to all
relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a
fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen”. This
amendment would create greater certainty and transparency for all stakeholders and would
encourage directors’ oversight of the corporation with a view to long-term sustainability without fear
of their decisions being attacked by “impatient investors”. Directors’ good faith decisions would be
protected by the defence under the CBCA that already serves duly diligent directors well. Fourth, we
recommend that the CBCA be amended to require discussion of management’s approach to material
ESG risks and opportunities in the management proxy circular distributed before each annual meeting.
Such information about management’s thinking about sustainability issues is directly relevant to the
election or re-election of directors.
Many of our recommendations are modelled on UK developments, where publicly-traded companies
must now explain how they are managing issues such as environmental performance, diversity,
human rights, and social and community involvement; and must report on certain statistics such as
CO2 emissions.
Imprecision in respect of information available on long-term climate-related financial risk or other ESG
risks is not a bar to directors and officers acting now with a view to the best interests of the
corporation. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the defences of good faith and acting on a
prudent and reasonable basis are very strong, even in the face of less than full information. The
amendments would enhance corporate governance and encourage corporate boards to engage in
oversight and undertake strategic planning in the interests of the long-term sustainability of the
corporation. At the same time, we are cognizant of the regulatory burden on companies and make
some recommendations that would ease current requirements that may be outdated and allow
companies to shift some resources towards climate-related and ESG risk management.
There are a host of other federally-regulated companies that would benefit from this enhanced
language of fiduciary obligation and ESG consideration, and while this report examines all of them,
the priority should be the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act. Directors pursuant to these
statutes have the same obligations as under the CBCA and have the good faith reliance defence under
the relevant enabling statutes. Moreover, they are some of the most financially significant, with the
most developed risk management and governance structures, and thus most able to assist in shifting
the trajectory towards a greener economy. As has often been done in the past, once there is
experience with the CBCA, other statutes should be amended to align.
We also recommend amending of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act to add the obligation to
consider ESG factors when investing the assets of a pension fund in a manner that a reasonable and
prudent person would. The pension administrator should provide information on ESG factors to
members, former members, survivors or former spouses for their consideration. The Pension Benefits
Standards Regulation should be amended to require that the Statement of Investment Policies and
Procedures must contain information on how ESG factors are being incorporated. These amendments
go one step further than developments in Ontario, but mirror developments in the United Kingdom
and Europe.
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With respect to the series of questions that the Expert Panel asked about the TCFD disclosure
framework, we also have a suite of recommendations. First, as a policy matter, we urge the Expert
Panel to broaden its consideration to questions of expanded ESG disclosure generally, while
recognizing the TCFD framework as an important framework for climate-related financial disclosure.
Thus, we recommend that material ESG risks, costs and assets be included in the company’s financial
statements and notes thereto. Requirements for such integration should be accomplished by
regulations under Canadian accounting standards, adopting internationally developing sustainability
accounting standards. Integrating ESG matters in corporate financial statements will allow greater
transparency and accountability. Where accounting methods are developing, the notes to the
financial statements should make clear the basis on which metrics are being reported and changes
year over year, allowing for reporting of currently known ESG risks and opportunities.
We also recommend that the new Capital Markets Regulatory Authority pursuant to the Cooperative
Capital Markets Regulatory System work to require expanded disclosure according to the TCFD
framework. Given the systemic, non-diversifiable nature of the financial risks inherent in climate
change and the transition to a lower-carbon economy, our analysis is that the new Regulatory
Authority has the authority to enact such requirements, but may also want to work first cooperatively
with the provinces and territories. We have a number of recommendations for improving the quality
of disclosure as new requirements are being developed, from clarifying the concept of materiality to
acting to celebrate ESG and climate disclosure leaders. We suggest changes to reporting periods that
would ease the regulatory burden of reporting material ESG risks, while protecting the continuous
disclosure system and advancing financial sustainability.
We recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly diligent directors and officers,
recognizing that as ESG disclosure and metrics develop, readers of the information should understand
that it is evolving and that the disclosure may change as understandings of risks, opportunities and
how to measure them improve. Such a safe harbour will encourage longer-term sustainability
planning and provide protection against short-termism pressure by “impatient capital”. The safe
harbour is a method under securities law to protect directors and officers in their duly diligent efforts
to disclose material information to investors, regulators and the broader public. A protection for
investors regarding ESG reporting in financial statements is that directors and officers are required to
explain changes in methodology or metrics year over year.
On climate-related financial risk more specifically, we recommend that the federal government adopt
requirements that institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension
funds, disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the investor’s
measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in their
portfolio construction and management, corporate engagement and voting policies.
We offer a number of practical approaches regarding how to effect legislative change federally, as
well as how the federal government should work cooperatively with provincial regulators. Finally, we
conclude with a recommendation that the federal government create a Sustainable Finance Institute
aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian economy, including working with the
private sector, regulators, universities, non-governmental organizations, and green finance institutes
internationally to further develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics. For
ease of reference, all our recommendations are contained in Appendix 1 of the report at page 115.
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Time to Act
Response to questions posed by the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance on
Fiduciary Obligation and Effective Climate-related Financial Disclosures
Janis Sarra and Cynthia Williams*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change represents a significant risk in financial and other markets; it could substantially
affect the valuation of many publicly-listed companies and place some investment portfolios at
risk.1 The allocation of capital in business and investment have an impact on and are impacted by
climate change.2 Globally, the OECD estimates that $6.9 trillion US each year is required up to
the year 2030 to meet climate and sustainable development objectives.3 While that scale applies
globally, there is no question that Canada has to deploy significant resources to ensure that
climate objectives are met. There is also no doubt that sustainable finance presents new
opportunities for Canada. For example, globally, investments in renewable electric technologies
were $298 billion US in 2017, more than double the annual investment in fossil fuel generation.4
According to the Global Commission on the Economy and the Climate, the clean economy is
expected to grow to $26 trillion US and create 65 million jobs worldwide by 2030.5
In this respect, Canada needs to develop timely and proactive strategies to address climaterelated challenges and to devise a going-forward strategy. However, it is necessary to look beyond
climate-related financial risk and consider the environmental, social and governance factors that
may present important risks and opportunities in the transition to a sustainable Canadian
* Dr Janis Sarra, Presidential Distinguished Professor, University of British Columbia and Professor of Law, Peter
A Allard School of Law, UBC and Professor Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
1 Janis Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change” (April 2018)
CCLI (Oxford and Canada), online (pdf): CCLI Oxford <https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/Janis-Sarra_Fiduciary-Obligation-in-Business-and-Investment.pdf> [Sarra, “Fiduciary
Obligations”]. See also World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017 (11 November 2017), online: WEF
<http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/> and Cynthia Williams, “Disclosure of Information Concerning
Climate Change: Liability Risks and Opportunities” (April 2018) CCLI (Oxford and Canada), online (pdf): CCLI
Oxford <https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Cynthia-Williams_Disclosure-of-InformationConcerning-Climate-Change.pdf>.
2 Sarra, ibid at 1, 47.
3 OECD and World Bank, “Financing Climate Futures” (2018) at 15, DOI:
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308114-en>.
4 Ibid at 22, citing International Energy Agency, “The Future of Cooling: Opportunities for energy-efficient air
conditioning” (2018).
5 Global Commission on the Economy and the Climate, quoted in Government of Canada, Prime Minister of
Canada, Government of Canada fighting climate change with price on pollution (23 October 2018), online:
Government of Canada <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/10/23/government-canada-fighting-climatechange-price-pollution> [Prime Minister, Price on Pollution].
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economy. Transition needs to benefit everyone and not disproportionately impact economically
vulnerable Canadians or strand communities highly dependent on carbon intensive economic
activity.6
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2018 Special Report on the impacts of
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emission pathways reported further scientific evidence that human-induced global warming has
now reached 1°C above preindustrial levels, with some impacts predicted to be long-lasting or
irreversible, such as the loss of ecosystems.7 The IPCC reports that without stepping up climate
action, global average temperature increase could reach 2°C soon after 2060 and continue rising.8
The IPCC reports that approximately 4% of the global land area is projected to undergo a
transformation of ecosystems from one type to another now that we are at 1°C of global
warming, and will increase to 13% at 2°C temperature change,9 significantly and directly affecting
coastal areas and deltas and increasing risks associated with sea level rise for many human and
ecological systems.10
The recent United States (“US”) National Climate Assessment Report notes that adaptation
“entails iterative risk management”, a continuing risk management process that does not have
an end point.11 It highlights that individuals and organizations need to assess risks and
vulnerabilities from climate and other drivers of change such as economic, environmental, and
societal, take actions to reduce those risks, and understand that learning will take place over
time.12 It notes that timescale differences relate to resilience, ranging from the ability to
withstand and recover from current shocks and stressors while retaining basic functions to the
ability to transform in desirable ways over time as the magnitude of change increases; to
maximize benefits in the near term and identify the most important opportunities for longerterm resilience.13
The highly respected scientific journal, Nature, has published an empirical report that says
globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80% of current coal reserves should
remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C.14 The study finds that
6

Ibid at 28.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Global warming of 1.5°C – An IPCC Special Report on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty” (October 2018) at 7, online: IPCC <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>.
8 Ibid at 8.
9 For example, 99% of coral reefs are projected to disappear globally at a temperature increase of 2ºC.
Irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet could be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. Ibid.
10 Ibid at 10.
11 National Climate Assessment, “Fourth National Climate Assessment, Chapter 28: Reducing Risks Through
Adaptation Actions” (2017), online: NCA <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/28/> [NCA, “Fourth
National Climate Assessment”].
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, “The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global
warming to 2°C” (7 January 2015) 517 Nature 187-190, online: Nature
7
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trillions of dollars of known and extractable coal, oil and gas cannot be exploited if the global
temperature rise is to be kept under the 2°C safety limit agreed by the world’s nations.15
Considerable financial and reputational risks to corporations will arise from the physical,
ecological, human health and human rights claims and impacts associated directly with the
corporation’s role in contributing to GHG emissions and increased climate-change risk. These
observations, among the thousands now generated, illustrate why it is time for the Canadian
government to act to do its share to avert a global environmental and financial tragedy.
The Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance16 has been commissioned by the Canadian Government
to determine how best to generate sustainable finance, a significant challenge when Canada’s
economy is very carbon intensive. While “sustainable finance” has a number of definitions, the
Expert Panel has defined it as “capital flows (as reflected in lending and investment), risk
management activities (such as insurance and risk assessment), and financial processes (including
disclosures, valuation, and oversight) that assimilate environmental and social factors as a means
of promoting sustainable economic growth and the long-term stability of the financial system.”17
While there are numerous strategies to be deployed to move Canada to a financially sustainable
future, this report address two critically important issues in the governance and oversight of this
transition: first, fiduciary obligation of corporate- and pension-fiduciaries, and second, national
action on climate-related financial disclosure and broader environmental social and governance
(“ESG”) financial disclosure.
Our economy is facing significant challenges and disruptions in the transition to a lower carbon world.
Our view is that absent clear and innovative steps to ensure our corporations and financial institutions
act to address carbon emissions and other environmental, social and governance risks and
opportunities, we will be seriously prejudiced in a world that is rapidly moving towards greener and
more sustainable economic activity.

It is time for the federal government to act to codify and build further on the fiduciary obligation
that already exists at common law and in corporate law in Canada with respect to directors and
officers of federally-registered corporations. We also make recommendations to align statutory
fiduciary obligation and disclosure requirements with developments nationally and
internationally. It is also the moment for Canada to show leadership on the issue of transparency
and disclosure regarding factors that pose materials risks and opportunities as Canada transitions
to a greener economy.

<https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14016>. The authors use “a single integrated assessment model that
contains estimates of the quantities, locations and nature of the world’s oil, gas and coal reserves and
resources, and which is shown to be consistent with a wide variety of modelling approaches with different
assumptions, to explore the implications of this emissions limit for fossil fuel production in different regions.”
15 Ibid, including most Canadian tar sands, all Arctic oil and gas and much potential shale gas.
16 Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance, Interim Report of the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 25 October 2018), online (pdf): Government of Canada
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/En4-350-1-2018-eng.pdf> [Expert Panel].
17 Ibid at 3.
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Underpinning the recommendations throughout this report is the fact that the transition to a
sustainable economy carries with it tremendous opportunities in addition to risks. For example,
five years ago, Alberta-based TransAlta Corporation spun off TransAlta Renewables in an initial
public offering, and today its assets include 20 wind facilities, 13 hydroelectric facilities and one
solar power facility.18 TransAlta Renewables has tripled in value and is now worth more than its
parent corporation.19 The European Commission reports that “between 1990 and 2016, energy
use was reduced by almost 2%, and greenhouse gas emissions by 22%, while GDP grew by 54%.”20
The European Commission has estimated the upside economic benefits of energy efficiency
digitalization, renovation and fuel switching, more efficient products and appliances, smart
buildings management systems, and improved materials for insulation.21 In addition to financial
benefits and reduction of carbon emissions, the European Commission has observed that
achieving a net-zero GHG economy will reduce pre-mature deaths caused by fine particulate
matter by more than 40% and health damage by around €200 billion per annum.22 Responsible
investing considering ESG risks and opportunities, compared to traditional investment
approaches, has been shown to potentially lead to positive investment outcomes over the longterm.23
Our 25 recommendations serve as a practical guide to changes in statutory language that are required
based on the type of legislation and area of fiduciary obligation and disclosure discussed. The majority
of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel will not likely require legislative change, but rather, will
require innovative thinking, new finance, a principled commitment to a lower carbon economy backed
by meaningful economic and technological strategies, and strong partnerships between governments,
the private sector, the not-for-profit and non-governmental organization sectors. Our
recommendations are “legislatively focused” in this submission because they build on existing
statutory duties. The improvements suggested are aimed at providing a baseline commitment, across

18

TransAlta Renewables, “Reports on Voting Results From The 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders” (10 May
2018), online: TransAlta <https://www.transaltarenewables.com/2018/05/10/transalta-renewables-increports-on-voting-results-from-the-2018-annual-meeting-of-shareholders/>.
19 Expert Panel, supra note 16 at 26.
20 European Commission, A Clean Planet for all – A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern,
competitive and climate neutral economy (COM 773 final, 28 November 2018) at 4, online (pdf):
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_en.pdf>.
21 Ibid at 8.
22 Ibid at 16. In 2018, more than half of Europe's electricity supply is free from GHG emissions, anticipated to
move to more than 80% of electricity will be coming from renewable energy sources. It has allocated €70
billion for the implementation of the Energy Union Strategy. EFSI 2.0 focuses even more on sustainable
investments in all sectors to contribute to meeting the Paris Agreement’s objectives and to help to deliver on
the transition to a resource efficient, circular and low-carbon economy, ibid at 17. See also the Juncker Plan –
one pillar of which is the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI). The European Commission proposal to
step up climate mainstreaming to at least 25% in the next Multiannual Financial Framework demonstrates the
EU budget would continue to act as a catalyst to leverage sustainable private and public investment and
channel EU support for the clean energy transition to where it is most needed. It is also a key part of the EU’s
credibility in advocating for net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in 2050, ibid at 17-18.
23 World Business Council on Sustainable Development, “Aligning Retirement Assets develops new resource to
help companies meet the growing demand for responsible investing” (4 December 2018), online: WBCSD
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-RetirementAssets/News/new-resource-to-help-companies-meet-the-growing-demand-for-responsible-investing>.
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the board, for all federally-regulated corporations, financial institutions, investment funds and
pension funds, to embed sustainable thinking in the discharge of their fiduciary obligations. They are
largely principles-based, setting threshold standards, which directors and officers can then implement
as they believe appropriate for their organization. Our recommendations are timely and practical,
and give specifics on how changes can be accomplished at the federal level.

This report is organized by direct responses to questions posed by the Expert Panel on Sustainable
Finance in its interim report,24 specifically, the questions posed by the Expert Panel under two
sections of the interim report: “3.4 Clear Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty” and “3.3 Effective
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures”. For ease of reference, we have sub-labelled the questions
3.4(1) to (4) and 3.3(1) to (8) in the discussion below. The recommended changes to corporate
and financial services legislation should be made immediately as they are clearly within federal
parliamentary authority. The changes in the securities law domain will likely take longer, given
the importance of federal, provincial and territorial cooperation.

1. Context and methodology of our submission
This report builds on ongoing work of the authors as part of the Canada Climate Law Initiative.
We are also the principal Canadian investigators in the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative
(“CCLI”), an interdisciplinary research, education, and theory development project. The global
CCLI initiative is organized by Ben Caldecott, Director of Sustainable Finance at the Smith School
of Enterprise and the Environment at Oxford University, UK, in collaboration with the Prince’s
Accounting for Sustainability, our law schools and a number of international partners. As
Canadian partner and full participants in the global CCLI, in 2017 and 2018, we conducted
research and wrote reports; conducted expert meetings in Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa, and
Toronto with industry and legal specialists; organized two major conferences in Vancouver and
Toronto on director and officer obligations and climate change financial risk management; and
participated in both Canadian and international fora on how best to transition to a lower carbon
economy, given current challenges in law and finance.
With financial support for our research from the Ivey Foundation, the University of British
Columbia and York University, we examined the legal basis for corporate directors in Canada to
be required to take account of, disclose, and manage climate change risks under prevailing
statutory and common laws.25 We assessed the materiality of these considerations, in terms of
disclosure and the potential implications for company and investor decision-making in the real
economy.26 We also examined the legal basis for pension trustees, pension investment managers
and other pension fiduciaries in Canada to take account of, disclose, and manage climate change
risks under prevailing statutory and common law.
24

Ibid.
Janis Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change”, supra note 1.
26 Cynthia Williams, “Disclosure of Information Concerning Climate Change: Liability Risks and Opportunities”,
supra note 1; Cynthia Williams and Janis Sarra, “Directors’ Liability and Climate Risk: Canada – Country Paper:
Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative” (April 2018).
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In preparation for this report, in addition to extensive research on developments globally and
careful analysis of Canadian corporate, securities, pensions and financial institutions legislation,
we met with more than 30 institutional investors and asset managers, portfolio managers,
lawyers, accountants, corporate executives, securities regulators, and several umbrella
accounting and corporate governance associations. We circulated a draft report on 5 December
2018 on a confidential basis to 18 of these market participants; conducted a series of phone calls
and in-person discussions with each of these individuals and organizations; and incorporated
their helpful suggestions in this report. As a result, we believe our recommendations are well
grounded, timely and realistic.

2. Understanding what is meant by environmental, social and governance risks and
opportunities
The European Commission has defined sustainable finance as the process of taking due account
of environmental and social considerations in investment decision making, which will lead to
increased investments in longer-term and sustainable activities.27 There are now many
definitions for ESG considerations, most of which address the same factors. For purposes of our
discussion in this submission, we use the definition recommended by the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) for sustainability accounting purposes. It reports that:
Sustainability accounting reflects the management of a corporation’s environmental and
social impacts arising from production of goods and services, as well as its management
of the environmental and social capital necessary to create long-term value. It also
includes the impacts that sustainability challenges have on innovation, business models,
and corporate governance and vice versa.28
SASB proposes accounting metrics under five broad sustainability dimensions of ESG:
Environment, including environmental impacts, either through the use of non-renewable,
natural resources as inputs to the factors of production or through harmful releases into
the environment that may result in impacts to the company’s financial condition or
operating performance. It includes accounting for GHG emissions, air quality, energy
management, water management, waste management and ecological impacts.
Social Capital, which relates to the expectation that a business will contribute to society
in return for a social license to operate. It addresses the management of relationships
with key outside parties, such as customers, local communities, the public, and the
government; includes issues related to human rights, protection of vulnerable groups,
local economic development, access to and quality of products and services, affordability,
27

European Commission, The Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (2018), online: EC <https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097>.
28 SASB, “Sustainability Framework” (2018), <https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/materiality-map/>.
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responsible business practices in marketing, customer privacy, data security, and selling
practices and product labelling.
Human Capital, which addresses the management of a company’s human resources
(employees and individual contractors) as key assets to delivering long-term value; and
includes issues that affect the productivity of employees, diversity, management of
labour relations and of the health and safety of employees, and the ability to create a
safety culture.
Business Model and Innovation, which addresses the integration of environmental,
human, and social issues in a company’s value-creation process, including resource
recovery, other innovations in the production process, business model resilience,
managing the physical impacts of climate change, supply chain management, and
product innovation, including efficiency and responsibility in the design, use phase, and
disposal of products.
Leadership and Governance, including the management of issues that are inherent to the
business model or common practice in the industry and that are in potential conflict with
the interest of broader stakeholder groups, and therefore create a potential liability or a
limitation or removal of a license to operate. It includes systemic risk management,
critical incident risk management, regulatory compliance, business ethics, safety
management, supply-chain and materials sourcing, conflicts of interest, anticompetitive
behaviour, and corruption and bribery.29

II.

FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

The Canadian government has an important opportunity to provide leadership by enacting
legislation across a range of federal statutes to clarify fiduciary obligation and modernize its scope
to align with existing Canadian common law and with developments internationally. The most
logical place for a clarified duty on corporate directors and officers would be in the statutory
fiduciary obligation provisions in corporations statutes. This obligation should apply to all
federally-incorporated companies, whether publicly-listed or privately held. Our focus in
responding to this question of the Expert Panel is on federal legislation, although one would hope
that provincial and territorial governments would follow suit. Essentially, we want corporate
boards to be identifying ESG material risks and opportunities, and disclosing them to their
stakeholders without fear of liability when they are duly diligent in their consideration of these
issues. To this end, we require immediate and medium-term action to shift governance practice.

Expert Panel Question 3.4 (1):
Is there a need to more clearly define the scope of fiduciary duty with respect to the
evaluation of climate-related or broader ESG factors in financial decision-making in
29

Ibid.
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Canada? What would be the best ways to effect change, and who are the key stakeholders
in facilitating this change?
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) judgment in Peoples Department Stores30 clarified the
fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and officers 15 years ago. The scope of directors‘ and
officers’ fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the corporation applies equally to
privately-held and publicly-listed corporations. The Peoples Department Stores case involved the
duties of directors and officers of a privately-held corporation that was wholly-owned by a
closely-held publicly-listed company.31 The SCC judgment in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders in
2008, made clear that these obligations apply to publicly-listed corporations as well.32
In Peoples Department Store, the SCC held that section 122(1) of the Canada Business
Corporations Act establishes two distinct duties to be discharged by directors and officers in
managing, or supervising the management of, the corporation.33 Section 122(1)(a) specifies that
every director and officer of a corporation, in exercising their powers and discharging their duties,
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, what the
Court referred to as the “duty of loyalty” and “statutory fiduciary duty”. The SCC held that “The
statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith with a
view to the best interests of the corporation.”34 “They must respect the trust and confidence
that have been reposed in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the
realization of the objects of the corporation.”35 The SCC further held that: “We accept as an

30 Peoples

Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples Department Stores].
Ibid. Wise Stores Inc. acquired Peoples Department Stores Inc from Marks and Spencer Canada Inc
(“M & S”). The three Wise brothers were sole directors and majority shareholders and officers of Wise,
controlling 75% of the firm’s equity. Because of covenants imposed by M & S, Peoples could not be merged
with Wise until the purchase price had been paid. Wise was founded in 1930 as a small clothing store,
expanded and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1986. Peoples was incorporated in 1991 by its parent
M & S plc, ibid at paras 5, 7. Wise incorporated a company, 2798832 Canada Inc., for the purpose of acquiring
all of the issued and outstanding shares of Peoples from M & S. The $27-million share acquisition proceeded as
a fully leveraged buyout, at para 9. To protect its interests, M & S took the assets of Peoples as security
(subject to a priority in favour of the TD Bank) and negotiated strict covenants concerning the financial
management and operation of the company. Among other requirements, 2798832 Canada Inc. and Wise were
obligated to maintain specific financial ratios, and Peoples was not permitted to provide financial assistance to
Wise. In addition, the agreement provided that Peoples could not be amalgamated with Wise until the
purchase price had been paid, ibid at para 11. In January 1993, 2798832 Canada Inc. was amalgamated with
Peoples, the new entity retaining Peoples’ corporate name. Upon amalgamation the new Peoples became a
subsidiary directly owned and controlled by Wise, the three Wise brothers were Peoples’ only directors, ibid at
para 12.
32 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 39, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders].
33 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 4. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-4, as
amended, online (pdf): Government of Canada <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/pdf/C-44.pdf> [CBCA].
34 Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 32.
35 Ibid at para 35. The SCC cites 820099 Ontario Inc v Harold E Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 123 (Ont Ct (Gen
Div), (aff’d (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 (Ont Div Ct)), in which Farley J “correctly observes that in resolving a conflict
between majority and minority shareholders, it is safe for directors and officers to act to make the corporation
a “better corporation””, at para 41.
31
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accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best
interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for
the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”36
The SCC held that the second duty, the “duty of care”, “imposes a legal obligation upon directors
and officers to be diligent in supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs”.37 The SCC held
that the duty of care is to be assessed against an objective standard, taking into account the
context in which a decision was made.38 The Court held that the contextual approach to
assessment of the duty of care not only emphasizes the primary facts, but also permits prevailing
socio-economic conditions to be taken into consideration. 39
Several years later, the SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders held that:
[66] Directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation, may be obliged to
consider the impact of their decisions on corporate stakeholders, such as the
debentureholders in these appeals. This is what we mean when we speak of a
director being required to act in the best interests of the corporation viewed as
a good corporate citizen. However, the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, and only to the corporation.
...
[81] As discussed, conflicts may arise between the interests of corporate
stakeholders inter se and between stakeholders and the corporation. Where the
conflict involves the interests of the corporation, it falls to the directors of the
corporation to resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.
[82] The cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that the duty of the
directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to
treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and
fairly. There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all
the circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation,
having regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the
need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the
corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.40
[emphasis added]
It is important to draw attention once again to the precise wording of the statutory fiduciary
obligation in Canada, because any need to “clarify” the duty in corporations statutes is really the
36

Ibid at para 42. The SCC held that “The directors’ fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the
nebulous “vicinity of insolvency”.” Ibid at para 46.
37 Ibid at para 32.
38 Peoples Department Stores Inc, supra note 30 at paras 62 and 63.
39 Peoples Department Stores Inc, ibid at para 64.
40 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, supra note 32.
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idea of codifying what is already the law in Canada, in order to provide greater certainty.
Codification will make the duties more transparent and accessible to all individuals performing
duties within Canadian corporations or stakeholders interacting with corporations, including both
the scope and limitations of these duties. It is also timely to enhance the scope of duties by
adopting language creating an express duty to consider ESG factors, and to act reasonably where
those factors are material, as discussed in the next part.
Much of this report is focused on statutory reform. While very detailed, the goal is to set out a
detailed blueprint of what is doable in the immediate to short term with respect to fiduciary
obligation and corporate disclosure, in a manner that is consistent with the current statutory and
regulatory frameworks that allow corporations and financial institutions to operate in Canadian
capital and financial markets.

1. Amend the Canada Business Corporations Act to enhance good governance practice and to
codify the common law
There are currently 310,000 corporations incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations
Act (CBCA).41 Both the statutory language of Canadian corporate law and guidance from the
Supreme Court of Canada make clear that the current fiduciary obligation of directors and officers
of corporations is to manage or supervise management of the corporation in the best interests
of the corporation. The CBCA should be amended to codify Canada’s common law, thus aligning
the statutory wording to the obligations of directors and officers that have been clarified by the
common law for many years. Equally, it is important to make absolutely clear the importance of
considering and addressing material risks and opportunities.
In terms of whether the statutory amendments should relate only to climate change risk or ESG
factors more generally, ESG makes the most sense and most closely aligns with the common law.
Our view is that directors and officers already have a fiduciary obligation to inquire whether ESG
factors present a material risk or opportunity for the company in terms of its long-term
sustainability. The corporate board has a responsibility to ensure that all material risk factors,
including ESG factors, are managed, which includes oversight of officers charged with managing
these risks and their impact on the business.
However, some institutional investors have observed that there is an uneven level of
understanding of these obligations throughout Canada. While Canadian courts have been very
consistent in their findings on the scope of obligations in acting in the best interests of the
corporation, there has not, to our knowledge, yet been a judgment on the specific issue of
41

Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-4, as amended, online (pdf): Government of Canada
<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/pdf/C-44.pdf> [CBCA]. Number of CBCA corporations is from Marketplace
Framework Policy Branch Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada (27 November 2017):
Canada, Parliament, Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Evidence, 42nd
Parl, 1st Sess (30 November 2017), online: Senate of Canada
<https://www.sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/421/BANC/53684-e>.
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directors’ and officers’ obligations to consider material ESG risks. It may take another decade for
a court decision specifically on an ESG issue such as climate-related financial risk fiduciary
obligation to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. Corporate and pension fiduciaries should
benefit now from clear language under Canadian statutes. It also makes sense to codify ESG
factors in the statutory fiduciary obligation to align with developments internationally.
A survey of corporate directors undertaken by the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance
(“CCGG”) found that no company is too early in its development or too small not to be thinking
about how environmental and social factors are or may become important to business strategy
and what risk management practices need to be implemented.42 Directors need to ensure timely
and accurate information if they are to fulfill their risk management and capital decision
obligations. The CCGG observes that environmental and social issues can impact a corporation’s
assets and liabilities, both tangible and intangible, and that even smaller companies need to focus
on longer-term issues if they want to be successful in the long term, noting that practices and
measures can evolve with company maturity and scale.43
ESG considerations are already high on the Canadian corporate agenda. As of December 2018,
there are 120 Canadian signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI),
representing assets under management of over 4 trillion CAD.44 By signing the UN PRI, Canadian
corporations and investors commit to the integration of ESG issues into investment analysis and
corporate and investment decision-making processes. That level of support speaks to the growing
support for effective governance, including addressing ESG risks and opportunities.
As the SCC has ruled, “Considerable power over the deployment and management of financial,
human, and material resources is vested in the directors and officers of corporations.” 45 “In
deciding to invest in, lend to or otherwise deal with a corporation, shareholders and creditors
transfer control over their assets to the corporation, and hence to the directors and officers, in
the expectation that the directors and officers will use the corporation’s resources to make
reasonable business decisions that are to the corporation’s advantage.”46
While fewer than 1% of the 310,000 federally-registered companies are publicly-listed
companies, they are some of Canada’s most significant corporations. While we could not get
precise numbers of publicly-listed federally-registered companies, the Toronto Stock Exchange
(“TSX”) was very helpful in supplying information regarding the market value of corporations
42

Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG), “The Directors’ E&S Guidebook, Practical insights and
recommendations for effective board oversight and company disclosure of environmental and social (“E&S”)
matters” (May 2018) at 6, online (pdf): CCGG
<https://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/the_directors__e_s_guidebook.pdf> [CCGG Guidebook].
43 Ibid at 7.
44 Nalini Feuilloley, UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), “Signatories by country, Canada” (27
November 2018), online: UN PRI
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46 Ibid.
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listed on the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange (“TSXV”) by jurisdiction of registration.47 As the graph
below illustrates, at October 2018, federally-registered corporations account for 86.9% of market
value of all corporations listed on the TSX and TSXV. That represents a market value of 719.4
billion CAD.48

Source of data: TSX November 201849

It means that if the federal government acts to clarify the corporations statutes by codifying the
common law and acts to enhance disclosure of systemic risks, it is covering the vast majority
portion of publicly-listed companies in Canada by market value.
Our recommendation for amendment to the CBCA is four-fold. First, amend the statute to require
directors and officers to “consider” ESG factors with a view to the corporation’s best interest. In
considering ESG factors, directors and officers may conclude that ESG factors are or are not
factors posing a material risk or opportunity to the corporation. Corporate stakeholders would
be confident, however, that such factors have been considered by directors and officers. Second,
amend the CBCA to require directors and officers to “address” ESG factors where they are
material. This second obligation arises only where ESG factors are material to the best interests
47

Our thanks to Cheryl Mascarenhas, Specialist, Market Intelligence, TMX Group and other staff at the TSX and
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48 Data on file with authors: TSX, ibid. Actual figure at 31 October 2018: $719,383,487,832.20.
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of the corporation. One option for wording to qualify what they are to address, drawn from
federal environmental legislation, is that directors and officers are to “take all reasonable care”
to address material ESG issues.50 The importation of this language would place a reasonableness
standard on the requirement to address material ESG risks and opportunities.
Third, for greater certainty, codify in the CBCA the wording in the Supreme Court of Canada
judgments that directors and officers may consider the interests of multiple stakeholders in
making those decisions by adding a new section 122(2) to the CBCA. New section 122(2) would
specify that directors and officers “may consider” multiple interests. As with the common law,
the board is to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, “having regard to all
relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders
in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate
citizen”.51 In the list of stakeholders to consider, our recommendation is to include retirees in the
list given by the SCC, as recent cases have illustrated that their interests are relevant to the best
interests analysis. A fourth recommended amendment to the CBCA on disclosure is discussed in
Part IV below.
There is a substantial body of empirical study now that links management of ESG factors with
positive corporate financial performance. In a meta-study of 2,200 empirical studies on ESG and
financial performance, Friede, Busch and Bassen found that the large majority report positive
corporate financial performance when the companies integrate ESG considerations, and for 90%
of the total, there was at least a non-negative relationship between ESG and corporate financial
performance.52 The study reported that the positive ESG impact on corporate financial
performance appears stable over time; and the results show that the business case for ESG
investing is empirically very well-founded.53 Friede Busch, and Bassen conclude that the
orientation toward long-term responsible investing, including integrating ESG factors, should be
important for all kinds of rational investors in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties, and may better
align investors’ interests with the broader objectives of society.54 Investors globally are engaging
with corporate boards on ESG issues, one study reporting that asset managers with €2 trillion
50

For example, section 280.1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, as amended,
specifies that: “Duties of directors and officers 280.1 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation shall take all
reasonable care to ensure that the corporation complies with (a) this Act and the regulations, other than
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52 Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch and Alexander Bassen, “ESG and financial performance: aggregated evidence from
more than 2000 empirical studies” (2015) 5:4 Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 210-233, DOI:
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53 Ibid at 212.
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under management are now engaging with corporate boards.55 Another example is BlackRock,
which as of December 2018 has $5.98 trillion US in assets under management and has a team of
40 professionals engaged specifically in ESG and sustainable stewardship.
A number of other empirical studies offer broad evidence from capital markets that supports the
notion that corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) and ESG factors matter to a company’s financial
performance and to its cost of capital.56 Integrating ESG factors can result in better access to
finance;57 lower the cost of capital,58 including both debt and equity capital;59 and may reduce
the likelihood that companies face major capital constraints.60 Another empirical study showed
that the level of engagement with ESG matters reduces firm risk and increases firm value;
including evidence that an improvement in CSR ratings are likely to decrease the risk of
government litigation and reduce the likelihood of an environmental or social crisis that could
negatively affect firm’s cash flows.61 Another empirical study found that firms with strong ESG
and CSR significantly outperform firms with weak CSR in the mid- and long-term in certain areas
of activity and regions.62
55
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<https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2018.1486997>. The study used three hypotheses and sample of 1,621
publicly traded US companies from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD Research and Analytics) database
during the period 1996–2011.
62 Gregor Dorfleitner, Sebastian Utz and Maximilian Wimmer, “Patience pays off – corporate social responsibility
and long-term stock returns” (2018) 8:2 Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 132-157 at 152, DOI:

24

Other studies indicate that industry-specific classifications of materiality identify ESG information
that is value relevant and predictive of companies’ future financial performance. 63 One survey
found that 82% of respondents suggest that they use ESG information because it is financially
material to investment performance.64 The 2018 RBC Global Asset Management Responsible
Investing Survey, reporting on 540 investment firm, portfolio manager and asset manager
responses, found that over 90% believe ESG-integrated portfolios are likely to perform as well or
better than non-ESG-integrated portfolios and 67% view ESG as a risk mitigator.65
Recommendation 1:
The current fiduciary obligation under the CBCA should be amended to incorporate ESG factors
as follows (in red italics):
Duty of care of directors and officers
122 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and
discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
122(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.
For greater certainty, the new section 122(2) makes transparent the fact that directors and
officers already have the option of considering multiple stakeholder interests, as the CBCA has
<https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2017.1403272>, using a novel classification of activities into nine areas,
each belonging to one of the standard environment, social, and governance (ESG) dimensions.
63 Amir Amel-Zadeh and George Serafeim, “Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global
Survey” (2018) 74:3 Financial Analysts Journal 87-103 at 87, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v74.n3.2> [AmelZadeh and Serafeim], surveying investment firms with the collaboration of Bank of New York Mellon, with
respondents, on a value-weighted basis, with $31 trillion US in assets under management (AUM), comprised 43%
of global institutional AUM. See also M Khan, G Serafeim, and A Yoon, “Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence
on Materiality” (2016) 91(6) Accounting Review 1697–724.
64 Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim, ibid at 88.
65 2018 RBC Global Asset Management Responsible Investing Survey, “Charting a Sustainable Advantage”
(2018) at 5-6, online (pdf): RBC <http://www.rbcgam.com/corporate-governance-and-responsibleinvestment/pdf/esg-executive-summary.PDF>.
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been interpreted by the SCC. However, it would give directors and officers more confidence that
such consideration would not be attacked by shareholders that have only a short-term interest.
It would assist with corporations making decisions in the longer term best interests of the
corporation as it would counter-balance pressure for short-term returns to the potential harm to
the sustainability of the corporation.
Incorporating ESG considerations in section 122 of the CBCA would mean that directors’ good
faith decisions would be protected by the defence under the CBCA that already serves duly
diligent directors well:
Defence — good faith
123(5) A director has complied with his or her duties under subsection 122(1) if
the director relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the corporation represented to the director by an
officer of the corporation or in a written report of the auditor of the corporation
fairly to reflect the financial condition of the corporation; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by the professional person.66
Consideration of ESG factors aligns completely with direction given by the Supreme Court of
Canada in respect of how directors and officers are to approach their obligations to act in the
best interests of the corporation, whether privately held or publicly-listed, looking to its longterm interests. In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, the SCC reiterated its conclusions in Peoples
Department Stores that “In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors
may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers,
governments and the environment to inform their decisions.67 The SCC further held that:
The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual
concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the
corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the
corporation. The content of this duty varies with the situation at hand. At a
minimum, it requires the directors to ensure that the corporation meets its
statutory obligations. But, depending on the context, there may also be other
requirements. In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory;
directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.68
[emphasis added]
In considering the specific substance of the fiduciary duty based on the relationship of directors
to corporations, the SCC held that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be
read not simply as the “best interests of the shareholders”; that from an economic perspective,
the “best interests of the corporation” means the maximization of the value of the corporation,
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but that various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors should consider in
soundly managing with a view to the best interests of the corporation.69 The fiduciary obligation
of directors and officers is clear in the caselaw. The proposed amendments to the CBCA would
make these duties even clearer.
If these amendments are enacted, board approval processes and practices should improve, and
boards will ensure that they have allocated appropriate time and examined relevant information
to assess whether material ESG risks are being considered and addressed along with other
material risks, including in capital allocation decisions. By codifying the requirement to consider
ESG factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation, oversight of risk and opportunities
will be enhanced. Coupled with increased disclosure to investors, as discussed at length in Part
IV below, the amendments will provide greater transparency and enhance governance. It will
encourage boards to undertake strategic planning in the interests of the long-term sustainability
of the corporation. Boards should also consider aligning the compensation of senior officers and
other staff with achievement of sustainability goals.

2. The existing defence under the CBCA is strong
The defence under the CBCA specifies that a director has complied with his or her fiduciary duty
and duty of care if he or she relied on a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to
a statement made by the professional. In other words, directors that make inquiries of
professionals in regard to ESG factors that affect the best interests of the company and in good
faith make decisions based on that advice, are not liable for decisions taken. This defence has
protected duly diligent directors for years.
Imprecision in respect of information available on long-term climate-related financial risk or other
ESG risks is not a bar to directors and officers acting now with a view to the best interests of the
corporation. The defences of good faith and acting on a prudent and reasonable basis are very
strong, even in the face of less than full information. The SCC has held that:
the contextual approach dictated by s 122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only emphasizes
the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be
taken into consideration. The emergence of stricter standards puts pressure on
corporations to improve the quality of board decisions. The establishment of
good corporate governance rules should be a shield that protects directors from
allegations that they have breached their duty of care. . . . Many decisions made
in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and
defensible at the time they are made. Business decisions must sometimes be
made, with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in
which detailed information is not available. It might be tempting for some to see
unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of
information that becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of
69
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hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business
decisions.70
[emphasis added]
This deference in the face of uncertainty is apparent in many other Canadian corporate law
judgments. For example the Ontario Court of Appeal has held:
The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a
perfect decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness,
the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board even though
subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination. As long
as the directors have selected one of several reasonable alternatives, deference
is accorded to the board’s decision.71
The SCC is very clear about the defences available and the deference that will be given to
fiduciaries’ decisions:
Directors and officers will not be held to be in breach of the duty of care under s
122(1)(b) of the CBCA if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis.
The decisions they make must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the
circumstances about which the directors or officers knew or ought to have
known. In determining whether directors have acted in a manner that breached
the duty of care, it is worth repeating that perfection is not demanded. Courts
are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business
expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making, but
they are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in reaching what is claimed
to be a reasonable business decision at the time it was made.72
[emphasis added]
As the Supreme Court has held, directors’ decisions are not going to be assessed based on
hindsight bias.73 Even more so in respect of climate-related risks or ESG that are evolving as new
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72 Peoples Department Stores, ibid at para 64.
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information and insights on financial risk develop. Similar recommendations are below made in
respect of Canadian financial institutions.74
Another option would be to amend the CBCA regulations to embed ESG considerations in the
manner we have recommended amending the statute. In our view, while this strategy may be
accomplished more quickly, it lacks the transparency of statutory language, in terms of assisting
companies to be aware of their obligations and manage their oversight accordingly and in terms
of clarity and certainty for stakeholders.

3. Amending the CBCA to incorporate ESG factors in the statutory fiduciary duty is unlikely to
result in forum shopping to jurisdictions with lower standards
Given that the proposed amendments are essentially codification and clarification of existing
common law, the argument that corporations will “forum shop” to another jurisdictions with
lower standards is without merit. The SCC’s clarification 15 years ago did not result in a mass
move to incorporate in the US or other jurisdictions. Registration (both incorporation and
continuation) under the CBCA allows corporations to operate nationally, an important feature of
CBCA registration. Moreover, many Canadian institutional investors have made clear that they
expect directors and officers to consider ESG factors and their level of engagement with boards
means that companies are unlikely to risk loss of significant investors.
It is possible they could incorporate under provincial corporate statutes, but it is also unlikely as
the fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation exists across the country.
An example that statutory amendment will likely not lead to forum shopping was the amendment
to the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) after the SCC’s judgment in Peoples Department
Stores.75 The SCC held that the duty of care can be owed to creditors in addition to shareholders,
given that the statutory language does not specify that the duty of care is owed solely to the
corporation.76 This ruling that the duty of care could open directors up to actions by creditors 77
led the Ontario government to change the OBCA in 2007 to provide that directors owe their
statutory duty of care exclusively to the corporation.78 There was a great deal of speculation at
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76 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 30 at para 57.
77 The SCC held: “Indeed, unlike the statement of the fiduciary duty in s. 122(1) (a) of the CBCA , which specifies
that directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, the statement of the
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the time that many companies would shift place of registration to Ontario to limit the scope of
their duty of care obligations. That was not the case.

4. Amend the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act to incorporate ESG factors
There are a growing number of not-for-profit corporations in Canada. The federal government
has recognized their importance in its recent allocation of $755 million to help not-for-profit
corporations, charitable and other social purpose organizations access new financing that will
drive positive social change.79 The federal government expects that its new Social Finance Fund
could generate up to $2 billion in economic activity, and help create and maintain as many as
100,000 jobs over the next decade.80
Thus it makes sense to amend the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act81 to align with the
clarified fiduciary obligation in the CBCA. The rationale is the same as for directors and officers
under the CBCA. Directors pursuant to the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act have the same
obligations as under the CBCA and have the good faith reliance defence under the statute.
One question is whether this enhanced duty should apply to all not-for-profit corporations or only
those corporations that are a particular size. The federal government should commence with
larger not-for-profit corporations (by amount of capitalization) and then move to smaller
corporations. However, there is not really a cogent argument to exclude smaller not-for-profit
corporations, as their governance and financial decisions are likely to be less complex and ESG
factors less material, and thus, the time and resource costs of directors and officers putting their
minds to ESG risks and opportunities should be manageable. As discussed below under question
3.3(7), the federal government should play an important role in ensuring clear and accessible
tools are made available to smaller corporations to identify and address material ESG factors.
Recommendation 2:
Amend section 148 of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act to read (in red italics):
Duties of directors and officers

The amendments to the OBCA also added a new statutory defence of due diligence and good faith reliance that
aligns Ontario legislation with the CBCA. The expanded defences are aimed at providing more flexibility to
directors in allowing them to rely on due diligence or reports of corporate officers or employees outside of
financial statements in their decision-making.
79 Announcement of Social Finance Fund appeared in Government of Canada, “Fall Economic Statement (21
November 2018), online: Government of Canada <https://www.budget.gc.ca/fes-eea/2018/docs/nrc/2018-1121-en.html>. Additionally, the Government proposes to invest $50 million over two years in an Investment and
Readiness stream, for social purpose organizations to improve their ability to successfully participate in the
social finance market.
80 Ibid.
81 Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23, as amended [NFP Corporations Act].
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148 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and
discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
148(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, members, shareholders, employees,
retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.
Director — good faith
149 (2) A director has complied with his or her duties under subsection 148(1) if
the director relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the corporation represented to the director by an
officer of the corporation or in a written report of the public accountant of the
corporation fairly to reflect the financial condition of the corporation; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by that person.
The existing section 149(2) defence under the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act would be
available to directors that acted in good faith and relied on professional advice in respect to
consideration of ESG factors. Such an amendment would result in a consistent and transparent
set of fiduciary duties.

5. Canada can learn from the experience of the United Kingdom, which has incorporated ESG
factors, as well as consideration of stakeholder interests, in its corporate law
The United Kingdom (“UK”) has fully embraced the importance of ESG in corporate governance.
The UK government has incorporated ESG in several statutes on the premise that “companies
that address ESG concerns can achieve higher growth rates and increased profitability, better
stakeholder reputation and improved brand strength” and based on the conclusion that “ESG
risks can seriously undermine investor confidence and the long-term prospects for businesses.”82
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The UK Companies Act now requires directors, in specified circumstances, to consider ESG factors
and to report on them. There is strong language in government reports and guides, the Corporate
Code of Conduct and in publications of the London Stock Exchange that good governance means
considering and addressing ESG factors. There is confidence that having to report on the issues
requires directors to focus on them. For example, the Companies Act 2006 requires companies
to disclose climate change risks where they are financially material.83 The UK House of Commons
Environmental Audit Committee has reported that: “Environmental, social and governance (ESG)
refers to the three central factors in measuring the sustainability and ethical impact of an
investment in a company or business.”84
The duty of directors and officers under section 172 of the UK Companies Act has been modified
to create a duty on directors to act to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its
members as a whole, by considering the interests of multiple stakeholders, including: the likely
consequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the company's employees,
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, the impact of the company's operations on
the community and the environment.85
The UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 require
that quoted companies must provide, in their strategic report, “to the extent necessary for an
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s business,
information about human rights issues alongside social and community issues; a gender
breakdown at the end of the financial year of the directors of the company, the senior managers
and employees of the company.”86 The Strategic Report Regulations also introduced a new
requirement on quoted companies to state the annual quantity of emissions expressed in terms
of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent arising from the activities for which that company and its
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UK House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, Greening Finance: embedding sustainability in
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84 Ibid at 6.
85 Companies Act 2006, c 46 (UK): s 172 Duty to promote the success of the company
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consolidated undertakings are responsible (for example, from direct emissions to the
atmosphere) and arising from the purchase of energy for heating or cooling.87
The company’s strategic report must contain (a) a fair review of the company’s business, and (b)
a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.88 The review must, to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the
company’s business, include (a) analysis using financial key performance indicators, and (b) where
appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, including information relating to
environmental matters and employee matters.89 In the case of a quoted company, the strategic
report must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company’s business, include:
414C (7)(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future development,
performance and position of the company’s business, and
(b) information about—
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the
environment),
(ii) the company’s employees, and
(iii) social, community and human rights issues, including information about any
policies of the company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of
those policies.
If the report does not contain information of each kind mentioned in paragraphs
(b)(i), (ii) and (iii), it must state which of those kinds of information it does not
contain.90
[emphasis added]
The strategic report must be approved by the board of directors and signed on behalf of the
board by a director or the secretary of the company.91
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The UK Companies Act uses a comply or explain approach.92 Revisions effective in 2018 to the UK
Corporate Governance Code apply to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019.93
The Code is applicable to all companies with a premium listing, whether incorporated in the UK
or elsewhere.94 The principles state that: “A successful company is led by an effective and
entrepreneurial board, whose role is to promote the long-term sustainable success of the
company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to wider society.”95 The board
should understand the views of the company’s other key stakeholders and describe in the annual
report how their interests have been considered in board discussions and decision-making.96
UK-incorporated quoted companies, ie, those with equity shares listed on London Stock Exchange
Main Market, EEA regulated, NYSE or NASDAQ, are expected to explain how they are managing
issues such as environmental performance, human rights, social and community involvement and
diversity.97 They are also expected to report on certain statistics, for example Scope 1 and 2 CO 2
emissions and gender diversity at board, senior management and whole-company levels.98
Requirements differ for companies of different sizes and listed status; all companies are expected
to disclose principal business risks, and medium-sized companies are not expected to include an
analysis of non-financial key performance indicators.99 Furthermore, only listed companies are
required to contain an overview of the business strategy and model as well as environment,
employee, social, community, human rights and diversity information in the strategic report.100
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97 London Stock Exchange Group, “Revealing the Full Picture, Your guide to ESG reporting: Guidance for issuers
on the integration of ESG into investor reporting and communication” (2018) at 19, online (pdf): LSEG
<https://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/images/Green_Finance/ESG/2018/February/LSEG_ESG_rep
ort_January_2018.pdf> [London Stock Exchange].
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.

34

The UK amendments broaden the definition of governance and emphasize the importance of
positive relationships between companies, shareholders and stakeholders.101 Companies are to
demonstrate how the governance of the company contributes to its long-term sustainable
success and achieves wider objectives.102 The London Stock Exchange has also issued guidance
on ESG reporting in the UK.103 It observes that the UK governance and reporting framework
encourages reporting of ESG through the Guidance on the Strategic Report and Corporate
Governance Code requirements for disclosure of principal risks and uncertainties and a viability
statement.104

6. Amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act fiduciary duty
Other federally-regulated incorporation or registration statutes should be amended to align
fiduciary obligations with the proposed changes to the CBCA. The federal government should
amend the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act105 to align the fiduciary duty provisions
with the proposed amendments to the CBCA. The Act establishes the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board (“CPPIB”). Its objects are: (a) to assist the Canada Pension Plan in meeting its
obligations to contributors and beneficiaries under the Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”); (b) to
manage any amounts transferred to it under sections 108.1 and 108.3 of the CPP, and its right,
title or interest in any designated securities, in the best interests of the contributors and
beneficiaries; and (c) to invest its assets with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return,
without undue risk of loss, having regard to the factors that may affect the funding of the CPP
and the ability of the CPP to meet its financial obligations on any given business day.106 The CPPIB
board of directors is required to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs
of the Board.107
The CPPIB is a large institutional investor that manages and invests the funds of the Canada
Pension Plan on behalf of its 20 million Canadian contributors and beneficiaries.108 CPPIB states
that it has a profound responsibility: to invest the assets belonging to millions of Canadians to
help ensure the sustainability of the Canada Pension Plan.109 As of December 2018, CPPIB has
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$368.3 billion in assets under management.110 Its net income in Q2 of fiscal 2019 after all CPPIB
costs was $8.9 billion.111 Thus, the CPPIB has enormous potential to help shift governance
practice to meet the issues discussed in this report.
Recommendation 3:
The fiduciary obligation of the directors and officers pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board Act112 is virtually the same as many other federal statutes and section 14 of the
Act should be amended to incorporate ESG as follows (in red italics)
Duty of care
14 (1) Every director and officer of the Board in exercising any of the powers of
a director or an officer and in discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Board;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of
the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
Special knowledge or skill
14(2) A director or officer of the Board who in fact possesses, or by reason of
profession or business ought to possess, a particular level of knowledge or skill
relevant to the director’s or officer’s powers or duties shall employ that
particular level of knowledge or skill in the exercise of those powers or the
discharge of those duties.
14(3) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.
Reliance on statements
14(3) A director or an officer of the Board is deemed to comply with subsections
(1) and (2) if they rely in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the Board represented by an officer of the Board, or
represented in a written report of the Board’s auditor, to be a fair reflection of
the financial condition of the Board; or
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(b) a report of an accountant, lawyer, notary or other professional person whose
profession lends credibility to a statement made by the person.
CPPIB is already committed to ESG in its public statements: “We believe that organizations that
manage Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors effectively are more likely to create
sustainable value over the long-term than those that do not. As we work to fulfill our mandate,
we consider and integrate ESG risks and opportunities into our investment decisions.” 113 As a
long-term investor, CPPIB reports that it is investing for multiple generations of beneficiaries,
today and well into the future. It is positioning its portfolio to perform well through the transition
to a low-carbon economy. CPPIB states that “as a significant long-term investor we believe we
can have a powerful influence on the companies in which we invest. We seek to create change
from the inside by engaging with numerous Canadian and global companies that are high emitters
of greenhouse gas emissions.”114 Codifying the duty would make that fiduciary obligation
transparent to all Canadian stakeholders.

7. Amend the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act and the Canada Pension Benefits
Standards Regulation
Pension funds safeguard the financial security of our aging population.115 The fiduciary obligation
of pension administrators, trustees and other pension fiduciaries is evident in both statutory and
common law, requiring positive actions on the part of fiduciaries.116 In determining asset
allocation between short-term and long-term investments, the fiduciary obligation precludes
short-term investments that prejudice long-term investments, as the fund must be sustained over
the long-term, and thus, trustees must take account of systemic risks.117 The duty of impartiality
requires trustees and fund managers to balance intergenerational interests in their investment
decisions, recognizing that the time horizon for older workers is much different than for workers
just entering the workforce.118
The federal government has the opportunity to amend its federal pension legislation, the Canada
Pension Benefits Standards Act,119 to clarify the fiduciary obligations of pension fiduciaries. The
Act currently addresses the duties of administrators, corporate and individual trustees as follows:
Administrator
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114 Ibid. See also the discussion in Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, supra note 1 at 47-49.
115 For a discussion, see Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, ibid at 45-57.
116 Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377 at 419 [Hodgkinson v Simms]; Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v United
Steelworkers, [2013] 1 SCR 2; Sarra, “Fiduciary Obligations”, ibid at 47.
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119 Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, RSC, 1985, c 32 (2nd Supp) [Canada Pension Benefits
Standards Act].
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7 (1) The administrator of a pension plan shall be
(a) in the case of a multi-employer pension plan established under one or more
collective agreements, a board of trustees or other similar body constituted in
accordance with the terms of the plan or the collective agreement or agreements
to manage the affairs of the plan;
(b) in the case of a multi-employer pension plan not described in paragraph (a),
a pension committee constituted in accordance with the terms of the plan,
subject to section 7.1, to manage the affairs of the plan; or
(c) in the case of a pension plan other than a multiemployer pension plan,
(i) the employer, or
(ii) if the plan is established under one or more collective agreements
and the terms of the plan or the collective agreement or agreements to
manage the affairs of the plan provide for the constitution of a board of
trustees or other similar body, that body.
...
Administration of pension plan and fund
8(3) The administrator shall administer the pension plan and pension fund as a
trustee for the employer, the members of the pension plan, former members,
and any other persons entitled to pension benefits under the plan.
Standard of care
8(4) In the administration of the pension plan and pension fund, the
administrator shall exercise the degree of care that a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.
Manner of investing assets
8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund.
...
Administrator’s duty
8(4.3) If a pension plan permits a member, former member, survivor or former
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make
investment choices, the administrator must offer investment options of varying
degrees of risk and expected return that would allow a reasonable and prudent
person to create a portfolio of investments that is well adapted to their
retirement needs.
Deemed compliance with subsection (4.1)
8(4.4) With respect to the account for which an investment choice is made by a
member, former member, survivor or former spouse or former common law
partner of a member or former member, if an administrator offers investment
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options in accordance with subsection (4.3) and the regulations, that
administrator is deemed to comply with subsection (4.1).
Investment choices
8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for
additional voluntary contributions.
Special knowledge or skill
8(5) Without limiting the generality of subsection (4), an administrator who in
fact possesses, or by reason of profession or business ought to possess, a
particular level of knowledge or skill relevant to the administration of a pension
plan or pension fund shall employ that particular level of knowledge or skill in the
administration of the pension plan or pension fund.
Administrator not liable
8(5.1) An administrator is not liable for contravening subsection (4), (4.1) or (5)
if the contravention occurred because the administrator relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the pension plan prepared by an accountant, or a
written report of the auditor or auditors of the plan, that have been represented
to the administrator as fairly reflecting the financial condition of the plan; or
(b) a report of an accountant, an actuary, a lawyer, a notary or another
professional person whose profession lends credibility to the report.
The standard of fiduciary obligation of pension administrators and trustees is a standard that has
been set by the common law, now accompanied by amendments to pension law. Fiduciary duties
are imposed on a person who exercises discretionary power on behalf of another person who has
reposed their trust and confidence in that person.120 A pension fiduciary’s duties are a duty to
act prudently and a duty of loyalty.121 Pension fiduciaries must act with a view to the best
interests of the pension plan, aimed at providing a retirement income for employees when they
retire.122 As the statutory language above indicates, pension fiduciaries, in the administration of
the pension plan and pension fund, must exercise the degree of care that a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.123 Canadian pension
fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation to pension beneficiaries to act prudently in their best
interests in making investment decisions regarding fund portfolios.124
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When the courts assess whether pension fiduciaries have met their obligations, the duties are
assessed based on the express language in the pension plan, and the relevant pension and trust
legislation.125 For example, for a defined benefit pension plan, the objective is to build a life
income for the future retiree. Pension plans have an obligation to make investment decisions that
create sustainable pension funds, addressing intergenerational pressures such as the need to
fund pensions in the short to medium term, and the need to look ahead to future generations of
beneficiaries.126
Waitzer and Sarro have observed that systemic factors are critically important for long term
pension investments:127
It is now broadly accepted that most investment returns come from general
exposure to the market (beta) rather than from seeking market benchmark
outperformance strategies (alpha). As a result, systemic market factors have
become critical to fiduciary responsibility. Investments are increasingly expected
to look past current market benchmarks and consider questions of future
value—to “assess the impact of their investment decisions on others including
generations to come.” Risk management means considering such factors as
market integrity, systemic risks, governance risks, advisor risks, and the like.
There is also a growing recognition that asset classes of longer duration often
yield the highest private (as well as societal) returns.128
Arguably, therefore, the current standard of fiduciary obligation requires pension fiduciaries to
consider ESG risks and opportunities. However, as with corporations law, codification of the duty
would provide greater certainty and transparency for pension fiduciaries, pension beneficiaries,
investors and other stakeholders.
Recommendation 4:
Amend sections 8(4.1) and 8(4.2) of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act by adding the
follow language (in red italics):
Manner of investing assets
8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund, and in
exercising this authority, will consider environmental, social and governance
factors.
Investment choices
125

Burke v Hudson’s Bay Co, [2010] 2 SCR 273 at para 41; Nolan v Kerry (Canada) Inc, [2009] 2 SCR 678 at para
187.
126 Davis, supra note 118.
127 D Sarro and E Waitzer, “Fiduciary society unleashed: The road ahead for the financial sector” (2014) 69
Business Lawyer 1081.
128 Ibid at 1093.

40

8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for
additional voluntary contributions, and to inform that choice, the pension
administrator should provide information on environmental, social and
governance factors to the member, former member, survivor or former spouse or
former common law partner of a member or former member for their
consideration on each fund offered.
The existing section 8(5.1) protection from liability, set out on page 37, would apply to these
requirements regarding ESG factors.
The Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 and the Pension Benefits Standards Regulations129
(“PBSR”) currently require that the administrator of a federally-regulated pension plan establish
a written Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures (“SIP&P”).130 This SIP&P must be
based on the "prudent person portfolio approach" that a reasonable and prudent person would
apply to the investment portfolio of a pension fund.131 A well-developed SIP&P helps
administrators optimize the members' benefits under defined contribution pension plan
provisions and meet the promised benefits under defined benefit pension plan provisions.132
As prescribed in the PBSR, the SIP&P must specifically address the following elements:
(a) categories of investments and loans, including derivatives, options and
futures,
(b) diversification of the investment portfolio,
(c) asset mix and rate of return expectations,
(d) liquidity of investments,
(e) the lending of cash or securities,
(f) the retention or delegation of voting rights acquired through plan
investments,
(g) the method of, and basis for, the valuation of investments that are not
regularly traded at a marketplace; and categories of investments and loans,
including derivatives, options and futures; and
(h) related party transactions
having regard to all factors that may affect the funding and solvency of the plan
and the ability of the plan to meet its financial obligations.133
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In addressing these elements, the plan administrator is currently required to determine the
degree of risk and risk tolerance the plan is able to sustain.134 The plan administrator must
review the SIP&P at least annually.135 These requirements would be enhanced by expressly
amending the PBSR to incorporate ESG factors as one of the elements that the SIP&P must
address.
Recommendation 5:
The Pension Benefits Standards Regulations should be amended to specify that ESG factors
must be considered and incorporated in the SIP&P. The federal government should amend
section 7.1 of the Pension Benefit Standards Regulation to require:
The Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures required under section 7.1
shall contain information as to how environmental, social and governance
factors have been considered and have been incorporated into the plan’s
investment policies and procedures.
This amendment would align with developments in Ontario and internationally.
i.

Other jurisdictions have already incorporated ESG factors in their statements of
pension fund investment policy

The Ontario Pension Benefits Act136 has been amended to require pension funds to disclose
information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into
the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated.137
It is a “disclose and explain” approach.138 Pursuant to Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits
Act, the administrator of a pension plan is required to establish a statement of investment
policies and procedures (“SIPP”).139 Effective January 2016, plan administrators are required to
file their SIPP and any amendments with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario
(“FSCO”).140 FSCO observes that reporting that ESG factors are incorporated into the plan's
broader investment policies and procedures requires action by the administrator beyond a
broad delegation. Some examples of the actions that administrators should take include:
134
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summarizing policies where the managers incorporate ESG factors into their investment
policies; describing how the administrator incorporates ESG factors as part of the manager
search, selection and review process; and describing how the administrator incorporates ESG
in the choice of investment fund options.141
FSCO has observed that administrators have a fiduciary duty to supervise their investment
managers, including ensuring that the managers are complying with the Pension Benefits Act
and with the SIPP. This supervision requirement extends to the incorporation of ESG factors,
where the SIPP contains them.142 There are also specific requirements as to what must be
disclosed to beneficiaries and others that should provide guidance to how the federal
government can amend the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Regulation.143
One report suggests that the Ontario Pension Benefits Act amendments have been important
in stimulating boards of trustees to explicitly discuss ESG issues and to seek advice on how
responsible investment is consistent with their fiduciary obligation.144 Investors have observed
that the Ontario amendments have had an important catalytic effect on pension funds, in that
they now consciously assess both risks and opportunities associated with ESG factors as they
want to be in a position to give informed disclosure to beneficiaries.
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The UK has enacted similar legislation. Effective 1 January 2019, new regulations clarify
trustees’ fiduciary duties, including consideration of ESG factors.145 The new regulations clarify
that it is the duty of pension trustees to consider financially material risks and opportunities,
including ESG topics like climate change, in addition to traditional financial metrics. All pension
schemes that are required to produce a Statement of Investment Principles need to update the
statement to set out financially material considerations over the appropriate time horizon of
the investments, including how those considerations are taken into account in the selection,
retention and realization of investments.146 The UK Government has specified that “financially
material considerations” include, but are not limited to, ESG considerations, including, but not
limited to, climate change, which the trustees of the trust scheme consider financially
material.147 The appropriate time horizon for considering ESG factors is the length of time that
trustees consider is needed for the funding of future benefits by the investments of the
scheme.148
The UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association has observed:
Fiduciary duty means acting in the best interests of beneficiaries, who will have, given
the nature of pensions, long-term investment horizons. The integration of financially
material environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into investment decisions
and robust stewardship policies can help reduce investment risk and enhance returns.149
One improvement from the current Ontario requirements would be to require federallyregulated pension plans across Canada to incorporate ESG factors, including climate change risk,
into the plan’s statement of investment policies and procedures, as opposed to a disclose or
explain approach. Failure to do so would then give rise to liability for breach of fiduciary and
prudential obligations. It would align with UK and EU developments and would enhance
investment policies under the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act and provide important
signalling for provincial and territorial governments regarding pension legislation across the
country. At the absolute minimum, the federal government should require a disclose or explain
approach, as is required under Ontario law.

8. Require federal Crown corporations to consider ESG factors and address material ESG risks
and opportunities
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Federal Crown corporations operate in many sectors of the Canadian economy, each with a
specified public policy interest.150 There are currently 46 federal Crown corporations in Canada,
varying in size, capitalization and reliance on government appropriations.151 There is a broad
range of governance structures, although the majority are reporting corporations pursuant to
International Financial Reporting Standards.152 The Expert Panel should recommend to the
federal government that Crown corporations must consider ESG factors in their governance and
oversight and that they address material risks and opportunities. It would demonstrate leadership
in sustainability in terms of the activities funded in large part by Canadian taxpayers.
Recommendation 6:
The Expert Panel should recommend to the federal government to require federal Crown
corporations to consider whether there are material ESG risks and opportunities, and
where they exist, to take all reasonable care to address the material ESG factors.

Expert Panel Question 3.4(2):
What is the best way to incorporate ESG into rules or regulations that govern Canadian
financial institutions?

1. The significance of Canadian financial institutions to the Canadian economy
Canadian financial institutions are a significant part of the Canadian economy. Federallyregulated financial institutions that are publicly-traded had $597.6 billion in qualifying market
value as at November 2018, and that figure does not include more than 200 financial institutions
operating in Canada that are not listed on the TSX.153 Canadian financial institutions earned a
record total net income of $44.7 billion CAD in 2017.154 Insurance companies’ business activities
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represent almost 2% of Canada’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) generated annually155 and net
income of insurance companies in Canada was $9.8 billion in 2016, with 75% of the industry’s net
income attributable to three large conglomerate insurers.156 There have been considerable
amendments to financial institution legislation in recent years to enhance capital adequacy,
liquidity and governance oversight.
Fairness suggests that amendments to incorporate ESG factors as part of fiduciary obligation
should be made across the entirety of federally-regulated business entities, including federallyregulated banks, insurance companies and financial institutions. Given the size and market
capitalization of many of these entities, it would result in a considerable shift in corporate activity
towards sustainable governance.
Canada’s financial institutions are regulated under a number of statutes. Given that directors are
one of the key stakeholder groups to effect a shift to consideration of ESG factors, it makes sense
to amend these statutes to mirror the provisions of the CBCA. The policy suggestions below
specifically focus on fiduciary obligations under the Bank Act,157 the Insurance Companies Act,158
the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act,159 statutes relating to federally-registered credit
unions, and the Bank of Canada Act.160

2. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Bank Act to incorporate ESG factors
The Bank Act161 applies to banks listed in Schedule I or II and to bank holding companies, which
are body corporates incorporated or formed under Part XV of the Bank Act.162 The statute also
applies to authorized foreign banks permitted to carry on business in Canada.163 As of 31
December 2017, there were 32 banks,164 21 bank holding companies,165 and 32 foreign banks
authorized to carry on business in Canada pursuant to the Bank Act.166 The six largest banks
account for about 90% of total assets held by federally-regulated deposit-taking institutions.167
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The Bank Act also sets out the same fiduciary obligations for directors and officers of bank holding
companies, as for Schedule I and II banks.
Recommendation 7:
For greater certainty, the Bank Act sections 158 and 748 on fiduciary obligations of banks and
bank holding companies should be amended to read (in red italics):
158 (1) Every director and officer of a bank in exercising any of the powers of a
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer
shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
158(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.
…
Duty of care
748 (1) Every director and officer of a bank holding company in exercising any of
the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a
director or an officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank
holding company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
748(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
bank branches; 4 lending foreign bank branches; 44 trust companies; and 18 loan companies. OSFI, “Who We
Regulate”, supra note 153.
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funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.
The addition of sections 158(2) and section 748(2), which largely track the suggested CBCA
amendments codifying Canadian common law, adds depositors and deposit insurance protection
funds as stakeholders whose interests directors and officers may consider in acting with a view
to the best interests of the bank. Depositors are significant stakeholders whose savings are
protected under banking legislation. As the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
(“OSFI”) has observed: “Relative to non-financial businesses, the failure of a financial institution
can have a greater impact on members of the public who may have placed a substantial portion
of their life savings with the institution and who may be relying on that institution for day-to-day
financial needs.”168 The deposit insurance protection fund169 is essentially a significant contingent
creditor that could have the largest claim on a deposit-taking bank’s assets if it were to fail. It is
therefore another stakeholder that directors and officers may consider in acting in the best
interests of the bank.
Strong defences are already available under sections 211 and 798 of the Bank Act, which would
then apply to consideration of ESG factors and decisions to address material issues by banks and
bank holding companies:
Defence – due diligence
211 (1) A director, officer or employee of a bank is not liable under section 207
or 210 or subsection 506(1) and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 158(2)
if they exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good
faith on
(a) financial statements of the bank that were represented to them by an officer
of the bank or in a written report of the auditor or auditors of the bank fairly to
reflect the financial condition of the bank; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.
Defence — good faith
211 (2) A director or officer of a bank has fulfilled their duty under subsection
158(1) if they relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the bank that were represented to them by an officer
of the bank or in a written report of the auditor or auditors of the bank fairly to
reflect the financial condition of the bank; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.

168

OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline (September 2018), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fiif/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/CG_Guideline.aspx> [OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline].
169 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, “About deposit insurance” (2018), online: CDIC
<http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-di/Pages/default.aspx>.

48

...
Defence — due diligence
798 (1) A director, officer or employee of a bank holding company is not liable
under section 794 or 797 and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 748(2) if
they exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good
faith on
(a) financial statements of the bank holding company that were represented to
them by an officer of the bank holding company or in a written report of the
auditor of the bank holding company fairly to reflect the financial condition of
the bank holding company; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.
Defence — good faith
798 (2) A director or officer of a bank holding company has fulfilled their duty
under subsection 748(1) if they relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the bank holding company that were represented to
them by an officer of the bank holding company or in a written report of the
auditor of the bank holding company fairly to reflect the financial condition of
the bank holding company; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.
Thus, there is a strong defence that if directors and officers exercise the care, diligence and skill
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including
reliance in good faith on the assistance of professionals, they have nothing to be concerned about
in terms of personal or corporate liability. Here again, an obligation to address material ESG
factors would be counter-balanced by a strong defence for duly diligent directors and officers.

3. Include federally-regulated credit unions in the amended fiduciary obligation provisions
under the Bank Act, and amend the fiduciary obligation provisions of the Canada Cooperatives
Act and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act to align
The amendments to consider and address material ESG factors should also apply to federallyregulated credit unions.170 There are currently three federal statutes that regulate credit unions,
the Bank Act,171 the Canada Cooperatives Act172 and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act.173

170

Bank Act, supra note 157, s 183.01 Directors of federal credit union and s 216.01 Conversion into federal
credit union.
171 Ibid.
172 Canada Cooperatives Act, SC 1998, c 1, as amended [Canada Cooperatives Act].
173 Cooperative Credit Associations Act, SC 1991, c 48, as amended [Cooperative Credit Associations Act].
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The Bank Act defines a federal credit union as ”a bank that, within the meaning of section 12.1,
is organized and carries on business on a cooperative basis.”174 As with the issuing of letters
patent to incorporate a bank, the Minister is to take into account all matters that the Minister
considers relevant to the application, specifically, the nature and sufficiency of the financial
resources, soundness, feasibility, integrity, competence and the best interests of the financial
system in Canada, including the best interests of the cooperative financial system in Canada.175
A credit union can be structured by common shares or membership shares pursuant to the Bank
Act.176 At least two-thirds of the directors of a federal credit union, or any greater proportion that
is provided for by the by-laws, must be members of the federal credit union or representatives
of members of the federal credit union.177
A federal credit union may also apply, with the approval in writing of the Minister, under the
Canada Cooperatives Act178 for a certificate of continuance, or a certificate of continuance and a
certificate of amalgamation, as a cooperative under that Act; or apply under the Cooperative
Credit Associations Act179 for letters patent continuing the federal credit union as an association
under that Act or amalgamating and continuing the federal credit union as an association under
that Act.180
It therefore makes sense to amend the fiduciary duties under the Canada Cooperatives Act and
the Cooperative Credit Associations Act to align with proposed changes to the Bank Act.
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Section 2, Bank Act, supra note 157. Section 12.1 specifies: 12.1 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a federal
credit union is organized and carries on business on a cooperative basis if (a) a majority of its members are
natural persons; (b) it provides financial services primarily to its members; (c) membership in the federal credit
union is wholly or primarily open, in a non-discriminatory manner, to persons who can use the services of the
federal credit union and who are willing and able to accept the responsibilities of membership; (d) each
member has only one vote; (e) a delegate has only one vote even though the delegate is a member or
represents more than one member; (f) dividends on any membership share are limited to the maximum
percentage fixed in the federal credit union’s letters patent or by-laws; and (g) surplus funds arising from the
federal credit union’s operations are used (i) to provide for the financial stability of the federal credit union, (ii)
to develop its business, (iii) to provide or improve common services to members, (iv) to provide for reserves or
dividends on membership shares and shares, (v) for community welfare or the propagation of cooperative
enterprises, or (vi) as a distribution to its members as a patronage allocation. Section 22(2) specifies that (2) On
the application of five or more persons, a majority of whom are natural persons, made in accordance with this
Act, the Minister may, subject to this Part, issue letters patent incorporating a federal credit union.
175 Section 27, ibid.
176 Section 38(2), ibid.
177 Section 159.1, ibid.
178 Canada Cooperatives Act, supra note 172, s 11.1 specifies that: If a federal credit union, within the meaning
of section 2 of the Bank Act, is continued as a cooperative under this Act, (a) its membership shares are
deemed to be membership shares to which are attached the rights, privileges and restrictions set out in this
Act and the articles; (b) the members of the federal credit union are deemed to be the members of the
cooperative; and (c) any agreement made before continuance under which the members of the federal credit
union have agreed to vote in a manner provided in the agreement is of no effect.
179 Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra note 173.
180 Section 39.2 (1), Bank Act, supra note 157.
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Recommendation 8:
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers under the Canada Cooperatives Act as
follows (in red italics):
Duties
80 (1) Every director and officer must, in exercising the powers and performing
the duties of office,
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
cooperative;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
80(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.
Directors would have the existing due diligence defence under section 111 of the Canada
Cooperatives Act:
Defence Due diligence
111 A director is not liable under this Part if the director exercised the care, diligence
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable
circumstances, including reliance in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the cooperative represented to the director by an officer of
the cooperative or in a written report of the auditor of the cooperative fairly to reflect
the financial condition of the cooperative; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by the
professional person.
The Cooperative Credit Associations Act specifies similar duties of directors and officers and its
provisions should be amended to align with the recommendations above.
Recommendation 9:
Amend the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers under section 168(1) of the Cooperative
Credit Associations Act as follows (in red italics):
Duty of care
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168 (1) Every director and officer of an association in exercising any of the powers of a
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the association;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to environmental,
social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise
in comparable circumstances.
168(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may
consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.

Directors and officers under the Cooperative Credit Associations Act would have the due diligence
and good faith defences that already exist under the statute:
Defence — due diligence
215 (1) A director, officer or employee of an association is not liable under section 211
or 214 or subsection 430(1) and has fulfilled their duty under subsection 168(2) if they
exercised the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the association that were represented to them by an officer
of the association or in a written report of the auditor of the association fairly to reflect
the financial condition of the association; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by
them.181
Defence — good faith
215 (2) A director or officer of an association has fulfilled their duty under subsection
168(1) if they relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the association that were represented to them by an officer
of the association or in a written report of the auditor of the association fairly to reflect
the financial condition of the association; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made by them.
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Section 211 refers to a list of specified transactions for which a director may be liable in terms of consenting
or voting; section 214 refers to liability for employee wages in specified circumstances; and section 430(1)
refers to voidable contracts. Cooperative Credit Associations Act, supra note 173.
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4. Amend the fiduciary obligation provisions under the Canada Trust and Loan Companies Act
In order to create fairness and consistency, the federal government should amend the federal
Trust and Loan Companies Act,182 which currently has the same fiduciary obligation provisions as
the Bank Act. The rationale for the change is the same.
Recommendation 10:
Amend the fiduciary obligations under the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act as follows (in
red italics):
Duty of care
162 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
162(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments
and the environment to inform their decisions.
The defences under sections 216(1) and (2) of the Trust and Loan Companies Act183 are the same
as the liability protection pursuant to the Bank Act, discussed above.

5. Federally-regulated insurance companies and fiduciary duty
Several major Canadian insurance companies are signatories to the UN “Principles for Sustainable
Insurance”, which provides a framework for the global insurance industry to address ESG risks
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Trust and Loan Companies Act, SC 1991, c 45, as amended.
Ibid, s 216: Defence — good faith (2) A director or officer of a company has fulfilled their duty under
subsection 162 (1) if they relied in good faith on (a) financial statements of the company that were represented
to them by an officer of the company or in a written report of the auditor of the company fairly to reflect the
financial condition of the company; or (b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a
statement made by them.
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and opportunities.184 The four principles are a commitment to: embedding ESG issues relevant
to the insurance business in decision-making; work with clients and business partners to raise
awareness of ESG issues, manage risk and develop solutions; work with governments, regulators
and other key stakeholders to promote widespread action on ESG issues; and demonstrate
accountability and transparency in regularly disclosing publicly progress in implementing the
Principles.185
There are a number of insurance companies that are federally regulated and thus amendment of
the fiduciary obligation should significantly assist in embedding sustainable governance
strategies. OSFI reports that it currently supervises 67 federally-regulated life insurance
companies, 13 federally-regulated fraternal benefit societies and 152 federally-regulated
property & casualty insurance companies.186 Many of these insurance companies are already at
the forefront of advocating or adopting climate-related or ESG factors in their decision-making.
The Insurance Companies Act187 specifies that directors of a company shall manage or supervise
the management of the business and affairs of the company.188 There are a series of specified
duties, as well as exceptions to those duties in some circumstances.189 The fiduciary obligation in
184

United Nations Environment Finance Initiative, “Principles for Sustainable Insurance” (2018), online: UNEP
<www.unepfi.org/psi>.
185 Ibid.
186 OSFI, “Who We Regulate”, supra note 153.
187 Canada Insurance Companies Act, SC 1991, c 47, as amended [ICA].
188 Ibid, s 165 (1) Duty to manage.
189
Ibid, s 165 (1) Duty to manage; and s 165 Specific duties (2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1),
the directors of a company shall
(a) establish an audit committee to perform the duties referred to in subsections 203(3) and (4);
(b) establish a conduct review committee to perform the duties referred to in subsection 204(3);
(c) establish procedures to resolve conflicts of interest, including techniques for the identification of potential
conflict situations and for restricting the use of confidential information;
(d) designate a committee of the board of directors to monitor the procedures referred to in paragraph (c);
(e) in the case of a company that issues participating policies, establish, before issuing any participating policies
or, in the case of a former-Act company, within six months after the coming into force of this Part, a policy for
determining the dividends and bonuses to be paid to the participating policyholders;
(e.1) establish a policy respecting the management of each of the participating accounts maintained under
section 456,
(i) if the company has participating policyholders on the day on which this paragraph comes into force, within
six months after that day, and
(ii) in any other case, before issuing a participating policy;
(e.2) establish criteria for changes made by the company to the premium or charge for insurance, amount of
insurance or surrender value in respect of its adjustable policies,
(i) if the company has adjustable policyholders on the day on which this paragraph comes into force, within six
months after that day, and
(ii) in any other case, before issuing an adjustable policy;
(f) establish procedures to provide disclosure of information to customers of the company that is required to
be disclosed by this Act and for dealing with complaints as required by section 486;
(g) designate a committee of the board of directors to monitor the procedures referred to in paragraph (f) and
satisfy itself that they are being adhered to by the company;
(h) establish investment and lending policies, standards and procedures in accordance with section 492; and
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section 166(1) of the Insurance Companies Act mirrors the CBCA provisions. Therefore, it makes
sense to amend the fiduciary obligation in the Insurance Companies Act to align with the
proposed changes to the CBCA. In terms of stakeholder groups to consider, insurance
policyholders and the insurance protection funds should be included.190 As with deposit
insurance, the policyholder insurance protection funds are the largest contingent creditors and
their interests should be included in the enumerated list. The same duties are mirrored for
insurance holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act, and that language would also need
amending.
Recommendation 11:
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers of insurance companies and insurance
holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act as follows (in red italics):
166 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
166(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.
...
Duty of care
795 (1) Every director and officer of an insurance holding company in exercising
any of the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of
a director or an officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
insurance holding company;

(i) in the case of a former-Act company, appoint the actuary of the company forthwith after the coming into
force of this Part.
190 Assuris, “Home Page” (2018), online: Assuris <www.assuris.ca/>, and the Property and Casualty Insurance
Compensation Corporation, “Home Page” (2018), online: PACICC <http://www.pacicc.ca/>.
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(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
795(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.
The existing good faith defences would then be available to the directors and officers:
Defence — good faith
220(2) A director or officer of a company has fulfilled their duty under subsection
166(1) if they relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the company that were represented to them by an
officer of the company or in a written report of the auditor of the company fairly
to reflect the financial condition of the company; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.

Defence — good faith
845 (2) A director or officer of an insurance holding company has fulfilled their
duty under subsection 795(1) if they relied in good faith on
(a) financial statements of the insurance holding company that were represented
to them by an officer of the insurance holding company or in a written report of
the auditor of the insurance holding company fairly to reflect the financial
condition of the insurance holding company; or
(b) a report of a person whose profession lends credibility to a statement made
by them.
...
Reliance on information
960 An insurance holding company and any person who is a director or an officer,
employee or agent of the insurance holding company may rely on any
information contained in a declaration required by the directors pursuant to
section 959 or on any information otherwise acquired in respect of any matter
that might be the subject of such a declaration, and no action lies against the
insurance holding company or any such person for anything done or omitted to
be done in good faith in reliance on any such information.
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6. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions should assist in shifting governance
practices
OSFI should assist boards that come under OSFI’s supervisory authority to shift their governance
practices to take account of ESG factors. OSFI has said that the quality of corporate governance
practices of federally-regulated financial institutions is an important factor in maintaining the
confidence of depositors and policyholders, as well as overall market confidence.191 In September
2018, it issued a corporate governance guideline that “draws attention to specific areas of
corporate governance that are especially important for financial institutions (eg, risk governance),
owing to the unique nature and circumstances of financial institutions and risks assumed relative
to other corporations.”192 While its guideline has a number of important recommendations
regarding board diversity, independence, and risk management, it makes no mention of ESG
factors, other than to specify that: “On an on-going basis, the FRFI (federally-regulated financial
institutions) should be satisfied that the Risk Appetite Framework remains appropriate relative to
the risk profile of the FRFI, its long-term strategic plan and its operating environment.”193
Importantly, the new corporate governance guideline requires federally-regulated financial
institutions to develop a “Risk Appetite Framework”, OSFI noting that “Risk governance is a
distinct and crucial element of the FRFI’s corporate governance”.194 The Risk Appetite Framework
should set the basic goals, benchmarks, parameters and limits as to the amount of risk the
federally-regulated financial institution is willing to accept, taking into account various financial,
operational and macroeconomic factors. It should consider the material risks to the federallyregulated financial institution, as well as the institution’s reputation vis-à-vis policyholders,
depositors, investors and customers.195 Thus it does recognize the need to take account of risks
to diverse stakeholders, although makes no mention beyond direct financial claimants. Arguably,
the scope of the Risk Appetite Framework includes consideration of material ESG risks; however,
for greater certainty, OSFI should make clear the need to consider these risks.
OSFI’s role is to supervise federally-regulated financial institutions to assess their financial
condition and monitor compliance with the applicable federal legislation, which it carries out
within a risk-focused framework”.196 OSFI has developed a comprehensive set of assessment
criteria, key among which is the quality of oversight and control provided by the board and senior
officers, monitoring their activities to assess safety and soundness, the quality of control and
governance.197 Its general approach is “trust but verify” in terms of governance, capital adequacy
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OSFI, Corporate Governance Guideline, supra note 168.
Ibid.
193 Ibid at 11.
194 Ibid at 7.
195 Ibid at 8.
196 OSFI, Supervisory Framework (revised December 2010), online: OSFI <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fiif/rai-eri/sp-ps/Pages/sff.aspx>.
197 Ibid.
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and risk management.198 Within these activities, OSFI should contribute meaningfully to
enhanced governance through consideration of ESG factors by embedding them in its corporate
governance guideline and in its oversight practice. As the World Bank and the OECD have
observed, it is important to support financial supervisory authorities to better assess and oversee
climate-related risks that could threaten the financial stability of the financial system in the short
and long term.199
The Bank of England is integrating the financial risks from climate change into its supervisory
activities, including through its Prudential Regulatory Authority, to embed climate change risk in
its assessment and intervention practices in support of the safety and soundness of its financial
institutions and also in actively supporting an orderly transition to a low-carbon economy.200
The Expert Panel’s Interim Report noted that this year OSFI will include questions on climate risk
oversight in its supervisory process.201 No information is yet available on this development, but it
is an important factor to consider. OSFI advises that it will publish a short statement on climaterisk and the insurance industry in the coming weeks.202 OSFI should be encouraged to expand
that supervisory oversight to include material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and
liquidity of the financial institutions over which it exercises supervisory oversight.
Recommendation 12:
The Expert Panel should recommend that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions include in its supervisory oversight of federally-regulated financial institutions
material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and liquidity of these institutions.
This requirement would provide greater certainty and transparency of management of ESG
risks and opportunities.

7. Amend the Bank of Canada Act to include ESG factors
Canada’s central bank is created pursuant to the Bank of Canada Act.203 The purpose of the bank
is to: regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, control
and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and mitigate by its influence
fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far as may be
198

Janis Sarra, “Flotsam, Financing and Flotation: Is Canada ‘Resolution Ready’ for Insurance Company
Insolvency?” / «Épaves, financement et flottement : Le Canada est-il prêt pour la résolution des sociétés
d’assurance insolvables? » in Janis Sarra, Barbara Romaine, Blair Nixon and Jill Corraini, eds, Annual Review of
Insolvency Law 2018 (Toronto: Carswell, 2019) 793 at 1006.
199 OECD, “Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure” (28 November 2018) at 30, 84, online: OECD
<http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/climate-futures/> [OECD, “Financing Climate Futures”].
200 Bank of England, “The Bank of England’s response to climate change” (2017), online: Bank of England
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possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally promote the economic and financial
welfare of Canada.204 The business and powers of the bank include: buying and selling gold, silver,
or any other coin and gold and silver bullion; buying and selling foreign currencies and
maintaining deposit accounts with banks or foreign banks, either in or outside Canada; making
short-term loans or advances to members of the Canadian Payments Association; and a host of
other duties in buying and selling securities issued by or guaranteed by governments for the
purposes of conducting monetary policy or promoting the stability of the Canadian financial
system.205
While the Bank of Canada has a somewhat unique status as the nation’s central bank, it is
nonetheless worth considering legislative change to encourage the bank, in carrying out its
statutory purposes, to consider ESG factors where they are material. The Bank of Canada is a
body corporate with a board of 12 directors in addition to the Governor and a Deputy Governor
of the bank.206 There is no express statutory duty of care or loyalty set out in the statute, although
there is authority for the Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, to “appoint
directors to hold office, during good behaviour, subject to removal by the Governor in Council at
any time for cause.”207 There are express restrictions on serving in respect of conflicts of interest,
such as being a shareholder of a clearing house designated under the Payment Clearing and
Settlement Act208 or an investment dealer that acts as a distributor of new federal government
securities.209 There is a provision providing protection for directors specifying that no action lies
against the directors and other listed persons “for anything done or omitted to be done in good
faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended
or authorized to be executed or performed.”210
Creating an express statutory fiduciary obligation that includes taking account of ESG factors in
the Bank of Canada Act would codify director and officer responsibilities, creating greater
transparency. It will enhance activities the Bank is already engaged in. Bank of Canada Deputy
Governor Timothy Lane recently observed that the Bank of Canada needs to consider the effects
of climate change as it delivers on its mandate to promote the economic and financial well-being
of Canadians.211 He notes that the Bank has a broad “set of responsibilities to support financial
stability, including identifying, analyzing and assessing both imminent and emerging systemic
risks.”212 He notes that climate change ultimately has implications for monetary policy and that
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the Bank will continue to pursue low, stable and predictable inflation amid the structural shift to
a lower-carbon economy; monitor the transitory effect of carbon pricing on inflation, and take
account of structural changes that are likely to have important consequences for both aggregate
supply and demand. Lane observes that these changes may be difficult to incorporate directly
into our economic models, but the Bank has a role, particularly in bringing green finance ideas to
the table and envisaging a lower-carbon future.213
Thus it merits consideration of enacting an express duty of care in the Bank of Canada Act, the
federal government aligning requirements it asks of federally-regulated corporations and
financial institutions with the duty of directors and officers of its central bank. The language would
be different than the other statutes because the duties of directors of the Bank of Canada differ,
but it should specify statutory language such as the following:

Recommendation 13:
Amend the Bank of Canada Act to add the following language (in red italics):
1. The directors and officers, in carrying out their duties under this Act, shall in
good faith consider any material environmental, social and governance
factors that may affect the Bank fulfilling its statutory mandate.
2. In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may
consider the interests of, inter alia, members of the public, shareholders,
employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment
to inform their decisions.
The provision limiting liability should be amended to account for ESG factors in the following way
(in red italics):
No liability if in good faith
30.1 No action lies against Her Majesty, the Minister, any officer, employee or
director of the Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Governor for
anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or
discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended or authorized
to be executed or performed, including their consideration of environmental,
social and governance factors in carrying out their duties under this Act.
The proposed amendments would bring transparency to the obligations of directors and officers
and would encourage directors and officers of the Bank of Canada to take account of ESG factors
in their governance decisions.
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Expert Panel Question 3.4(4):
What is the most effective method for delivering board education on climate risk and
ESG/sustainability issues? Does education need to include guidance on effective
governance and committee modeling for ESG oversight?

1. Board education is critically important
There needs to be a multi-faceted approach to education of boards of directors on ESG and
sustainability issues. In this respect, there are a number of organizations well equipped to
conduct board education. Chartered Professional Accountants Canada (“CPA Canada”) is working
with the federal Ministry of Natural Resources to develop and conduct board education on
climate-related financial risk, a project the co-authors are involved in. The Institute for Corporate
Directors, while it has not yet taken on this issue, could be very effective, given its national reach.
However, there also needs to be access for small- and medium-sized enterprises to gain
information and expertise.
The CCGG has observed that Board orientation and continuing education should include building
awareness and understanding of complex and emerging environmental and social issues, where
relevant.214 In this respect, boards should consider the use of independent advisors and/or
external speakers to provide exposure to different viewpoints, and that education should be
disclosed in committee updates.215 The CCGG, whose members are Canadian institutional
investors that together manage approximately $4 trillion in assets, has issued a guidebook on
effective board oversight of environmental and social matters.216 The guidebook has 29
governance recommendations under eight key governance topics that are relevant for boards.217
It notes that the materiality of other environmental and social factors will largely depend on the
specific circumstances of a company, including sector, geography, or corporate structure, for
example, relations with Indigenous communities for extractive sector companies or
contamination of water in agribusiness.218 The CCGG also suggests that an effective enterprise
risk management framework can provide a process for identifying and managing material risks
that includes environmental and social factors, and provide appropriate information to the board
so that it can discuss the company’s management approach and priorities to environmental and
social factors in its corporate reporting through its Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(“MD&A”), annual report, and/or proxy circular.219
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In 2014, the TSX and CPA Canada issued a “Primer for Environmental and Social Disclosure” aimed
at educating senior management, particularly chief financial officers, in-house counsel and
members of audit committees of TSX issuers and TSX Venture Exchange issuers.220 It discusses
what principles boards need to consider for their business operations and financial reporting. 221
This kind of primer should be expanded based on new knowledge and become part of education
available to corporate boards of TSX-listed and TSX-V-listed companies.
The recent US National Climate Assessment Report highlights the need for board education in
terms of directors and officers understanding the breadth of climate-related risks.222 It observes
that many terms are used, but not fully explained. For example, the “social cost of carbon”
includes the economic costs of climate change that will be felt in market sectors such as
agriculture, energy services, and coastal resources, as well as nonmarket impacts on human
health and ecosystems.223
A taxonomy of terms could be incorporated into board education. Canada can benefit from
efforts internationally to develop consistent terms and metrics. Many impacts of climate change
are expected to have negative effects on economic productivity, such as increased prices of goods
and services,224 and board education needs to draw fiduciaries’ attention to the type and scope
of such risks. Equally, board education can alert boards to consider opportunities to move to
more sustainable practices.
Thus, some initiatives for board education have made important contributions to date, but such
education on ESG factors, including climate-related financial risk, needs to be widely expanded
to reach boards of all sizes so that they fully understand their fiduciary obligations. Our
recommendation regarding a Sustainable Finance Institute (recommendation 25 in Part VII)
should serve an important role in dissemination of educational materials to boards as that
information becomes available.
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TSX and CPA Canada issued “A Primer for Environmental and Social Disclosure” (March 2014), online (pdf):
TSX <https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/73>.
221 Ibid.
222 NCA, “Fourth National Climate Assessment”, supra note 11, Appendix 5 at 40. The Global Change Research
Act of 1990 mandates that the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) deliver a report to Congress
and the President no less than every four years.
223 Ibid. It contains extensive discussion, including, that high temperatures and storm intensity, which are both
linked to more deaths and illness, are projected to increase due to climate change, which would in turn
increase health care costs for medical treatment. At the same time, these health effects directly impact labour
markets. Workers in industries with the greatest exposure to weather extremes may decrease the amount of
time they spend at work, while workers across a wide range of sectors may find their productivity impaired
while on the job, which translate into lower earnings for workers and firms; ibid, Chapter 14 at 28-29.
224 Ibid.
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III.

FINANCIAL SERVICES ADVISORS AND ESG CONSULTATIONS

Expert Panel Question 3.4 (3):
What are the responsibilities of investment agents and advisers for identifying and acting
in accordance with the preferences of clients regarding sustainability issues? What is the
most effective manner for these preferences to be identified and communicated?

1. Require financial services advice to include information on material ESG factors and work
towards a “best interests of the client” standard of financial advice in the future
Canadian investment firms and their financial services representatives serve millions of retail
investors.225 There are a growing number of reports on the inadequacy of financial advice in
Canada, and it is well beyond the scope of this submission to discuss the myriad issues. 226
However, in the context of the Expert Panel’s work on sustainable finance, two issues have been
directly relevant. One is to consider requiring a “best interest standard” for financial advice to
consumer or retail investors and the second is to embed ESG considerations in giving advice on
financial services and products.
The Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) have recently consulted on incorporating an
explicit best interest of the client standard into financial services advice, and unfortunately, its
new recommendations in September 2018 on embedded commissions as an investor protection
measure do not propose reforms regarding the client best interest standard, which appears to
mean that there is not yet sufficient support across Canadian securities regulators.227 The Expert
225

A significant majority of investors use an intermediary to complete their trades in securities. Such
intermediaries have various titles, and can fulfill a number of roles. Sometimes the intermediary functions largely
as an order-taker and simply executes orders. In many cases the intermediary provides advice and/or
recommendations. In some cases the intermediary manages the portfolio and has discretion as to what specific
investments the client will hold and is not required to obtain client consent to purchase or sell a specific
investment. Often the relationship between the investor and the intermediary is long-term. The investor comes
to rely on the intermediary’s advice in deciding how to invest his or her money. For ease of reference, we refer
here to individuals who act as intermediaries in any of these capacities as “financial service representatives” or
“representatives” for short. These individuals include all those individuals, known as “registrants” who are
overseen by the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (“MFDA”), the Investment Industry Regulatory
Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) and those directly regulated by the various securities commissions.” Canadian
Centre for Elder Law and the Canadian Foundation for the Advancement of Investor Rights, “Report On
Vulnerable Investors: Elder Abuse, Financial Exploitation, Undue Influence And Diminished Mental Capacity”
(2018), online (pdf):
British Columbia Law Institute <https://www.bcli.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/171115-Vulnerable-Investor-Paper-FINAL.pdf> at 14 [Report on Vulnerable
Investors].
226 See for example, Report on Vulnerable Investors, ibid.
227 Ontario Securities Commission, “Canadian securities regulators propose rules to prohibit certain embedded
commissions” (13 September 2018), online: OSC
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20180913_csa-propose-rules-to-prohibit-certain-embeddedcommissions.htm>. Barbara Shecter, “OSC drops push for ‘best interest’ standard as regulators propose
narrower reforms” Financial Post (21 June 2018), online: <https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-
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Panel should recommend that financial services advice should include offering advice on options
for investment that incorporate material ESG factors; which we submit would be a step towards
advising in the best interest of the client, although not denominated as such. In the longer term,
the best interest of the client standard, as adopted in the UK, US and other countries, is a standard
that is more responsive to the modern challenges of retail investing and should be considered
further.
In the interim, it is timely for the federal government to act to align with other OECD countries
and at least implicitly embed “best interests of the client” in the standard for giving financial
advice in Canada, by expressly requiring financial advisors to proactively ask investors if they wish
to invest in socially responsible investments or funds that explicitly incorporate ESG factors. As
Canada shifts from defined benefit pension plans and defined contribution pension plans to
individually directed pension savings,228 the professionals advising individuals should be acting in
their best interests and should be providing them with investment options that incorporate ESG
factors and options that reflect socially responsible investment. At a minimum, they should be
providing information on whether ESG factors are being included in the governance of financial
services and products being recommended, in a form that allows consumers to assess their
options.
One report has observed that: “In addition to low financial literacy, the increasing degree of
product complexity and product proliferation makes it difficult for the average Canadian to be
adequately informed about the different investment product options that are available. Canada
has not been immune to the proliferation of complex products including complex exchange
traded funds and structured products.”229
Provincial securities commissions, under the auspices of the Canadian Securities Administrators,
the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (“IIROC”), and the Mutual Fund
Dealers Association of Canada (“MFDA”) are responsible for regulating investment firms and their
representatives in Canada. They impose “suitability obligations” on representatives, which
require representatives to ensure investment decisions are suitable for their clients based on
their clients’ personal characteristics, investment objectives, time horizon, and risk tolerance.230
street/osc-drops-push-for-best-interest-standard-as-regulators-propose-narrower-reforms>, discussing CSA
consultations on the best interest of the client standard and its replacement with specific reforms to reduce
conflicts of interest.
228 Between 1977 and 2011, the proportion of the overall employed population covered by registered pension
plans declined from 52% to 37% for men, mainly due to a drop in defined benefit coverage. Report on
Vulnerable Investors, supra note 225 at 20-21.
229 Ibid at 21.
230 CSA Staff Notice 31-336, Guidance for Portfolio Managers, Exempt Market Dealers and Other Registrants on
the Know-Your-Client, Know-Your-Product and Suitability Obligations (2014) and NI 31-103, Registration
Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations (12 June 2018), s 13.3; IIROC, “Notice 12-0109
Know your client and suitability – Guidance” (26 March 2012), online (pdf): IIROC
<http://www.iiroc.ca/Documents/2012/d21b2822-bcc3-4b2f-8c7f-422c3b3c1de1_en.pdf> and IIROC, “Rule
1300 Supervision of Accounts” (31 October 2018), online (pdf): IIROC
<http://www.iiroc.ca/RuleBook/MemberRules/RulesCollated_en.pdf>; MFDA, “Bulletin 0713 Suitability –
Research Paper on Canadian Securities Regulatory Authority Decisions” (24 January 2017), online: MFDA
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The key components of the suitability obligation are: “know your client (“KYC”) and “know your
product”, which means the “representative should be able to explain to the client the
investment’s risks, key features, and initial and ongoing costs and fees”, and disclose all material
negative factors about an investment product, ensuring the client comprehends the
information.231 The representative should be able to clearly explain the reasons that a specific
investment product is or is not suitable for the client based on the client’s KYC profile.”232
The Canadian Foundation for the Advancement of Investor Rights (“FAIR Canada”)233 has
observed that consumers are confused by different titles and functions of financial advisors.234
It observes that a key reform needed to help protect financial consumers and lead to improved
outcomes for retail investors is the implementation of a meaningful statutory best interest
standard. It observes:
While many consumers suffer harm as a result of non-compliance with existing rules
(such as suitability), they also suffer significant and profound harms when they are
dealing with registrants and licensees who are complying with the existing rules. These
harms are costing Canadian financial consumers millions of dollars and impacting their
ability to save adequately for their retirement, help put their children through university
or for their other financial (and life) goals. Harms from product sales that are focused
more on compensation to the advisor rather than the consumer’s best interest are much
more widespread than harms from deficient financial plans.235
Implementation of a “best practices” standard to provide information on alternatives
incorporating material ESG factors would align well with global efforts to develop good ESG
information to be able to offer advice on retirement investments. One study found that
employees, particularly younger employees, tend to save more for retirement when offered
investment options that reflect their values.236 The World Business Council on Sustainable
<http://mfda.ca/bulletin/0713-p/>, MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1 ‘Know-Your-Client’” (4 January 2018), online: MFDA
<http://mfda.ca/policy-and-regulation/rules/mfda-rules/#r2_2_1> [MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”], and MFDA, “Notice
0069 Suitability” (22 February 2013), online: MFDA <http://mfda.ca/notice/msn-0069/>.
231 Report on Vulnerable Investors, supra note 225 at 24.
232 Ibid.
233 FAIR Canada, “Home Page” (2019), online: FAIR <www.faircanada.ca>.
234 FAIR Canada, “Comment on the Regulation of Financial Planners” (17 April 2018) at para 1.4, online: FAIR
<https://faircanada.ca/submissions/fair-canada-comments-on-regulation-of-financial-planners/>. FAIR Canada
therefore recommends that the use of business titles be restricted to the following categories: “financial
planner” for those who have the necessary proficiency and who provide services on a fee-for-service basis and
who do not receive any compensation for product sales or referrals; “investment or financial advisor or
planner” with appropriate financial planning credential to be subject to a fiduciary duty and a statutory best
interest standard; “portfolio manager” for those licensed to exercise discretionary authority while operating
within business models that allow them to comply with the fiduciary duty already required of such registrants;
and “salesperson” for the remaining financial services representatives who do not meet the above restricted
categories.
235 Ibid at 2.3.
236 As You Sow, “Aligning Defined Contribution Plans with Sustainability Goals” (2017), online: As You Sow
<https://www.asyousow.org/reports/aligning-defined-contribution-plans-with-corporate-sustainability-goals>.
Meaghan Kilroy, “Millennials embrace ESG option in Bloomberg’s 401(k) plan” Pensions & Investments (7
February 2018), online: <https://www.pionline.com/article/20180207/ONLINE/180209884/millennials-
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Development (“WBCSD”) is a CEO-led organization of over 200 leading businesses working
together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world, targeting the realization of the
Sustainable Development Goals (“SDG”) through six work programs to achieve systems
transformation.237 One of its major projects is aimed at enabling companies to better align
retirement assets, including defined benefit and defined contribution plans, with their overall
sustainability goals by integrating ESG considerations, creating more demand for sustainable
investments.238 WBCSD’s initial data indicate it may be possible to create total portfolio solutions
that enhance risk-adjusted returns in the long run without compromising short-term return goals,
matching well with the long duration of retirement investments. It suggests that companies that
have high ESG characteristics are likely to be more resilient through a downturn. Top asset
management and investment consulting firms, including BlackRock and Mercer, are developing
best practices and innovative thinking on how to incorporate ESG sustainable strategies into
advice regarding corporate retirement plans.239 As an aspirational goal, the WBCSD project
envisions that 1% ($10 billion US) of WBCSD member companies’ total retirement assets
(estimated at $1 trillion US) will be invested in ESG-themed funds by 2020.240
In December 2018, WBCSD published a toolkit, to help companies understand how retirement
plans are governed and operated, as well as how ESG responsibility may be considered in
different plan structures and contexts.241 It specifies that, traditionally, investment “advisors have
provided plan sponsors with advice on their portfolio asset allocation (defined benefit plans),
lineup construction (defined contribution plans) and manager selection/monitoring (both) and
plan sponsors have maintained the responsibility for implementation of investment portfolios
and managing other third-party relationships such as recordkeepers. The nature and extent of
this advice can vary substantially, up to and including a fully outsourced model.”242
Recommendation 14:
The Expert Panel should recommend that financial advisers be required to include
information on material ESG factors in giving financial advice to consumer or retail
investors.
embrace-esg-option-in-bloombergs-401k-plan>, cited in World Business Council on Sustainable Development
(WBCSD), “Aligning Retirement Assets Toolkit #1: The Responsible Retirement Plan Opportunity” (4 December
2018), online: WBCSD <https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decisionmaking/Aligning-Retirement-Assets/Resources/The-responsible-retirement-plan-opportunity> [WBCSD,
“Aligning Retirement Investment Assets"]. WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Assets develops new resource to help
companies meet the growing demand for responsible investing” (4 December 2018), online: WBCSD
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-RetirementAssets/News/new-resource-to-help-companies-meet-the-growing-demand-for-responsible-investing>.
237 WBCSD, “How we drive sustainable development” (2019), online: WBCSD <https://www.wbcsd.org/>.
238 WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Assets” (2018), online: WBCSD
<https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Redefining-Value/Investor-decision-making/Aligning-Retirement-Assets>.
239 Ibid. The project is developing the toolkits to help understand: (1) What is sustainable retirement? (2) How
to develop a sustainable retirement plan?
240 Ibid.
241 WBCSD, “Aligning Retirement Investment Assets”, supra note 236.
242 Ibid at 14.
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2. Investment agents and advisors should be responsive to client preferences regarding ESG
Investment advisors, brokers, dealers, and mutual fund dealers are regulated by the IIROC or the
MFDA, both of which are self-regulatory organizations. Both have standards of conduct for their
licensed members that generally require fairness, honesty, actions in good faith and observing
high standards of ethics when dealing with clients’ business.243 As noted above, investment
advisors also have obligations to know their clients, including their clients’ investment goals, risk
tolerance, and investment horizon.244
Implicitly, these standards of conduct suggest that investment advisors and agents would be
expected to suggest investments, or invest clients’ money, where given discretionary authority,
consistent with clients’ statements of investment principles or sustainability concerns, and
consistent with any contractual obligations defining the relationship between an investor and an
asset manager.
The European Union is requiring a more proactive approach among financial advisors. Part of the
European Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth is to incorporate
sustainability when providing financial advice.245 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(“MiFID II”) and the Insurance Distribution Directive (“IDD”) require investment firms and
insurance distributors to offer 'suitable' products to meet their clients' needs, when offering
advice, requiring advisors to ask about their clients' preferences such as ESG factors and take
them into account when assessing the range of financial instruments and insurance products to
be recommended, ie, in the product selection process and suitability assessment.246 We
recommend that the government encourage that approach in Canada.
Recommendation 15:
The federal government should work with IIROC, MFDA and investment firms to develop
new requirements that investment advisers and distributors ask about their clients'
preferences regarding ESG factors and take them into account when assessing the range
of financial instruments and insurance products being recommended.
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IIROC, “Rule 1402 Standards of Conduct”, online (pdf): IIROC
<http://www.iiroc.ca/industry/rulebook/Documents/rule-1400.pdf>; MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”, supra note 230.
244 IIROC, “Rule 2500 Minimum Standards for Retail Customer Account Supervision”, online (pdf): IIROC
<http://www.iiroc.ca/Rulebook/MemberRules/Rule02500_en.pdf>; MFDA, “Rule 2.2.1”, ibid.
245 European Commission, “Commission Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth” (March 2018), online:
Europa <https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/180308-action-plan-sustainable-growth_en> [EC, “Commission
Action Plan”]. The Commission will amend the MiFID II and IDD delegated acts in Q2 2018 to ensure that
sustainability preferences are taken into account in the suitability assessment. Based on these delegated acts,
the Commission will invite the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) to include provisions on
sustainability preferences in its guidelines on the suitability assessment to be updated by Q4 2018.
246 Ibid at 2.4.
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IV.

EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES THAT WILL ADVANCE THE PATH TO
SUSTAINABILITY

The Expert Panel has posed a series of questions on climate-related disclosure, and more
specifically, questions relating to the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Taskforce on ClimateRelated Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) disclosure framework. We have reordered the questions
slightly in our response in the belief that an important public policy decision is whether to
broaden the sustainability disclosure to ESG factors, given that trend internationally. In our view,
incorporating ESG into financial reporting is an important step in the transition to sustainable
finance. It also aligns with our recommendations above in respect of codifying and enhancing the
common law of director and officer fiduciary obligation.
Thus, we commence with the third question, 3.3(3), on including climate-related disclosures in
financial statements, broadening the response to discuss why material ESG factors should be
included in financial statements. We then address the remaining seven questions posed by the
Expert Panel, directly responsive to the specific climate-related and TCFD-related questions.
Our discussion includes two possible routes to enhancing disclosure on the path to sustainability.
One is through amendments to corporate law, as has been done in the UK. The second is through
federal capital markets stability law. In answering the Expert Panel’s questions in this part, we
clearly delineate the two possible avenues, both of which can be accomplished effectively within
the Canadian law and policy framework. In addition, the Expert Panel should encourage the
provincial and territorial governments to enhance disclosure under securities law in respect of
ESG risks and opportunities, including climate-related risks and opportunities.
Expert Panel Question 3.3(3):
Is there a need for climate-related disclosures to be included in mainstream financial
statements, or is that not necessary so long as other conditions are met (i.e. robust
oversight and governance of the reporting process and quality)?

1. Include material ESG risks, costs and assets in financial statements
Realistically, the only way that corporations will fully take account of climate-related financial
costs and benefits is to include them in the financial statements. Financial statements are a
fundamental component of continuous disclosure. Financial statements provide both equity and
debt investors with the information to make informed choices whether to buy, sell or hold their
investment.247 Financial statements are, by their nature, mainly historical, in that they are the
247

NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations (12 June 2018), s 4.1 [NI 51-102]: Generally, annual and
quarterly reporting includes a statement of comprehensive income, a statement of changes in equity, a
statement of cash flows, a statement of financial position at the end of the most recently completed financial
year and the financial year immediately preceding the most recently completed financial year. NI 51-102
specifies that the audited annual financial statements must be filed, for a reporting issuer other than a venture
issuer, within 90 days after the end of its most recently completed financial year; and the date of filing, in a
foreign jurisdiction, annual financial statements for its most recently completed financial year. Venture issuers
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record of past transactions and their impact on the issuer’s financial position.248 Critically
important is that the information is comparable from one year to the next. One issue that has
been identified as problematic with separate “non-financial corporate social responsibility”
(“CSR”) reports is that companies can change the metrics form one year to the next if they do not
like the results and there is nothing that requires them to explain the changes, thus there is no
comparability or consistency in reporting year over year. The CCGG notes that siloed, nonintegrated, CSR and environmental reporting can be viewed as “greenwashing”.249 A second issue
is that when CSR reports are not part of financial statements, they tend to be ignored by
corporate boards, as they are not viewed as issues core to the corporation. They are often not up
to date as a result, and there is not a corporate-wide commitment to accuracy or strategic
planning in respect of material ESG issues.
Embedding disclosure of material ESG risks and opportunities in financial statements would allow
directors and officers to report how they view ESG as material in the reporting period and how
they have addressed it to date. It would embed sustainability thinking in core financial reporting.
It would allow investors to measure progress year over year, as the data will be comparable or
changes explained as the metrics reporting improves. Requiring ESG to be included in financial
statements also levels the playing field for corporations, in terms of their ability to attract debt
and equity investment. It avoids “greenwashing” of ESG results. It will encourage directors’ and
officers’ best thinking in respect of material ESG risks and opportunities. Requiring ESG disclosure
in financial statements would require corporate officers to explain changes in methodology of
measuring material ESG risks and opportunities, and would provide transparency and
comparability in the market across corporations. Changes in metrics because of developing
information on ESG factors, such as climate-related financial risk, would be explained in the notes
to the financial statement, leading to increasingly better transparency.
The TCFD recommends that organizations should provide information specific to the potential
impact of climate-related risks and opportunities in their financial statements and future cash
flows.250 The TCFD recommends that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in
annual financial filings.251 The TCFD observed that:
the Task Force’s disclosure recommendations should result in more quantitative
financial disclosures, particularly disclosure of metrics, about the financial impact
that climate-related risks have or could have on an organization. Specifically,
asset impairments may result from assets adversely impacted by the effects of
have 120 days. Deadlines for filing interim financial reports are 45 days for non-venture issuers and 60 days for
venture issuers after the end of the interim period or the date of filing, in a foreign jurisdiction, interim
financial reports: NI 51-102, ss 4.2, 4.4.
248 Mary Condon, Anita Anand, Janis Sarra and Sarah Bradley, Securities Law in Canada: Cases and
Commentary, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2017) at 401 [Condon, Anand, Sarra and Bradley,
Securities Law in Canada].
249 Ibid.
250 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), “Final Report: Recommendations of the Task
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures – Appendix 3” (June 2017) at 50, online (pdf): FSB
<https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf> [TCFD,
“Final Report”].
251 Ibid at 18.
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climate change and/or additional liabilities may need to be recorded to account
for regulatory fines and penalties resulting from enhanced regulatory standards.
Additionally, cash flows from operations, net income, and access to capital could
all be impacted by the effects of climate-related risks (and opportunities).252
Arguably, the same case can be made for ESG factors more generally, as recognized by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in a 2019 Statement on Disclosure
of ESG Matters by Issuers.253 The IOSCO Statement is premised on the view that:
IOSCO Principle 16 states that issuers should provide “full, accurate, and timely
disclosure of financial results, risk, and other information which is material to
investors’ decisions.” With regard to this Principle, IOSCO emphasizes that ESG
matters, though sometimes characterized as non-financial, may have a material
short-term and long-term impact on the business operations of the issuers as
well as on risks and returns for investors and their investment and voting
decisions.254
As a result, the IOSCO Statement counsels that “IOSCO encourages issuers to consider the
materiality of ESG matters to their business and to assess risks and opportunities in light of their
business strategy and risk assessment methodology. When ESG matters are considered to be
material, issuers should disclose the impact or potential impact on their financial performance
and value creation. In doing so, issuers also are encouraged to give insight into the governance
and oversight of ESG-related material risks.”255
The CCGG has observed that financial reporting should convey key considerations related to
governance, strategy, and risk management with the right level of detail, context, supporting
information, and metrics, so that investors can make better informed decisions; and boards
should have the necessary controls in place, whether internal or external, to provide reasonable
verification and assurance of the disclosure.256 One survey of asset and portfolio managers using
ESG in their investments reported that the biggest challenge to using ESG information for
investment decision making relates to the lack of comparability of reported information across
firms.257 Another study examined how CSR disclosure in a stand-alone report, disconnected from
a firm’s financial disclosure, is problematic, as it may lead to asymmetric anchoring, where
financial professionals and investors may underreact to CSR information when it is disclosed in a
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Ibid at 37-38.
International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Statement on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuers”
(18 January 2019), online (pdf): IOSCO <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf>. This
Statement was not voted on by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
254 Ibid at 1 (emphasis in original).
255 Ibid at 3.
256 CCGG Guidebook, supra note 42 at 4.
257 Amir Amel-Zadeh and George Serafeim, “Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global
Survey”, (2018) 74:3 Financial Analysts Journal 87 at 88.
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stand-alone report compared to when CSR information is provided in an integrated financial
report.258
As noted above, ESG factors are currently frequently reported as part of a CSR report, which the
CCGG observes can result in metrics that do not link to strategy or are not relevant to a
corporation’s operations or risk.259 It observes that CSR reports usually are not subject to board
oversight or approval and do not give investors or other corporate stakeholders the assurance
processes that support financial reporting.260 As a result, boards of directors are often not paying
attention to ESG factors. Incorporating either climate-related financial disclosures or ESG
disclosures into financial statements would address this deficiency in current reporting.
Integrating ESG matters in corporate financial statements would allow greater transparency and
accountability. Where accounting methods are developing, the notes to the financial statements
can make clear the basis on which any metrics are being reported or which metrics have changed
year over year. It would also allow for reporting of currently known ESG risks and opportunities
as well as forward-looking ESG information. The scope of a potential safe harbour that recognizes
that understanding of and information on these risks and opportunities are still evolving is
discussed in response to the Expert Panel’s Question 3.3(6) below.
The goal of financial reporting is to allow corporate stakeholders, including equity investors, debt
investors, regulators and other corporate stakeholders, to understand the financial performance
of the corporation. Accounting for ESG factors (including climate-related financial risk and return)
in financial reporting must allow corporate stakeholders to understand the corporation’s
economic performance in respect of these issues. Metrics need to be clear and measurable.
Financial reporting metrics continue to be refined by a number of organizations in Canada and
internationally. The reporting framework a company chooses to follow, and its rationale, should
be described in the company’s MD&A, allowing investors and others to assess how the financials
have been measured and verified.
i.

Canada can look to international standards

The work of incorporating climate-related and ESG factors into financial reporting is already well
underway. The US-based independent Sustainability Accounting Standards Board was created to
develop standards for disclosure of material ESG matters.261 The recommendations are not
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Markus Arnold, Alexander Bassen and Ralf Frank, “Timing effects of corporate social responsibility
disclosure: an experimental study with investment professionals” (2018) 8:1 Journal of Sustainable Finance &
Investment 45-71, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2017.1368229>. See also George Apostolakis, Gert
Van Dijk, Robert Blomme, Frido Kraanen & Athanasios Papadopoulos “Predicting pension beneficiaries’
behaviour when offered a socially responsible and impact investment portfolio” (2018) 8:3 Journal of
Sustainable Finance & Investment 213-241, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2018.1429148>.
259 CCGG Guidebook, supra note 42 at 18.
260 Ibid.
261 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), “Home Page” (2018), online: SASB
<https://www.sasb.org/>, originally aimed at what SEC registrants should provide in 10K filings, but now
developing global standards.
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mandatory, but they serve as guidance on determining what is material. “SASB’s mission is to
help businesses around the world identify, manage and report on the sustainability topics that
matter most to their investors.”262 The SASB has a Materiality Map that offers companies a risk
management framework that contains a risk identification and prioritization process.263
In November 2018, SASB published a complete set of 77 globally applicable industry-specific
codified standards that identify the minimal set of financially material sustainability topics and
their associated metrics for the typical company in an industry.264 It sets out a minimum set of
industry-specific disclosure topics reasonably likely to constitute material information, and a brief
description of how management or mismanagement of each topic may affect value creation. It
also recommends, for each sector, a set of quantitative and/or qualitative accounting metrics
intended to measure performance on each topic. Each accounting metric is accompanied by a
technical protocol that provides guidance on definitions, scope, implementation, compilation,
and presentation, all of which are intended to constitute suitable criteria for third-party
assurance. It also sets out a set of metrics that quantify the scale of a company’s business and
are intended for use in conjunction with accounting metrics to normalize data and facilitate
comparison.265 The accounting metrics for each industry and sector include how to financially
report GHG emissions, biodiversity impacts, human rights and rights of Indigenous peoples,
community relations, business ethics and transparency and a host of other metrics.266 Each
standard has an accompanying document explaining the reasons for recommending the
accounting standards proposed.267
Thus the federal government need not devise its own accounting standards regarding
sustainability financing where there are increasingly widely accepted standards internationally.
The federal government should deem companies to have complied with their reporting
requirements if their financial statements incorporate the SASB sustainability metrics in their
current accounting standards. The federal government should ask the Canadian Accounting
Standards Board to assess the SASB standards and discern if any changes should be required to
account for unique issues in Canada. However, with the move internationally to International
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Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”),268 there has been an international move towards
transparency, accountability and comparability in financial reporting, a shift that has been
endorsed by Canadian governments and accounting standards-setting authorities. Discussions
regarding how to integrate the SASB standards in IFRS are occurring and Canada should be part
of that public policy discussion.
CPA Canada has issued a publication that outlines 20 questions for boards of directors to ask in
overseeing organizational risk management, business strategy and performance in the context of
climate change.269 In respect of financial statements, CPA Canada suggests that boards ask: How
has the current and potential future impact of climate change issues, including carbon pricing, on
revenues, expenditures and cash flows been determined?270 How has the impact that climate
change issues have and could have on the company’s financial condition, liquidity and long-term
value creation been determined?271 How is materiality of climate change issues assessed, and are
disclosures made in the financial statements, the MD&A and, if applicable, the Annual
Information Form (“AIF”) consistent with this assessment?272
CPA Canada outlines a number of potential impacts on revenues and costs that could be reported,
including sales or licenses of innovative low-carbon technologies, sales of emissions allowances
or credits and proceeds from issuing green bonds, the possibility that assets such as oil and gas
reserves may no longer generate revenue, the need to retrofit property, plant and equipment to
reduce GHG emissions, and investments in productive capacity that embody new energy-efficient
technologies.273 The CPA Canada report offers guidance to directors in their consideration of
which procedures and controls to adopt to gather and record reliable and timely climate changerelated financial information for management analysis and internal decision-making, disclosure
filings with regulatory authorities, and external disclosure to investors, governments and other
stakeholders.274
CPA Canada also published Building a Better MD&A: Climate Change Disclosures,275 which
discusses how companies can account for and disclose carbon taxes, regulatory emissions
reduction targets/caps, and emissions trading transactions and obligations. It notes that: “Under
the second type of mandatory reporting, certain Canadian businesses must file GHG emissions
information with Canadian provincial and/or federal governments”; and directors should assess
268
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whether adequate systems, processes and controls are in place to deliver timely and reliable
information for these filings.276 In these situations, boards or audit committees may need to ask
about legal and regulatory requirements related to climate change reporting to determine the
appropriate degree of oversight.
While the CSA has been less active than one would have hoped, in 2010 the CSA did publish
guidance for reporting issuers on the environmental disclosure requirements for financial
statements, MD&A and AIF.277 The CSA’s environmental guidance explains the roles and
responsibilities of audit committees for oversight of continuous disclosure filings, including
climate-related disclosures, and underlying controls and procedures.
The TCFD reports that to be sufficiently comprehensive, financial disclosures should contain
historical and future-oriented information in order to allow users to evaluate their previous
expectations relative to actual performance and assess possible future financial implications.278
Future-oriented data should include clarification of the key assumptions used and forwardlooking quantitative disclosure should align with data used by the organization for investment
decision making and risk management.279 It recommends that disclosures should be written with
the objective of communicating financial information that serves the needs of a range of financial
sector users and should be sufficiently granular to inform sophisticated users, but should also
provide concise information for less specialized readers.280 The TCFD further recommends that
disclosures should show an appropriate balance between qualitative and quantitative
information and use text, numbers, and graphical presentations as appropriate; and that “fair and
balanced narrative explanations should provide insight into the meaning of quantitative
disclosures, including the changes or developments they portray over time.”281 Financial
disclosures should be timely and consistent over time. The TCFD recommendations on financial
statements should be adopted.
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The European Commission has launched a broad Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth,
which will require sustainability disclosure in accounting rule-making and create measurable
standards for green financial products.282
Recommendation 16:
i.

Require material ESG factors, including climate-related financial disclosures, to
be reported in annual financial filings.

ii.

Ask the Canadian Accounting Standards Board to review the industry specific
standards promulgated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board for
purposes of adoption in Canada.

iii.

The federal government should work with Canadian accounting standards
authorities and securities regulators to provide tools to assist companies to
embed ESG disclosure in publicly-listed corporations’ financial statements and
notes to financial statements.

2. Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and opportunities in
management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual meeting
The Annual Meeting for every company incorporated pursuant to the CBCA, both privately-held
and publicly-issuing, includes, as important matters of business, the election of directors,
consideration of the financial statements, consideration of the auditor’s report, and reappointment of the incumbent auditor.283 With respect to the election of directors, for
companies required to distribute a proxy circular, biographical information is required to be
disclosed concerning every proposed director, including those directors being re-elected, to
permit an evaluation of that director’s professional experience, likely competence, and
integrity.284 In conjunction with review of the required financial statements,285 the proxy circular
information allows shareholders to evaluate how the company has been managed, generally
speaking, and whether it is prudent to continue the directors in office.
Publicly-listed companies that are reporting issuers under provincial and territorial securities
legislation must distribute more extensive proxy information in the proxy circular to all
shareholders entitled to vote in conjunction with the annual meeting and any special meetings
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that management calls.286 These requirements to distribute a proxy circular are pursuant to the
CBCA and implementing Regulations, with the specific information to be disclosed primarily being
defined by National Instruments pursuant to provincial and territorial securities law.287 Thus, this
requirement is an area of law where federal and provincial powers interact regarding the scope
of required disclosure. The purpose of the proxy circular is to provide the information that
regulators have deemed necessary for shareholders or their representatives to be able to
exercise their voting rights in an informed manner. Thus the information required depends on
the specific issue on which shareholders are being asked to vote.
While most of the specific disclosure requirements for publicly-listed companies are promulgated
based on National Instruments, the federal government does have the power to add to those
disclosure requirements for corporations incorporated pursuant to the CBCA, and has done so in
at least a few occasions.288 Thus, we recommend that the CBCA be amended to not only require
incorporating material ESG risks disclosure into the financial statements and notes thereto, as
above, but also amend the CBCA to require the board to discuss how it is evaluating and
incorporating material ESG risks and opportunities into its strategy, governance, and risk
management.
Proxy circular disclosure of how the board as a whole is analyzing material ESG risks and
opportunities would give shareholders valuable qualitative information about how proactive
management is, and how the board and management are positioning the company for future
success. There are a number of approaches the federal government could take in amending the
CBCA to require such annual proxy disclosure. As discussed immediately above, guidance for how
directors should evaluate climate change and ESG risks and opportunities, including how to
connect those topics to strategy and risk management generally, has been developed by a
number of private initiatives, such as the SASB, the TCFD, and CPA Canada. The CBCA should be
amended to ask companies to discuss governance, risk management, and strategy of ESG risks
and opportunities using the parameters, or questions boards should ask, identified in one of those
three frameworks.
Another approach is that recently suggested by Professor Jill Fisch, who proposed that the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) require an annual Sustainability Discussion and
Analysis (“SD&A”) modelled on MD&A (Management Discussion and Analysis).289 In MD&A, in
both the United States and Canada, companies are required to discuss known trends, events, or
uncertainties that may have a significant effect on the company’s financial results going forward.
Fisch suggests that reporting companies should be required to “identify and explain the three
sustainability issues most significant to their operations,” and include “a discussion of the
potential impacts of the issues and the basis for the company’s determination” that these issues
286
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are the three most significant for the company’s sustainability.290 Like MD&A, this requirement
would give investors insight into management’s views of known or reasonably knowable
sustainability issues that are likely to have a material effect on the company’s operations. Also
like MD&A, this requirement would serve to focus board attention on sustainability issues, but
with the flexibility for the board to determine what is significant among the panoply of potential
sustainability issues. Professor Fisch emphasizes the importance of board responsibility for the
proposed SD&A if the proposal is to have the intended effect of providing investors with insights
into boards’ deliberations and understanding of sustainability risks and opportunities.291
Any of these approaches would give shareholders and their advisors deeper insight into how the
board is positioning the company for long-term success, and thus would add appreciably to the
information available as shareholders exercise their voting rights regarding the composition of
the board.
Recommendation 17:
i.

Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and
opportunities in management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual
meeting.

ii.

Create a consultation process to evaluate using a “sustainability disclosure and
analysis” (“SD&A”) reporting tool for the proxy circular ESG disclosure.

3. The Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation
offers another avenue for dealing with systemic risk
Approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in November 2018 of the constitutionality of the draft
federal “Capital Markets Stability Act” 292 presents an important and timely opportunity to embed
systemic risk factors in financial statements and other disclosures. However, it is important to
realize that it will take time for federal and provincial governments to sort out the transition
towards the infrastructure and policies underpinning the new capital markets stability structure.
Nonetheless, it offers yet another avenue to address systemic risk and the need for a shift to a
sustainable economy.
The federal government and the governments of Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Yukon have agreed to implement a national Cooperative
System for the regulation of capital markets in Canada.293 All the reasoning in the SCC judgment
points to climate-related financial risk falling squarely within the types of systemic risk that the
SCC found was within the jurisdiction of the new national regulatory Authority.
290
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The SCC held that the Constitution Act of Canada authorizes the implementation of pan-Canadian
securities regulation under the authority of a single regulator, according to the model established
by the most recent publication of the “Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Cooperative
Capital Markets Regulatory System”.294 The SCC held that the draft federal Capital Markets
Stability Act does not exceed the authority of the Parliament of Canada over the general branch
of the trade and commerce power under ss 91(2) of the Constitution Act.295 The main components
of the Cooperative System include a model provincial and territorial statute that deals primarily
with the day-to-day aspects of the securities trade,296 a proposed draft federal act, the Capital
Markets Stability Act, which is aimed at preventing and managing systemic risk and which
establishes criminal offences relating to financial markets, and a national securities regulator (the
“Authority”) charged with administering this coordinated regime.297 The Authority and its board
of directors are to operate under the supervision of a Council of Ministers, which will comprise
the ministers responsible for capital markets regulation in each participating province and the
federal Minister of Finance.298
The Supreme Court held that the pith and substance of the draft Capital Markets Stability Act is
to control systemic risk having the potential to create material adverse effects on the Canadian
economy.299 The concept of systemic risk is specifically invoked throughout the draft federal Act
as a means of limiting the scope of federal regulatory powers. The SCC held at para 90:
[90] The cornerstone of the Draft Federal Act is the prevention and control of
“systemic risk related to capital markets”, which is defined in s. 3 as follows:
3. In this Act, systemic risk related to capital markets means a threat to
the stability of Canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted
through or impairs capital markets and that has the potential to have a
material adverse effect on the Canadian economy.
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For the purposes of this definition, systemic risk can be understood as having
three constituent elements: (a) it must represent a threat to the stability of the
country’s financial system as a whole; (b) it must be connected to the capital
markets; and (c) it must have the potential to have a material adverse effect on
the Canadian economy. It is noteworthy that this definition does not encompass
every economic risk that may relate to capital markets, but is limited to those
that pose a sufficiently significant threat to the Canadian economy.
[emphasis added]
The intention is not that the draft Act will displace provincial and territorial securities legislation,
rather, it is designed to complement these statutes by addressing economic objectives that are
considered to be national in character.300
With respect to the classification, the SCC held that the ultimate question is whether the draft
Act, viewed in its entirety, addresses a matter of genuine national importance and scope going
to trade as a whole, in a way that is distinct and different from provincial concerns. The SCC held
that the dual purposes of the draft federal Act, set out in section 4: “The purposes of this Act are,
as part of the Canadian capital markets regulatory framework, (a) to promote and protect the
stability of Canada’s financial system through the management of systemic risk related to capital
markets; and (b) to protect capital markets, investors and others from financial crimes”, when
read together with the Authority’s statutory mandate (section 6), suggests that the federal
government’s role in regulating capital markets is limited to the detection, prevention and
management of risk to the stability of the Canadian economy, as well as to the protection against
financial crimes.301 The SCC held that draft federal Act does address a matter of genuine national
importance and scope relating to trade as a whole, and it therefore falls within Parliament’s
general trade and commerce power under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act. The preservation
of the integrity and stability of the Canadian economy quite clearly has a national dimension, and
one that lies beyond provincial competence.302 The Court further held that “The regulatory
powers authorized by the Draft Federal Act are engaged solely when such threats may
foreseeably affect national economic interests.”303
The SCC further held that: “the regulation of systemic risk in capital markets goes to promoting
the stability of the economy generally, not the stability of one economic sector in particular”, 304
and engages trade as a whole under the federal trade and commerce power. “Put simply, the
management of systemic risk across Canadian capital markets must be regulated federally, if at
all.” 305
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The SCC findings that capital market stability comes under national authority is bolstered by the
recent US federal government report on the systemic risks to the US national economy from
climate change that was published in late November 2018.306 It reports that:
the continued warming that is projected to occur without substantial and
sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions is expected to cause
substantial net damage to the US economy throughout this century, especially in
the absence of increased adaptation efforts. With continued growth in emissions
at historic rates, annual losses in some economic sectors are projected to reach
hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century—more than the current
gross domestic product (GDP) of many US states.
...
While these adaptation and mitigation measures can help reduce damages in a
number of sectors, this assessment shows that more immediate and substantial
global greenhouse gas emissions reductions, as well as regional adaptation
efforts, would be needed to avoid the most severe consequences in the long
term. Mitigation and adaptation actions also present opportunities for additional
benefits that are often more immediate and localized, such as improving local air
quality and economies through investments in infrastructure.307
The framework of the Cooperative System is set out in the memorandum between the federal
government and the governments of Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick,
Prince Edward Island and Yukon (“participating jurisdictions”).308 This cooperative system has
four primary components: uniform provincial and territorial legislation, whereby each
participating province is to enact a statute that mirrors the “Model Provincial Act” addressing all
matters respecting capital markets that fall within provincial or territorial jurisdiction;309
complementary federal legislation that addresses matters relating to systemic risk in Canada’s
capital markets, national data collection and criminal matters;310 contemplates a national
regulator;311 and the new national Authority, which is to operate under the supervision of a
Council of Ministers.312 The duties of the Council of Ministers include proposing amendments to
the draft federal Act and the Model Provincial Act.313 Both statutes will provide that any
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regulations proposed by the Authority must be approved by the Council of Ministers before they
come into force.314
The draft Capital Markets Stability Act sets out the fundamental provisions of capital markets
statutory law while leaving detailed requirements, including some requirements that are
currently contained in provincial and territorial securities legislation, to be addressed in
regulations.315 Part 7, which deals with disclosure, does not contain any reference to ESG factors,
although the fact that the requirements of the legislation will be set out in regulations316 means
that there is considerable scope for requiring ESG factors to be included in disclosure
requirements.
The draft Capital Markets Stability Act specifies:
19. The regulations may, in order to address a systemic risk related to capital
markets, prescribe requirements, prohibitions and restrictions respecting
systemically important benchmarks, including in relation to
(a) submissions of information for the purpose of determining those
benchmarks;
(b) their design, determination and dissemination;
(c) plans for continuity, recovery and cessation;
(d) governance, compliance and accountability; and
(e) any other aspects of benchmark administration.
...
23. The regulations may, in order to address a systemic risk related to capital
markets, prescribe requirements, prohibitions and restrictions respecting
practices that are prescribed to be systemically risky, including in relation to
(a) policies and procedures for risk management and internal controls;
(b) disclosure to the public of information whose disclosure is not otherwise
required;
(c) transparency;
(d) aspects of governance and organizational and ownership structure that are
related to risk management;
(e) capital, leverage and financial resources;
(f) margin, collateral, credit protection and position limits;
(g) the use of credit ratings, including how investment policies govern that use;
and
314
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(h) conflicts of interest related to the determination of credit ratings.
It appears that there is ample potential for the new national regulatory Authority to work with
provincial and territorial governments to develop regulations requiring disclosure of ESG factors
that pose a systemic risk to Canada’s securities law or capital markets, as we discuss at pages 8184.

4. Can the federal government relieve some of the regulatory burden of requiring climaterelated or ESG factors to be included in financial statements?
The federal government, pursuant to its new federal capital markets draft legislation, is already
committed to being nimble in respect of approaches to capital markets and securities regulation,
moving away from overly codified securities requirements. As the legislation and regulations are
being finalized, the new Authority could relieve some of the regulatory burden on publicly-listed
companies by moving to bi-annual financial statements rather than quarterly financial
statements. Such a move would need to be with consent of the co-operating parties, which
includes Ontario, in which case, approximately more than 95% of market disclosure would be
covered. For smaller issuers, the requirement should be for only annual financial statements.
Material changes would still be subject to the continuous disclosure regime, but the cost and
resources of currently providing quarterly reports should be redirected towards effecting
financial reporting on ESG risks and benefits. Moreover, moving away from quarterly financial
statements assists with focusing time horizons on longer periods, much needed, particularly in
respect of climate-related financial risk and opportunity.
While there would need to be national instruments agreed to by all regulators, the fact that six
securities regulators, including Ontario and British Columbia, will be part of the new federal
regulatory body, creates an opening to incorporate either climate-related or ESG factors in
financial statements. There were also many recommendations in previous studies conducted by
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation and similar national efforts to conceptualize a
national system that would relieve the regulatory burden while moving financial statement and
other disclosure towards modern and responsive disclosure, including use of financial technology
to allow full access to financial statements and material information.317 These recommendations
and many others made over the years should be considered in terms of how they might relieve
the regulatory burden with the approval, finally, of a national capital markets stability framework.
Recommendation 18:
The Expert Panel should consider recommending a move to bi-annual and annual
financial statements for larger issuers and only annual financial statements for venture
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and smaller issuers (by market cap) as one means to focus on longer-term sustainability
and relieve some of the resource pressures in shifting to an ESG governance framework.
Expert Panel Question 3.3(1):
What would accelerate adoption of the TCFD disclosure framework? Are there any critical
enablers or barriers to adoption that have not been discussed?
The most effective way for the Government to accelerate adoption of the TCFD disclosure
framework is to require publicly-listed companies to disclose information pursuant to the TCFD
recommendations.318 In this section, we discuss the rationale for requiring TCFD disclosure; the
mechanisms the federal government should use to require that disclosure, given Canada’s
cooperative federalism; and the rationale for taking a tiered approach. We then discuss a number
of barriers to adoption of TCFD disclosure.

1.

The rationale for requiring disclosure pursuant to the TCFD framework

As recognized by the Expert Panel’s Interim Report, the recommendations of the TCFD merit
careful consideration within the Canadian context for a number of reasons. These reasons
include that the TCFD’s recommendations (a) are specific to climate-change risk, which is
understood to be a systemic risk; (b) have been developed by extremely influential, international
participants in business and government; (c) have been endorsed by Canada’s five largest banks
and six of its eight largest pension funds,319 indicating that core Canadian financial actors
understand the importance of the information TCFD suggests needs to be disclosed; and (d) have
been endorsed by hundreds of businesses and investors around the world, including 457
companies with over $5.7 trillion US of market capitalization and financial firms with close to $100
trillion US of assets under management.320 As Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney
stated in November of 2018: “TCFD is now supported by three-quarters of the world’s globally
systemic banks, eight of the top ten asset managers, the world’s leading pension funds and
insurers, major credit rating agencies, the Big Four accounting firms, the two dominant
shareholder advisory firms, and the two dominant shareholder advisory services,” all together
representing a fifth of global GDP.321
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Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders to advocate for adoption of TCFD Framework.
321 Terry Slavin, “‘Tragedy of the horizon’ still holding back action on climate change, Carney says” Ethical
Corporation (26 November 2018), online: <http://ethicalcorp.com/tragedy-horizon-still-holding-back-actionclimate-change-carney-says> [Ethical Corporation, “Tragedy of the Horizon”]. In the same speech Governor
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The TCFD identified four features of its recommendations that it considers “key features”: (1) that
they could be adopted by all organizations, including financial institutions and investors as well
as operating companies; (2) that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in
required financial filings; (3) that the disclosure be decision-relevant, forward-looking
information; and (4) that there should be a strong focus on risks and opportunities from the
transition to a lower-carbon economy.322 It also emphasized, as a key recommendation, the
importance of using and disclosing the results of scenario analysis to determine the resilience of
an organization and its strategies under different climate change and adaptation scenarios, 323
issuing a Technical Supplement to guide issuers and financial institutions in preparing scenario
disclosure.324
The Final Report identifies four areas for climate-related disclosure that represent the core
elements of how organizations operate: Governance, Strategy, Risk Management, and Metrics &
Targets.325 It conceptualized these recommendations as follows:

TCFD Final Report326
In discussing these categories of information, the Task Force stated:
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The Task Force recommends that organizations provide climate-related financial
disclosures in their mainstream (i.e., public) annual financial filings and
recognizes that most information included in financial filings is subject to a
materiality assessment. However, because climate-related risk is a nondiversifiable risk that affects nearly all industries, many investors believe it
requires special attention. . . .327
The Task Force concluded that information about a company’s governance and risk management
should be included in financial filings irrespective of materiality, while disclosures related to
company strategy, metrics and targets should be provided in annual financial filings only when
material.328 Even there, the TCFD recommended that non-financial firms in energy, transportation
materials, and agriculture, food and forest products with $ 1 billion US equivalent or more of
annual revenue should provide disclosures on strategy and metrics and targets in “other reports,”
such as sustainability or CSR reports.329
What is notable about the TCFD’s disclosure categories is that they do not call on issuers to make
speculative determinations about how large-scale, systemic disruptions such as climate change
might affect their business at a far future date. Rather, they call upon individual companies to
discuss how that company is approaching the identification, quantification, and management of
climate change risks and opportunities today, and what strategic risks and opportunities the
company perceives in the transition to a low-carbon economy. In other words, what are
companies’ managements doing now to respond to the challenges of the Paris Agreement and
their country’s Nationally Determined Contributions to meet the goals of that agreement? Far
from requiring speculative or boiler-plate disclosure, then, the TCFD has focused on specific
information that managers can provide (how are they evaluating and managing these risks to
their company in their industry and geographic regions), and specific information that investors
and lenders can use to direct their capital to companies with smart, proactive management.
Presumably it is because the information is perceived by investors to be decision-useful that
financial institutions with close to $100 trillion US have endorsed TCFD, including Canada’s largest
banks and pension funds.
ii. Implementing the TCFD’s disclosure framework
The TCFD’s recommendations are widely viewed as the foundation for improved reporting of
climate-related issues in mainstream financial filings. The TFCD believes that the reporting of
climate-related risks and opportunities will evolve over time as companies, investors and others
contribute to the quality and consistency of the information disclosed. Thus, eventually, TCFD
disclosure is expected to allow investors, lenders, insurers, and credit ratings agencies’ access to
better information about specific companies’ climate-related risks and opportunities, and how
managers and boards are thinking about those issues. As such, the information disclosed should
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provide an important impetus to sustainable finance in Canada, allowing the capital markets to
more effectively play a role in allocating capital to those companies with the most proactive
insights into the transition to a low-carbon economy and how to position their company in light
of that transition. The key question for the Expert Panel, then, is how to suggest that the federal
government implement required TCFD disclosure consistent with the Constitution Act, if the
Panel is persuaded that is the best policy recommendation to make to the federal government in
order to accelerate TCFD disclosure.
As indicated above, a key consideration for the SCC in upholding the constitutional validity of the
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory Scheme was that the federal government’s role in
regulating capital markets independent of the cooperating provinces and territory is limited to
the detection, prevention and management of systemic risks to the stability of the Canadian
economy.330 Systemic risk is defined in the draft Capital Markets Stability Act as “a threat to the
stability of Canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted through or impairs capital
markets and that has the potential to have a material adverse effect on the Canadian
economy.”331
Both climate change itself and the transition risks inherent in Canada meeting its obligations
pursuant to the Paris Agreement to limit the warming of the Earth to “well under” 2° C, compared
to the pre-industrial era, and “pursuing efforts” to limit to 1.5° C332 are systemic risks with the
potential to have a material adverse effect on the Canadian economy. As such, the federal
government would likely have jurisdiction to act independently of the cooperating provinces in
enacting new regulations to require disclosure consistent with TCFD. As the new framework
negotiated between the federal government and the cooperating provinces specifies,333 the
federal government’s new Authority would work with the cooperating provinces and territory—
Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and the Yukon—
330
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to develop new climate-specific disclosure based on TCFD.334 Each of these approaches will be
discussed in turn.

2.

Federal jurisdiction under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act: Climate change as a
systemic risk

The underlying premise of TCFD is that climate change poses systemic risks to the global financial
system. The impetus for the TCFD was discussed in a September 2015 speech to Lloyd’s of
London delivered by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the FSB at the
time of the speech, and former Governor of the Bank of Canada. The speech, entitled Breaking
the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability, identified climate change as
one of the greatest extant threats to the resilience and prosperity of global financial markets.335
Governor Carney identified three broad channels through which climate change can affect
financial stability:
First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance liabilities and the value of financial
assets that arise from climate- and weather-related events, such as floods and storms
that damage property or disrupt trade;
Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise tomorrow if parties who have suffered
loss or damage from the effects of climate change seek compensation from those they
hold responsible. Such claims could come decades in the future, but have the potential
to hit carbon extractors and emitters –and, if they have liability cover, their insurers–the
hardest;
Finally, transition risks: the financial risks that could result from the process of adjustment
towards a lower-carbon economy. Changes in policy, technology and physical risks could
prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of assets as costs and opportunities
become apparent. The speed at which such re-pricing occurs is uncertain and could be
decisive for financial stability.336
Each of these potential risks can be observed in Canada today, given such events as the Fort
McMurray fire in 2016, with approximately $8.9 billion Cdn of direct and indirect costs, or the
recently-filed claim for liability against the federal government for failing to address climate
change.337 The clearest risks to the Canadian economy are transition risks, however.
334
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In December 2016, the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change was
agreed to by the federal government and all of the provinces and territories, with the exception
of Saskatchewan, to meet Canada’s commitment to the Paris Agreement.338 That commitment
is to reduce Canada’s GHG emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.339 While the Ontario
government has recently pulled out of the Pan-Canadian Framework’s core policy instrument of
a tax on carbon,340 it maintains it will still meet the commitment to reduce GHG emissions by
30%.341 The federal government has indicated it will impose a back-stop tax on carbon in any
province that has not implemented one by 2019, which now includes Ontario and
Saskatchewan.342
The Pan-Canadian Framework estimates that 80% of Canada’s GHG emissions are caused by the
production and use of energy: to power homes, offices, and industrial facilities; to fuel the
transportation of people and goods; to build and heat homes and other types of facilities; to grow
food and transport that food; to fish, manage forests, cut trees, and generally to fuel the
economy.343 But Canada faces a number of particularized challenges in its transition to a lowcarbon economy. It is a large, cold country, with people primarily clustered along its southern
border, but also living at great distances to the North.344 These geographic aspects require
extensive systems of transportation, and intensive amounts of energy for heating, including the
use of carbon-intensive and polluting diesel generators in the North. Moreover, 14.4% of the
<https://globalnews.ca/news/3187254/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-study-pegs-cost-of-lost-buildings-income-andenvironmental-damage-at-9-5b> (revised from nearly $10 billion). Of this, $3.7 billion were insurable losses,
making it the most expensive disaster for insurers in Canadian history. Statistics Canada, Infographic: Fort
McMurray 2016 Wildfire – Economic Impact (16 March 2017), online: Government of Canada
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2017007-eng.htm>. Regarding liability risk, see
“Young Quebecers sue Canada for climate negligence” Montreal Gazette (26 November 2018), online:
<https://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/young-quebecers-sue-canada-for-climate-negligence>.
338 Canada, Environment and natural resources, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate
Change (Gatineau, QC: Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016), online: Government of Canada
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html>
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Canadian economy is tied to the extraction, refining, transport and sale of oil, gas, coal, and
minerals.345 Transitioning away from these GHG-intensive sources of energy and economic inputs
to the Canadian economy over the next decades will have effects on both producers and
consumers; and could disproportionately affect particular provinces in Canada, notably Alberta,
and particular people, such as those individuals who work in the oil, gas, and coal industries.
Given the systemic nature of climate change as a non-diversifiable economic challenge, and the
particularized transition risks in Canada, we submit that the federal government has clear
authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act to implement TCFD disclosure.

3.

The federal government should also work with provincial securities regulators to
encourage provincial securities law to require TCFD disclosure

Notwithstanding its likely jurisdiction under the new Capital Markets Stability Act, the federal
government should also work cooperatively with the provinces, territories and exchanges now to
encourage implementation of TCFD disclosure on a provincial and territorial level, since it is likely
to be some time before the new cooperative Authority is fully operational, and its priorities
established.
The CSA, an umbrella organization of provincial and territorial securities regulators, whose
mission is to “improve, coordinate, and harmonize” securities regulation across Canada, would
be the logical place to begin to develop a collaborative approach to this issue. CSA has already
studied the potential for requiring TCFD disclosure, and has put the matter on a watching brief.
The CSA was engaged in consultations with investors, regulators, and issuers throughout much
of 2017, and on 5 April 2018, the CSA published Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate Changerelated Disclosure Project.346 In the report, regulators stated that they intend to “consider new
disclosure requirements regarding non-venture issuers’ corporate governance practices in
relation to material business risks including emerging or evolving risks and opportunities arising
from climate change.”347 Thus, there would seem to be some receptivity to policy consideration
of at least part of TCFD-type disclosure, perhaps an approach like the SD&A discussed above.348
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Mark Carney has expressed the view recently that it is too early to require TCFD disclosure, that
the framework needs further iteration based on the experiences of early adopters.349 This point
of view needs to be taken seriously, particularly because it is the expression of the person who
initiated the TCFD process. Moreover, the academic literature supports the view that one of the
advantages of voluntary, private self-regulation is that the “regulatory” framework can adapt
more readily to changing circumstances, can evolve relatively quickly over time, and can more
obviously incorporate the experiences of companies using it, versus traditional public laws, which
can become ossified and are difficult to amend.350 Another advantage of voluntary self-regulation
may be that participants become more engaged in meeting the spirit as well as the letter, of its
requirements, and so there may be lower levels of psychological resistance to the
requirements.351
Given the broad support for TCFD disclosure by Canadian banks and investors, it could be that
proceeding along the lines of (a) encouraging strong federal endorsement of TCFD; (b) energizing
banks and investors to pressure their clients to disclose climate-change risks and opportunities
using the TCFD framework; and (c) industry peer-pressure will lead to significant voluntary uptake
of the disclosure framework while the federal Capital Markets Stability Act is being implemented,
and while the CSA continues to study the issue of climate-related financial disclosure.
When the federal government is in a position to require this disclosure, it should take the
approach indicated in our Recommendation 19, to require disclosure according to the “at-thetime current” version of TCFD. This approach would allow the framework for disclosure to evolve
with the experience of companies using it, allowing some of the advantages of self-regulation,
while still employing a mandatory approach. Sweden and Denmark have taken a similar approach
to their sustainability reporting requirements, basing the structure of required sustainability
reporting on voluntary reporting frameworks. Since 2008 public reporting companies in Sweden
must issue an annual sustainability report using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
framework.352 Since January 2009, approximately 1,100 large companies in Denmark, as well as
institutional investors and loan providers, have been required to publish an annual corporate
responsibility report, following a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility. 353
Companies may use their annual reporting to the UN Global Compact as the framework for their
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public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of the Principles
of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the UN Environment Program.354
The safe harbour, discussed in response to Expert Panel Question 3.3(6): below, would protect
corporations as the standards develop.
Recommendation 19:
i.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should
require companies to disclose and address material climate-related financial risk
in its initial regulations, and should peg requirements to international standards
as they develop.

ii.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should
assess whether there is a need to address material environmental, social and
governance systemic risk more generally, in terms of risk to the stability of the
country’s financial system as a whole and the potential to have a material
adverse effect on the Canadian economy.

iii.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should
negotiate with securities administrators across Canada to embed a staged
approach to TCFD disclosure within provincial securities regulation, where
applicable and as standards develop.

Expert Panel Question 3.3(2):
Should the Government of Canada become an official supporter of the TCFD?

1. The extensive process underpinning the TCFD framework is one that the Government of
Canada should recognize
In considering this question, we submit that members of the Expert Panel should consider the
broad, global indications of support from companies and investors, set out above, but also the
derivation of the idea for the TCFD, and the careful way the TCFD recommendations were
developed. TCFD is a project of the FSB, under the leadership of Canada’s former Governor of
the Bank of Canada Mark Carney. Founded in 2009 in reaction to the global financial crisis, the
FSB is an international organization of central bank governors and financial regulators established
by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty (G-20) as a successor to the
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Financial Stability Forum.355 Its remit is to enhance the stability of global financial markets by
monitoring and making recommendations regarding financial regulations and policies.356
As discussed above, the impetus for the TCFD was Governor Carney, who, in a 2015 speech
entitled Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability, 357 identified
climate change as one of the greatest threats to the resilience and prosperity of global financial
markets. Carney promoted the establishment of a climate disclosure task force to assess the
effectiveness of various environmental disclosure regimes and develop an authoritative,
voluntary disclosure framework so that markets could allocate capital properly to promote the
necessary transition to a low-carbon economy.358 In December 2015, the TCFD was established
by the FSB, with Michael Bloomberg as its Chair, and with 32 global industry participants as
members, including people from operating companies, banks, insurance companies, asset
managers, and credit rating agencies.359 Canadians Jane Ambachtsheer (then at Mercer, now
based in Paris) and Stephanie Leaist, CPPIB, were part of the Task Force.
The TCFD was created to develop voluntary climate-related disclosures that “could promote more
informed investment, credit [or lending], and insurance underwriting decisions” that would, in
turn, “enable stakeholders to understand better the concentrations of carbon-related assets in
the financial sector and the financial system’s exposures to climate-related risks.”360 In keeping
with its mandate, the TCFD released a scoping project in which it invited comments in April 2016;
a consultation draft of recommended climate-related financial disclosures in December 2016;
and then a Final Report setting out the TCFD’s recommendations on 29 June 2017.361
Accompanying the Final Report, the TCFD published an Annex providing further specific guidance
on how to report pursuant to its framework;362 and a Technical Supplement providing further
detail on how to develop climate-related scenario analyses.363
The extensive process to develop the TCFD recommendations and disclosure framework is a
reason why so many governments, corporations, financial institutions and investors have
endorsed it as a framework. The federal government’s endorsement of the framework would
provide an important signal to Canada’s capital markets participants that Canada intends to
closely align its capital markets disclosure framework with developments internationally. Then
the new Authority can carefully work through the specifics with other securities regulators.
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Recommendation 20:
The federal government should endorse the TCFD disclosure framework, recognizing that
it is continuing to develop.
Expert Panel Question 3.3(4):
Should larger firms be looked upon to demonstrate leadership to small- and medium sized
enterprises with respect to TCFD disclosure?
1. Cultivate leadership by size of enterprise
Rather than looking to larger firms to demonstrate leadership to small-and medium-sized
enterprises, we suggest that leaders be identified in each category--small, medium, large, and
national enterprise champions. The challenges facing companies of different sizes are distinct,
and the resources available to meet those challenges vary widely according to size. Thus the
approaches taken by a larger firm to various TCFD disclosure issues—identifying, quantifying
where possible, and analyzing risks and opportunities; developing targets for GHG emissions
reductions and metrics; engaging in scenario analyses—may not be relevant to a small firm with
few employees and informal governance systems at best.
The federal government may be able to encourage companies to pursue sustainability disclosure
goals by rewarding leading companies in each size category. Leading companies could be asked
by the federal government to constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders. Companies could be
permitted to advertise their membership in the Council by a certification mark, which would
permit concerned consumers to direct their purchases to sustainability leaders. Empirical
evidence is starting to show that consumers are willing to pay up to 20% more for fair trade goods
and other goods with known sustainability certifications, and that demand for these goods is
higher than for comparably priced, or even lower priced, non-fair trade goods.364 At least where
companies are consumer-facing, being a recognized sustainability leader would presumably have
economic value.
Moreover, by recognizing leaders and celebrating innovation, the government challenges
laggards to improve performance. Japan has used techniques of celebrating leaders and
supporting sector dialogues to improve technological performance. One study suggests that the
greater success of Japanese car companies in reducing emissions versus US companies was based
on the government’s praise of technological innovations and clear expectations that other
Japanese automakers “would have to innovate to reach or exceed a new ceiling as soon as
another Japanese manufacturer took environmental engineering of motor vehicles up through
an old ceiling.”365 A similar technique could be used with respect to sustainability disclosure:
celebrating leaders and implicitly expecting laggards to improve.

364

R Dragusanu, D Giovannucci, and N Nunn, “The Economics of Fair Trade” (2014) 28:3 J of Econ Perspectives
217-236.
365 John Mikler, Greening the Car Industry: Varieties of Capitalism and Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2009), cited in Braithwaite, supra note 350 at 501.

93

Still, it must be recognized that many small and medium enterprises will not have the resources
to invest in new disclosure regimes of unproven benefit to them. Even larger companies express
concerns about how sustainability disclosure may—or may not—be valued by investors. Natural
Resources Canada recently gave support to CPA Canada to do an in-depth study of investors’
expectations of disclosure generally and sustainability disclosure specifically, and how the
information is being used in investment, insurance and underwriting decisions. This avenue of
study is promising. The government should be asked to support in-depth dialogues between
investors and companies in key sectors to develop support for further engagement with TCFD
across sectors and sizes of companies.
Finally, TCFD or other sustainability disclosure should not be understood only as a mechanism to
better inform investors, insurers and underwriters, although it is important in that regard.
Focusing on the underlying facts to be disclosed about governance of climate change risks and
opportunities, risk management, strategy, targets, and metrics is understood to focus attention
on those matters and lead to improvements in processes, cost savings, new products,
innovations, and so forth. As Carney has observed, “you manage what you measure.”366 So if the
government were to establish a Council of Sustainability Leaders recognizing excellent disclosure,
and were to bring participants together annually, or semi-annually, it might help to establish
networks of peers for sharing learning and innovation, much as innovation hubs such as the
Centres for Social Innovation or Green Economy Canada do.
Recommendation 21:
i.

The government should establish criteria to recognize leaders in
sustainability disclosure in each size category (small, medium, large,
national champions) and constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders.

ii.

The government should facilitate dialogues between investors and
companies to develop mutual understandings of what types of
sustainability disclosure is most valuable to investors.

Expert Panel Question 3.3(5):
Is there a need for further guidance on the relationship between climate-related risks and
materiality? How can the understanding of what is material be improved?
World business leaders, members of civil society, and governments recognize that climate change
presents material economic risks. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2019,
published on 15 January 2019, climate change and climate change–related risks dominate the
list, accounting for six of the top ten global risks, identified by both likelihood of occurrence and
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magnitude of impact.367 “Extreme weather events” was identified as the number one likely risk,
and the failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation was number two, both in terms of
likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of negative impact.368 Biodiversity loss, water crises,
food insecurity and large-scale involuntary migration also ranked within the top ten risks facing
the world, each of which is related to climate change.369
The Canadian government has similarly understood that climate change represents material,
economic risks. As just one example, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Lane has
stated that the Bank recognizes that “climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing
Canada and the world in the 21st Century. Climate change itself and actions to address it will have
material and pervasive effects on Canada’s economy and financial system.”370 One difficulty has
been translating these macro-economic and systemic environmental and social risks posed by
climate change into specific, material information individual companies need to discuss and
disclose. It is there that the TCFD process has advanced policy in a fundamental way.
The premise of the TCFD recommendations is that much of the climate-related financial
disclosures they recommend, particularly regarding risk management and governance of climate
change, are already required to be disclosed by existing securities law requirements in the G20
countries, where material.371 As discussed above, however, the quality of both required
(material) and voluntary climate change and ESG disclosure now in Canada is poor.372 This poor
quality of information suggests that there is a need for further guidance on the relationship
between climate-related risks and materiality. In this section we summarize the guidance that
has been provided by Canadian securities regulators to date on the materiality of environmental
information generally, and then discuss recommendations on how to improve that guidance.
It is important to note in this context that what is “material” under securities law is a narrower
concept than under corporate law. Under corporate law, materiality is one lens through which
directors and officers assess risk and opportunity and act with a view to the best interests of the
company. Under securities law, it is aimed at protecting investors, as discussed in this part.

367

World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2019 (2019) at 5, online (pdf): WEF
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf>.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
370 Lane, “Thermometer Rising”, supra note 211.
371 See TCFD, “Final Report”, supra note 250, stating that “The Task force also reviewed financial filing
requirements applicable to public companies across G20 countries and found that in most G20 countries,
issuers have a legal obligation to disclose material information in their financial reports—which includes
material, climate-related information.”
372 See footnote 346. It should be noted that both the CPA Canada and the CSA have recently evaluated
climate-related disclosures, primarily focussed on disclosure required under provincial securities laws and
regulations, and found the quality of such disclosures to be poor. CSA Staff Notice 51-354, supra note 346; CPA
Canada, “State of Play: Study of Climate-Related Disclosures by Canadian Public Companies” (2017), online:
CPA <https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/business-and-accounting-resources/financial-and-non-financialreporting/sustainability-environmental-and-social-reporting/publications/climate-related-disclosure-study>.

95

1.

Guidance on the materiality of environmental information to date

As discussed above, the requirements set out in provincial and territorial securities legislation are
the primary source of disclosure obligations for publicly-listed corporations in Canada, but they
are based on nationally harmonized standards agreed to by regulators.373 General disclosure
obligations are primarily provided by National Instrument 41-101 General Prospectus Standards
(“NI 41-101”) for primary market transactions, and National Instrument 51-102 Continuous
Disclosure Obligations (“NI 51-102”) for secondary market transactions and continuing
disclosure.374 According to those instruments, issuers’ disclosures must generally provide “full,
true, and plain disclosure of all material facts”; issuers must also notify security holders of any
material changes to their business and operations.375
Three changes in the market motivated the CSA in 2010 to issue specific guidance on
environmental reporting in CSA Staff Notice 51-533: “increasing impacts on issuers of
environmental matters; the changing environmental regulatory landscape; and increasing
investor interest in environmental matters.”376 A staff notice is a less formal communication from
the CSA than a National Instrument, often, as here, to provide guidance on “emerging regulatory
problems that have not yet become the subject of a policy or a rule.”377 Staff Notice 51-533 was
published in an effort to “assist issuers in assessing which information must be disclosed on
material environmental matters, such as risks related to weather patterns or environmental
legislation”.378 In specific, CSA Notice 51-333 was drafted to provide guidance on definitions and
principles concerning the following areas of disclosure:379
 Material Information (that is, the materiality of environmental information)
 Environmental risks and related matters
 Environmental risk oversight and management
 Forward-looking information requirements as they relate to environmental goals
and targets
 Impact of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards on disclosure
of environmental liabilities.380
It is important to point out that Canadian environmental disclosure requirements are part of
disclosure obligations generally, as established in NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations. In
other words, environmental disclosure obligations are not housed in a distinct instrument or
373
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piece of legislation, but rather, are an application of the general disclosure obligations of NI 51102. Staff Notice 51-333 states that environmental matters comprise a “broad range of issues,
including air, land, water and waste”, which can affect issuers in several ways, “including
interrupting operations, resulting in material unplanned costs, providing new business
opportunities, and potentially affecting reputation, capital expenditures, and a license to
operate”.381 Bearing in mind the source and scope of environmental disclosure in Canada, what
follows is an overview of the purpose of Staff Notice 51-333 and the guidance it sets out for
issuers on the topic of materiality.
i.

Purpose of Staff Notice 51-333

The purpose of CSA Notice 51-333 “is to provide guidance to reporting issuers (other than
investment funds) on existing continuous disclosure requirements relating to environmental
matters under securities legislation”.382 The Notice is intended to assist issuers with: (1)
determining what information about environmental matters needs to be disclosed, and (2)
enhancing or supplementing their disclosure regarding environmental matters, as necessary.383
ii.

Materiality of environmental information

The determining factor in considering whether information should be disclosed under securities
disclosure laws generally is materiality. The test for materiality is objective: “information . . . is
likely material if a reasonable investor’s decision whether or not to buy, sell or hold securities of
the issuer would likely be influenced or changed if the information was omitted or misstated”.384
Where the information is deemed to be material, it must be disclosed. In order to assist issuers
with determinations of the materiality of environmental information, the Notice sets out several
guiding principles for determining the materiality of information generally.
One caveat to note here is that CSA Staff Notice 51-333 states that it reviewed many “discussions
of materiality in the environmental context” in arriving at its guiding principles for determining
the materiality of environmental information, including reviewing five specific documents on
climate change disclosure.385 There is nothing specific to climate change disclosure in its
discussion of material information, nor in its Staff Notice generally, although there are a number
of examples of climate-related disclosures set out in the Appendix. Certainly there is no guidance
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on climate-related financial disclosure of the kind now provided by the TCFD Final Report and
supplemental materials.
The first guiding principle stated by the CSA is that there is no-bright line test for materiality.386 In
order to make it clear that there is no quantitate threshold for materiality, the CSA states that
issuers should consider both qualitative and quantitative environmental factors when deciding
whether environmental matters are material and require disclosure.387 As such, materiality is a
flexible concept that varies between issuers and industries according to the circumstance.388 In
other words, an event that may warrant disclosure by one issuer, such as perhaps a small issuer,
may not be material to another, larger issuer.
The second guiding principle is that determinations of materiality depend on the context.389
Though certain facts and events may not be material on their own, they may be material if
considered “in light of all the facts available”.390 Conversely, some facts and events are material
on their own. In any case, issuers should not assess the materiality of individual facts, but rather
holistically consider the total mix of facts.391
The next two guiding principles are closely related with an issuer’s projected lifecycle. The third
guiding principle, being the timing of disclosures, is driven by the circumstances of the issuer.392
For instance, an issuer that is expected to have a long investment cycle, or develop and
implement new technologies throughout its projected investment cycle, may be more
susceptible to the impacts of gradual environmental change.393 As such, an issuer should consider
whether the impact of an environmental matter “might reasonably be expected to grow over
time, in which case the matter may be considered material and warrant early disclosure on the
basis that it might be important to reasonable investors”.394 Similarly, issuers should also
understand how their business will intersect with known trends, demands, commitments, events
and uncertainties. Accordingly, the next principle states that, when an issuer’s affairs are (or will
be) affected by a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, such information should be
disclosed.395 Issuers should consider their operational time horizon and assess the probability
and the magnitude of the effects imposed by a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
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– such that environmental matters that are likely to come to fruition within the projected
investment cycle of an issuer and materially affect its business and operations are disclosed.396
The last principle articulates the CSA’s general pro-disclosure approach. As it states, “if there is
any doubt about whether particular information is material”, the CSA “encourages issuers to err
on the side of materiality and disclose the information”.397

2. Improving the understanding of what is material
The CSA’s discussion of materiality in Staff Notice 51-333 shows that well-meaning and wellcounseled issuers have good, general, principles-based guidance on the disclosure of
environmental issues in securities documents and financial statements. Yet this guidance does
not provide specific, clear, and comprehensive guidance on the disclosure of specific climaterelated information, since “materiality” as the screen for what is to be disclosed is a principlesbased concept. In our view, therefore, using the TCFD Framework to structure companies’
disclosure would give investors a clearer, more consistent, and more easily comparable picture
of how companies are thinking about, and managing, their current and future challenges from
the changing climate and regulatory efforts to mitigate and adapt to those climatic changes.
In the Annex accompanying its recommendations, the TCFD provided further details on its
recommended disclosures, using a structure comparable to other voluntary disclosure initiatives
(eg, GRI, the Carbon Disclosure Project’s (CDP) climate surveys, SASB): disclosure guidance for all
sectors, including financial institutions; and then sector-specific disclosures. For all sectors,
specific disclosures are identified relating to each of the four thematic areas: governance,
strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.398 For all sectors, there is no materiality
screen for disclosures related to governance and risk management, since these are matters
assumed to be of importance to investors across the board; but for strategy, metrics and targets
materiality judgments are still relevant.399 Thus, some of the difficulties that the concept of
materiality presents will still need to be addressed, particularly how company by company
materiality determinations should be evaluated in light of systemic risks where each company’s
contribution to the problem matters, but may not be independently “material” in the total
economic output of that individual company. For asset managers, the “Task Force recommends
including carbon foot-printing information in reports to clients and beneficiaries independent of
a materiality assessment.”400
Sector-specific disclosures are identified for financial institutions, including banks, insurance
companies, asset managers and asset owners (investors); and then for sectors particularly
vulnerable to material financial implications from the physical effects of climate change and the
transition to a low-carbon economy. The Task Force identifies those vulnerable sectors as energy;
396
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transportation; materials and buildings; and agriculture, food and forestry.401 Again, sectorspecific, detailed guidance is provided for disclosure across the four thematic areas of
governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.
It is clear from the TCFD analysis that few significant sectors are understood not to be particularly
vulnerable to climate change effects and transition efforts. That analysis is consistent with the
conclusion of the US-based SASB that 72 of 79 industries, representing 93% of capital market
valuations, are vulnerable to material financial implications from climate change, although the
implications are obviously different for different sectors.402
The TCFD guidance would encourage corporations to disclose more climate-related information,
and give investors insight into the company’s process of considering ESG factors and asking
questions regarding materiality. This guidance thus clarifies reporting responsibilities for issuers
in a quite useful way. In every case, what is material is a fact-specific evaluation, based on the
company; its industry and physical locations; its financial assets, liabilities, and exposure to
climate risk and transition risk; its preparations for climate-related challenges, and so forth. In
other words, further materiality guidance of a general nature is unlikely to be possible. Rather,
the specific, sector-specific guidance of TCFD will be beneficial.
Recommendation 22:
The federal government should encourage securities regulators and the CSA to direct
companies to use the TCFD sector guidance and SASB guidance when determining the
materiality of climate-related disclosures and when disclosing information about
governance, risk management, company strategy, and targets and metrics within the
construct of their continuous disclosure.

Expert Panel Question 3.3(6):
Are there mechanisms that would help overcome the hesitation to make appropriate
disclosures with uncertain information in good faith, such as some form of regulatory safe
harbour?

1. A safe harbour for ESG disclosure
In addition to the protections from liability discussed above for the codified fiduciary duties of all
directors and officers, it makes sense to also consider a regulatory “safe harbour” for disclosure
by publicly-listed companies of either climate-related financial risk or ESG risk. While the
corporate law provisions specify the obligation to consider ESG factors and to address them if
they are material, securities law disclosure requirements are aimed at providing information to
401
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the capital markets so that investors can make informed decisions as to buy, hold or sell their
securities. Thus securities disclosure engages a narrower set of stakeholders than corporate law.
NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure403 already provides a safe harbour for a reporting issuer
regarding material forward-looking information, as well as “forward looking financial
information” (“FOFI”).404 The disclosure cautions users that actual results may vary from the
forward-looking information and identifies material risk factors that could cause material
variation.405 NI-51-102 defines FOFI as forward-looking information about prospective financial
performance, financial position or cash flows, based on assumptions about future economic
conditions and courses of action, and presented in the format of a historical statement of financial
position, statement of comprehensive income or statement of cash flows.406 “Forward-looking
information” means disclosure regarding possible events, conditions or financial performance
that is based on assumptions about future economic conditions and courses of action and
includes future-oriented financial information with respect to prospective financial performance,
financial position or cash flows that is presented as a forecast or a projection.”407 NI 51-102
contains provisions to avoid duplication with existing mineral and oil and gas disclosure
requirements.408
Pursuant to NI 51-102, a reporting issuer must disclose the material factors or assumptions used
to develop material forward-looking information.409 The factors or assumptions should be
relevant to the forward-looking information. The CSA has stated that disclosure of material
factors or assumptions does not require an exhaustive statement of every factor or assumption
applied – a materiality standard applies.410
403
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Conceptually and practically, in the initial period requiring disclosure of ESG in financial
statements, it makes sense to create a safe harbour in respect of disclosure of risks that may
appear material now but later are determined not to be material or that turn out to be even more
material than originally disclosed. While the metrics and accounting standards are being
developed and implemented, there is likely to be a period over the next several years in which
the standards will be refined. Thus, safe harbour language for disclosure of ESG information and
ESG financial information makes sense. The FOFI provisions offer a good starting point as a model.
The reality is that amendments to NI-51-102 will have to be negotiated by the CSA, and in this
respect, the federal government will not be able to unilaterally act as it is not responsible for day
to day securities regulation over continuing disclosure. There are some aspects of ESG disclosure,
such as climate-related financial risk, which may be so systematically important that the
government should require disclosure in a regulation under the new Capital Markets Stability Act,
as discussed above. Otherwise, the implementation of a safe harbour will be subject to provincial
and territorial regulatory oversight, for some provinces, now under the umbrella of the new
national Authority.
Clearly securities regulators are best equipped with the skill and knowledge to draft ESG
disclosure safe harbour language, but the point of the draft text below is to show that ESG
disclosure under securities law can be limited to material information, and it can provide a safe
harbour by cautioning readers of the disclosures that results may vary as new information
develops.
Importantly, the ESG disclosure safe harbour would not be confined only to forward looking
information, but all ESG reporting. The point is to have directors and officers determine which
ESG factors are material, what the risks and opportunities are, and how they are acting on these
risks and opportunities. The safe harbour recognizes that as ESG disclosure evolves, readers of
the information should understand that it is evolving and that the disclosure may change as
understandings of risks, opportunities and how to measure them improve. Here again, such a
safe harbour will encourage longer-term sustainability planning and provide protection against
short-termism pressure by “impatient capital”. The safe harbour is a method under securities
law to protect directors and officers in their duly diligent efforts to disclose material ESG factors
to investors, regulators and the broader public.
Recommendation 23:
The Expert Panel should recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly
diligent directors and officers (possible draft language in red italics):
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIROMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE INFORMATION
1. Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) Information
(1) This Part applies to ESG information that is disclosed by a reporting issuer
other than ESG information contained in oral statements.

102

2.

Disclosure
(1) A reporting issuer that discloses material ESG information must include
disclosure that
(a) cautions users of the ESG information that actual results may vary in
the future due to refinements in metrics to measure risks and
opportunities and identifies material risk factors that could cause results
to differ materially from the reported ESG information;
(c) states the material factors or assumptions used to develop the ESG
information; and
(d) describes the reporting issuer’s policy for updating ESG information.
(2) ESG outlook information that is based on assumptions that are reasonable
in the circumstances must, without limitation,
(a) be limited to a period for which the information in the ESG outlook
can be reasonably reported or be estimated; and
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered.
(3) This Part does not apply to disclosure that is (a) subject to requirements
in National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas
Activities or National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral
Projects; made to comply with the conditions of any exemption from the
requirements that a reporting issuer received from a regulator or securities
regulatory authority unless the regulator or securities regulatory authority
orders that this Part applies to disclosure made under the exemption; or
contained in an oral statement.

3. Reasonable Basis
A reporting issuer is not required to disclose ESG information unless the issuer has
a reasonable basis for considering the information to be material.
4. A reporting issuer that discloses ESG information must include disclosure that
states the date management approved the ESG information.
5. ESG Financial Information
(1) A reporting issuer must not disclose ESG financial information unless it is
reasonable in the circumstances,
(a) is limited to a period for which the information in the ESG financial
information or financial outlook can be reasonably measured or
estimated; and
(b) uses the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered by
the ESG information or the financial outlook.
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(2) The issuer must explain the ESG financial information in the financial
statements and the notes to the financial statements.
(3) The issuer must disclose the date management approved the ESG financial
information and explain the purpose of the ESG financial information and
caution readers that the information may not be appropriate for other
purposes.
(4) The issuer must disclose any year to year change in reporting ESG metrics
used.
The idea is that an issuer must have a reasonable basis on which to consider material ESG
information and ESG financial information disclosed in financial statements. As with FOFI
disclosure, the ESG disclosure should not be “boilerplate in nature”.411 If a reasonable investor’s
decision whether to buy, sell or hold securities of the reporting issuer would be influenced or
changed if the information were omitted or misstated, then the information is material. 412
Disclosure of material ESG information should be presented in a manner that allows an investor
who reads the document or other material containing the ESG information to be able to readily
understand the information and inform him/her or itself of the material assumptions underlying
the ESG information and/or ESG financial information and the material risk factors associated
with the information.413
Of note is that developing appropriate disclosures, including ESG information, is an ongoing
process. The record of existing disclosures under current securities regulation attests to this
ongoing process. In fiscal 2018, of 840 securities reviews the CSA conducted, 51% of issuers
reviewed were required to take action to improve and/or amend their financial statement
disclosures or resulted in issuers being sanctioned for failing to meet disclosure requirements in
their financial statements.414 There are continuing issues relating to financial disclosures in
compliance with the requirements of the IFRS, which include mining technical reports, climate
change disclosure, incorrectly classifying cash flows as investing or financing activities on the
statement of cash flows, and a number of other deficiencies.415 The CSA notes that many issuers
across a wide range of industries could be materially impacted by climate change and yet many
of these issuers either provide boilerplate disclosure or fail to provide disclosures of climate

411

51-102CP, supra note 405.
Ibid.
413 Ibid re forward looking information.
414 CSA Staff Notice 51-355 Continuous Disclosure Review Program Activities for the fiscal years ended March
31, 2018 and March 31, 2017 (19 July 2018), online: OSC
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20180719_51-355_continuous-disclosure-reviewprogram.htm>.
415 Ibid.
412

104

change-related financial risks and opportunities.416 To date, most disclosure of climate risks has
failed to be sufficiently specific to the issuer and its finances and operations.417
It will therefore be no surprise that fully embedding ESG factors in financial statements will take
some time, effort and resources. The safe harbour provision would protect the good faith efforts
of directors and officers of publicly-listed companies with respect to their securities law disclosure
requirements.

Expert Panel Question 3.3(7):
What is the role of a board - and specifically the audit committee - in overseeing climaterelated financial disclosures?

1. Both the board and the audit committee are vitally important to effective oversight of ESG
financial disclosures, including climate-related financial disclosures
The role of both the board and the audit committee is vitally important to the successful
transition of Canadian corporations to a sustainable future, particularly important with respect
to climate-related financial disclosures because the risks are rapidly becoming a reality and the
capacity to move swiftly and effectively to address climate-related risk has become an imperative.
The TCFD recommends that financial reporting of climate-related financial risk should be subject
to the same requirements as other corporate reporting and thus involve review by the chief
financial officer and audit committee, as appropriate.”418 As a core function, the board has a role
in overseeing climate-related financial disclosures and risk management, as it has oversight of all
significant risk factors, including ESG factors. Depending on the size of the company, it may be
the board itself, an enterprise risk management committee or the audit committee. Whatever
the designated structure in which ESG risks are being identified, reporting must be made directly
to the full board; directors should be made aware of the risks and whether they are material, and
how the risks are being managed, so that they can engage in proactive oversight.
If, as recommended above, ESG factors are required to be reported in financial statements, the
national instrument on audit committees will be helpful. National Instrument 52-110 Audit
Committees419 (“NI 52-110”) establishes requirements for the responsibilities, composition, and
416
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authority of audit committees. An audit committee of the board of directors has responsibility
for oversight of the financial reporting process, which includes helping directors meet their
responsibilities, providing better communication between the directors and the external
auditors, enhancing the independence of the external auditor, increasing the credibility and
objectivity of financial reports, and strengthening the role of the directors by facilitating in-depth
discussions among directors, management, and the external auditor.420 NI 52-110 also sets
financial literacy requirements for audit committee members.421 It means that ESG factors, if
included in financial reporting, will be subject to the standards of review of the audit committee,
providing greater assurance of the accuracy and reasonableness of the disclosures.
Also relevant to this question is National Instrument 52-109 Certification Disclosure in Issuer’s
Annual and Interim Filings422 (“NI 52-109”), which was promulgated to improve the quality,
reliability and transparency of annual filings, interim filings and other materials that issuers
submit under securities legislation. NI 52-109 requires an issuer’s chief executive officer (“CEO”)
and chief financial officer (“CFO”), or persons performing similar functions to a CEO or CFO
(referred to as certifying officers), to personally certify: that the issuer’s annual filings and interim
filings do not contain any misrepresentations; that the financial statements and other financial
information in the annual and interim filings fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations, and cash flows of the issuer; that they have designed or
supervised design of disclosure controls and procedures (“DC&P”) and internal control over
financial reporting (“ICFR”); that they have caused the issuer to disclose in its MD&A any change
in the issuer’s ICFR that has materially affected the issuer’s ICFR; and, on an annual basis, that
they have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s DC&P and caused the issuer to disclose their
conclusions about the effectiveness of DC&P in the issuer’s MD&A.423
This certification requirement means that if federal corporate law or Canadian securities law is
amended to require disclosure of ESG material information in financial statements, the certifying
officers of publicly-issuing corporations will have to personally certify the accuracy and quality of
the disclosures. They are required to certify that the financial statements fairly present the
420
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interim certificates is to reflect the overall financial health of the issuer and includes the issuer’s financial
position, as shown on the balance sheet, and other factors that may affect the issuer’s liquidity, capital
resources, and solvency; see 52-109CP (1 January 2011), s 4.2.
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financial condition of the issuer, that there are internal controls to ensure that material
information is conveyed to decision-makers, and that they have disclosed to the auditor and audit
committee any significant deficiencies in internal control and any fraud, material or not, that
involved managers or other employees who have a significant role in the company’s internal
controls.424 This degree of scrutiny will play a pivotal role in the disclosure of ESG financial
information, including climate-related financial risk.

Expert Panel Question 3.3(8):
Are there any other standards that could be combined with the TCFD to reduce reporting
burden?

1. Canada can benefit from international reporting standards already developed
The TCFD sector-specific disclosure guidance referenced above (see discussion of Expert Panel
Question 3.3(5)) has been prepared with a view to aligning TCFD’s disclosure recommendations
for energy; transportation; materials and buildings; and agriculture, food and forestry with the
other leading disclosure standards: the GRI framework; the Carbon Disclosure Project Standards
Board; and the SASB standards. As a result, requiring disclosure according with TCFD’s proposals,
as recommended above, obviates the need to canvass other reporting standards for synergies,
as that alignment is already occurring.
Along with an expansion of materiality standards, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB)
has a framework for identifying material environmental information that should assist
organizations in disclosing material climate risks.425 The framework involves an organization's
activities that will likely give rise to environmental impacts and affect the organization’s operation
of its business model and its strategy. The CDSB includes activities such as changes in resource
availability, supply, pricing, degradation, and policy constraints that could impact resources and
relationships the organization is dependent on.426 For instance, an organization’s activity may
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cause stakeholders to act against the company in order to protect environmental resources they
are negatively impacting.427

V.

AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR LENDERS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE
TRANSITION TO A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY

Both debt and equity investors have an important role in promoting Canada’s transition to a low
carbon economy. As noted above, many institutional investors in Canada have already recognized
the importance of this role. Internationally, there is considerable leadership whereby
institutional investors are committed to identifying and managing portfolio risks in order to
facilitate the transition to low emissions, and to accelerate the integration of climate change
analysis into the management of large, long-term and diversified asset pools.428 415 investors
with more than $30 trillion US in assets under management have called on the G7 countries to
act now to address climate-related financial risk, including accelerating private sector investment
into the low carbon transition and committing to improve climate-related financial reporting.429
In Canada, financial institutions are extremely well-positioned to help shift the trajectory of
climate-related financial risk in both their debt and equity investment decisions. Currently, 16
financial institutions and their 51 subsidiaries have an aggregate qualifying market value of
$597.6 billion and comprise 71.2% of all financial services trading on the TSX.430 In addition, there
are 71 privately-owned financial institutions, 27 domestic subsidiaries of foreign companies,
publicly traded on foreign markets and 175 foreign-owned institutions operating in Canada.431
The investment power of these institutions could be effectively deployed in the shift to a
sustainable economy. More importantly, absent their active support of the transition, Canada is
unlikely to be able to effectively address the impending transition risks to its economy or meet
its international commitments under the Paris Agreement.
Yet despite the leadership of some institutional investors,432 there are counter-pressures to
moving towards sustainable finance. On the debt side, our significant financial institutions are
well resourced to foster the move towards sustainable finance. However, amending fiduciary
427
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obligation alone will not shift the trajectory. Capital markets have changed significantly in the past
two decades in nature and size, in the maturing of Canadian securities regulation that has allowed
access to international capital pools, and in the shift from bank lending to public and private
market non-bank lending.433 The ease of capital movement and the accompanying exponential
increase in pressure for short-term investor returns has led many companies to pay out dividends
in preference to investing in the longer-term sustainability of firms.434 Intercompany credit
arrangements have become common, where assets of Canadian companies are encumbered to
finance operations of related entities in foreign jurisdictions.435 New products and strategies in
the structure of finance, including syndication, securitization and collateralization, have
profoundly altered the nature of debt.436 The result has been a fundamental shift in credit
relationships from the many years of relational lending to a situation where both domestic and
foreign creditors have little interest or direct connection with Canadian domestic corporations
and their stakeholders, other than an interest in short-term returns on their investment.
The result of these developments is that directors and officers of financial institutions can fully
act in the best interests of their institution and continue their lending practices of financing
carbon-intensive sectors. If the risk is fully hedged through securitization of the loan, or the risk
substantially reduced through syndicated lending, they will meet the best interests threshold test
as currently construed. What is needed, therefore, is more: some action that will ensure lenders
shift credit patterns to actually address climate-related financial risk. A first step is disclosure:
how are they taking steps in their portfolio construction, oversight of debt compliance and
engagement activities to ensure Canada is moving towards a lower carbon economy? Combined
with pricing ESG in financial statements, as recommended above, it will encourage financial
institutions to move towards more sustainable finance.
The same obligations should be placed on debt and equity institutional investors and asset
managers, given the increased market share of private equity funds, mutual funds and pension
plan investment firms. It will shift the minds, and hopefully the capital, of institutional investors
and asset managers towards potential investments in green infrastructure and technologies.
The federal government should adopt legislation similar to that enacted in France to require
institutional investors, including mutual funds and pension funds, to disclose annually the
financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s measures to reduce
them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every component of their
activities, and how their corporate and investment decision-making is contributing to the energy
and ecological transition to limit global warming. Relevant for this report are the requirements
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that institutional investors publish commitments on responsible investment regarding climate
change risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with their fiduciary duties.
In 2015, the French National Assembly enacted La Loi de transition énergetique pour la croissance
verte (the Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth), aimed at reducing GHG emissions,
capping fossil fuel production and increasing renewable energy usage.437 Article 173 of the Law
introduces the first mandatory requirements for institutional investors, including mutual funds
and pension funds.438 Institutional investors must disclose how their investment decision-making
takes ESG criteria into consideration, and disclose how they are contributing to the energy and
ecological transition to limit global warming.439 The law is an important step forward in
addressing climate financial risk, both in the transparent and accountable reporting required and
the obligation to disclose the specific manner in which climate change issues are being addressed.
The European Commission has proposed that institutional investors and money managers
demonstrate how their investments align with ESG factors under proposed regulations pursuant
to its action plan for financing sustainable growth.440 Among the proposals are regulations to
introduce consistency and clarity on how institutional investors, including pension funds and
insurance companies, should integrate ESG in investment decision-making processes. In
November 2018, the European Commission adopted a strategic long-term vision for a
prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy by 2050, “A Clean Planet for
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All”.441 The strategy focuses on investing in realistic technological solutions, empowering citizens,
and aligning action in key areas such as industrial policy, finance and research, while ensuring
social fairness for a just transition.442 The Action Plan on Sustainable Finance is aimed at
connecting finance with the EU's agenda for sustainable development, while the European
Commission's proposal for a unified classification system or taxonomy on sustainable economic
activities and proposed rules for low-carbon benchmarks and improved disclosure requirements
for investment products is aimed at enhancing transparency and helping investors with targeting
the right investments.443
We have an excellent role model within Canada. The Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec
(CDPQ) has an impressive investment strategy to address climate change, which is built on four
pillars:
1. CDPQ is factoring in climate change in every investment decision.
2. CDPQ is committed to increasing its low carbon investments by 50%, $8 billion, by
2020.
3. CDPQ is committed to reducing its carbon footprint by 25% per dollar invested by
2025, setting a carbon target covering all its asset classes.
4. CDPQ is committed to exercising strong leadership in accounting for climate risk and
will publish audited information on its portfolio’s GHG emissions annually.444
CDPQ’s strategy offers a frame of reference for what the federal government could mandate.
Recommendation 24 on disclosure would be an important first step. While this report discusses
ESG disclosure at length, the role of institutional debt and equity investors in addressing climaterelated financial risk and opportunity is of such importance, it is deserving of its own targeted
recommendation.
Recommendation 24:
The federal government should adopt requirements to require debt and equity
institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension funds, to
disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the
company’s measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon
strategy in each component of their activities, and how their corporate and investment
decision-making is contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global
warming.
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VI.

INITIATING THE REFORM PROCESS

The recommendations that we have made are extensive, and both the Expert Panel and the
federal government are likely to have priorities in what legislative reform is addressed first. We
note that of the 72 questions posed by the Expert Panel, the majority will not require legislative
change. However, our recommendations focus on areas of law that are already codified and
require amendment to reflect developments in the common law and in international standards.
The executive summary sets out our top four priorities.
If addressed on an individual statute basis, the process is clear: a bill proposing a new law or
amendments to existing law is introduced in either the Senate or the House of Commons, often
after a public consultation process on possible amendments to existing statues or a new draft bill.
The bill is tabled, then debated in the chamber of Parliament, and if approved for further
consideration, it is sent to a parliamentary committee for study and amendments if needed. The
bill is then brought for final reading and a vote; if it passes, it goes to the other chamber and the
process is repeated. Once the bill has been passed by both Chambers in identical form, it goes to
the Governor General for Royal Assent and is in force in Canadian law on a named date.
On a statute by statute basis, easiest to amend is the CBCA because it has a well-established
consultation and legislative process, as evidenced by recent amendments on board diversity. One
option would be to start with the CBCA and then work to amend the other federal incorporation
statutes to align. If the approach is to be statute by statute, we recommend that the Bank Act
and the Insurance Companies Act would also be the highest priorities, in terms of impact. We
note, however, that the recent amendments to the corporate board diversity provisions
simultaneously amended the CBCA, the Canada Cooperatives Act, The Canada Not-for-profit
Corporations Act and the Competition Act;445 so there is recent precedent for amending a number
of statutes on the same issue in one parliamentary bill.
The federal government should also implement a more overarching strategy on sustainable
finance by having a “framework strategy”, which it has used recently in its process regarding a
federal financial sector framework. In this framework strategy, the federal government
examined, on a broader basis, how to advance a financial sector legislative and regulatory
framework that supports stability, in terms of safety, soundness and resilience; efficiency, in
terms of encouraging competitively priced products and services, including efficiency gains to
customers, accommodating innovation, and effectively contributing to economic growth; and
utility, in terms of meeting the needs of an array of consumers, including businesses, individuals
and families.446 It commenced with a 2016 consultation paper and process, publishing responses
and submissions.447 It then conducted a second consultation stage in 2017 that proposed specific
445
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policy measures.448 That process is in the final stages, the Department of Finance Canada now
working on legislative reforms for consideration by Parliament prior to the statutory sunset date
of 29 March 2019, as well as having the suggestions and recommendations inform the
Department's longer-term approaches to the financial sector.449
In terms of the Expert Panel’s recommendations, the recommendations for federally-regulated
financial institutions, recommendations 7 to 13 of our report, should be included in the legislative
proposals coming forward in early 2019. They meet the express goals of the financial framework
process: stability, efficiency and utility; and are aimed at the protection of consumers, businesses
and other stakeholders. It would result in treating the federally-regulated financial institutions
on a level playing field in terms of ESG requirements being embedded in law.
The Expert Panel should also recommend a framework approach to the fiduciary obligations of
all federally-regulated entities and ESG considerations such as we have proposed here. It should
propose a series of legislative changes related to ESG across a variety of statutes as a framework
approach to effective governance and risk management, seeking community responses to the
express proposals and initiating the parliamentary process. That would assist in developing a
broad-based policy approach to ESG, and assist in creating a level playing field, as all federallyregistered companies would be subject to the new provisions at the same time.
Most of the recommendations in our report fall directly under federal jurisdiction and thus could
be implemented using one of these strategies. A few call on federal-provincial cooperation,
which, as noted in this report, will take more time and energy, but are nonetheless possible.
On climate-related financial risk more specifically, the Expert Panel should consider whether
some of its recommendations fall within the current federal government process of climate
action incentives, the public consultation process of which just closed.450 This process follows on
enactment of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act,451 but looks more systemically on creating
pricing incentives to shift Canada to a lower carbon economy. Some of its recommendations may
align with the federal government’s efforts to address these issues in a timely manner.

VII. A MECHANISM FOR ONGOING DIALOGUE AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT
The Expert Panel should also consider making a recommendation to the federal government to
establish a longer-term mechanism for ongoing dialogue and actions on aligning financial policies
and regulations with low carbon sustainable economy transition, so that there is a mechanism in
448
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place for evolution of fiduciary obligation, disclosure and transition strategies, and a coordinated
source for information on developments internationally as they occur. It is critically important
that the government stay engaged with the financial sector regarding the shift to a low carbon
economy, and that this engagement also includes other sectors of the economy, as well as
Indigenous peoples, and both urban and rural communities across Canada. The transition is both
challenging and exciting, and what is needed is a range of financial and other expert
conversations, including how best to leverage Canada’s natural and financial assets in this
transition.
One possible option is an institute on sustainable finance. There are different models. The UK
Government and the City of London have co-created and co-funded, in 2019 a new Green Finance
Institute that will act as the focal point for future UK green finance activity, a “one-stop-shop for
world-leading climate science, and for capital”.452 The Green Finance Institute is aimed at
accelerating green finance across a range of thematic areas, including green fintech solutions,
advancing international partnerships, supporting green finance policy and enhancing
communications and branding.453 It is to advance an innovative, coordinated agenda to ensure
London’s green finance approach continues to represent the cutting edge; work with other Green
Finance centres to shape international dialogues on green and sustainable finance; partner with
the private sector to deliver recommendations and support the UK Government’s Green Finance
Strategy; collaborate with universities to promote innovation and data analytics; and work closely
with the UK Government and regulators to ensure policy that supports the growth of green and
sustainable finance.454
The UK Green Finance Institute has been created at the same time as a new venture capital fund,
the Clean Growth Fund, in which the UK will invest £20 million, alongside at least £20 million from
private investors, in an investment fund to support new clean technology at early stages, making
direct investments in companies seeking to commercialize promising innovative green
solutions.455 It has sought proposals from prospective fund managers that will be responsible for
raising the private sector portion of fund investment of 50% or more.456
Other models include university-based models. The Smith School of Business Oxford Sustainable
Finance Programme at Oxford University and its Global Sustainable Finance Advisory Council is
researching environment-related risks, impacts, and opportunities across different sectors and
452
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asset classes; how such factors are emerging and how they positively or negatively affect asset
values; how they might be interrelated or correlated; their materiality (in terms of scale, impact,
timing, and likelihood); who will be affected; and what affected groups can do to pre-emptively
manage risk.457 Also in the UK, the Cambridge Centre for Sustainable Finance at Cambridge
University is aimed at building a sustainable financial system through strong partnerships that
bridge traditional academic and industry boundaries. It is developing research on the efficacy of
regulatory standards and practices in promoting the movement of capital into sustainable
business; the governance of the financial system with respect to the Sustainable Development
Goals; the potential gains and losses in financial markets as a consequence of climate change,
inequality and ecosystem degradation; whether responsible investment practices create more
stable and profitable institutions; and the impact of active ownership and engagement on
corporate sustainability performance.458
Similarly, Canada needs an independent research and policy body that can assist both public and
private sectors to build capacity.
Recommendation 25:
The Expert Panel should recommend that the federal government create a Sustainable
Finance Institute aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian
economy, including working with the private sector, regulators, universities, nongovernmental organizations, and green finance institutes internationally to further
develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The interim report of the Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance was an important first step in the
public policy discussion regarding how to ensure Canada is sustainable financially in the long
term. All of the questions posed in the report need careful consideration and specific proposals
need to be developed, but the policy recommendations generated must be timely and should be
implemented expeditiously. For climate-related financial risk, there is an urgent time imperative
that affects all Canadians in their daily economic and social lives. There is also the requirement to
act in order to meet Canada’s international commitments. For ESG more generally, it merits
serious consideration of expanding the need to address climate-related risks and opportunities
to these other important factors. It is hoped that our response to 12 of the 72 questions posed
by the Expert Panel contributes to moving the federal government forward to take action now.
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APPENDIX 1 Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 1:
The current fiduciary obligation under the CBCA should be amended to incorporate ESG
factors as follows (in red italics):
Duty of care of directors and officers
122 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and
discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
122(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.

Recommendation 2:
Amend section 148 of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act459 to read (in red italics):
Duties of directors and officers
148 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and
discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
459
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148(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, members, shareholders, employees,
retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.

Recommendation 3:
The fiduciary obligation of the directors and officers pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board Act is virtually the same as many other federal statutes and the Act
should be amended to incorporate ESG as follows (in red italics)
Duty of care
14 (1) Every director and officer of the Board in exercising any of the powers of
a director or an officer and in discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Board;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of
the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
Special knowledge or skill
14(2) A director or officer of the Board who in fact possesses, or by reason of
profession or business ought to possess, a particular level of knowledge or skill
relevant to the director’s or officer’s powers or duties shall employ that
particular level of knowledge or skill in the exercise of those powers or the
discharge of those duties.
14(3) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, retirees,
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their
decisions.

Recommendation 4:
Amend sections 8(4.1) and 8(4.2) of the Canada Pension Benefits Standards Act by adding
the follow language (in red italics):
Manner of investing assets
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8(4.1) The administrator shall invest the assets of a pension fund in accordance
with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person
would apply in respect of a portfolio of investments of a pension fund, and in
exercising this authority, will consider environmental, social and governance
factors.
Investment choices
8(4.2) A pension plan may permit a member, former member, survivor or former
spouse or former common law partner of a member or former member to make
investment choices with respect to their account maintained in respect of a
defined contribution provision or with respect to their account maintained for
additional voluntary contributions, and to inform that choice, the pension
administrator should provide information on environmental, social and
governance factors to the member, former member, survivor or former spouse or
former common law partner of a member or former member for their
consideration on each fund offered.

Recommendation 5:
The Pension Benefits Standards Regulations should be amended to specify that ESG
factors must be considered and incorporated in the SIP&P. The federal government
should amend section 7.1 of the Pension Benefit Standards Regulation to require:
The Statement of Investment Policies and Procedures required under section 7.1
shall contain information as to how environmental, social and governance
factors have been considered and have been incorporated into the plan’s
investment policies and procedures.

Recommendation 6:
The Expert Panel should recommend to the federal government to require federal Crown
corporations to consider whether there are material ESG risks and opportunities, and
where they exist, to take all reasonable care to address the material ESG factors.

Recommendation 7:
For greater certainty, the Bank Act sections 158 and 748 on fiduciary obligations of banks
and bank holding companies should be amended to read (in red italics):
158 (1) Every director and officer of a bank in exercising any of the powers of a
director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer
shall
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(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
158(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.
...
Duty of care
748 (1) Every director and officer of a bank holding company in exercising any of
the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a
director or an officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank
holding company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
748(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.

Recommendation 8:
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers under the Canada Cooperatives
Act as follows (in red italics):
Duties
80 (1) Every director and officer must, in exercising the powers and performing
the duties of office,
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
cooperative;
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(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
80(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.

Recommendation 9:
Amend the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers under section 168(1) of the
Cooperative Credit Associations Act as follows:
Duty of care
168 (1) Every director and officer of an association in exercising any of the powers of
a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer
shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the association;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to environmental,
social and governance factors with a view to the best interests of the corporation;
and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
168(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may
consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.

Recommendation 10:
Amend the fiduciary obligations under the federal Trust and Loan Companies Act as
follows (in red italics):
Duty of care

120

162 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the bank; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
162(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, depositors, deposit insurance protection
funds, shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment to inform their decisions.

Recommendation 11:
Amend the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers of insurance companies and insurance
holding companies in the Insurance Companies Act as follows (in red italics):
166 (1) Every director and officer of a company in exercising any of the powers
of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an
officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation; and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
166(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.
...
Duty of care
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795 (1) Every director and officer of an insurance holding company in exercising
any of the powers of a director or an officer and discharging any of the duties of
a director or an officer shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
insurance holding company;
(b) consider environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation;
(c) take all reasonable care to address any material issues relating to concerns
environmental, social and governance factors with a view to the best
interests of the corporation and
(d) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.
795(2) In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers
may consider the interests of, inter alia, policyholders, insurance protection funds,
shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment to inform their decisions.

Recommendation 12:
The Expert Panel should recommend that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions include in its supervisory oversight of federally-regulated financial institutions
material ESG factors that pose a risk to capital adequacy and liquidity of these
institutions. This requirement would provide greater certainty and transparency of
management of ESG risks and opportunities.

Recommendation 13:
Amend the Bank of Canada Act to add the following language (in red italics):
1. The directors and officers, in carrying out their duties under this Act, shall in
good faith consider any material environmental, social and governance
factors that may affect the Bank fulfilling its statutory mandate.
2. In exercising their powers and duties under the Act, directors and officers may
consider the interests of, inter alia, members of the public, shareholders,
employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment
to inform their decisions.
The provision limiting liability should be amended to account for ESG factors in the
following way (in red italics):
No liability if in good faith
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30.1 No action lies against Her Majesty, the Minister, any officer, employee or
director of the Bank or any person acting under the direction of the Governor for
anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or
discharge of any powers or duties that under this Act are intended or authorized
to be executed or performed, including their consideration of environmental,
social and governance factors in carrying out their duties under this Act.

Recommendation 14:
The Expert Panel should recommend that financial advisers be required to include
information on material ESG factors in giving financial advice to consumer or retail
investors.

Recommendation 15:
The federal government should work with IIROC, MFDA and investment firms to develop
new requirements that investment advisers and distributors ask about their clients'
preferences regarding ESG factors and take them into account when assessing the range
of financial instruments and insurance products being recommended.

Recommendation 16:
i.

Require material ESG factors, including climate-related financial disclosures, to
be reported in annual financial filings.

ii.

Ask the Canadian Accounting Standards Board to review the industry specific
standards promulgated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board for
purposes of adoption in Canada.

iii.

The federal government should work with Canadian accounting standards
authorities and securities regulators to provide tools to assist companies to
embed ESG disclosure in publicly-listed corporations’ financial statements and
notes to financial statements.

Recommendation 17:
i.

Require disclosure of management’s approach to material ESG risks and
opportunities in management’s proxy circular in conjunction with the annual
meeting.

123

ii.

Create a consultation process to evaluate using a “sustainability disclosure and
analysis” (“SD&A”) reporting tool for the proxy circular ESG disclosure.

Recommendation 18:
The Expert Panel should consider recommending a move to bi-annual and annual
financial statements for larger issuers and only annual financial statements for venture
and smaller issuers (by market cap) as one means to focus on longer-term sustainability
and relieve some of the resource pressures in shifting to an ESG governance framework.

Recommendation 19:
i.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should
require companies to disclose and address material climate-related financial risk
in its initial regulations, and should peg requirements to international standards
as they develop.

ii.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act and
should assess whether there is a need to address material environmental, social
and governance systemic risk more generally, in terms of risk to the stability of
the country’s financial system as a whole and the potential to have a material
adverse effect on the Canadian economy.

iii.

The new national Authority under the draft Capital Markets Stability Act should
negotiate with securities administrators across Canada to embed a staged
approach to TCFD disclosure within provincial securities regulation, where
applicable and as standards develop.

Recommendation 20:
The federal government should endorse the TCFD disclosure framework, recognizing that
it is continuing to develop.

Recommendation 21:
i.

The government should establish criteria to recognize leaders in sustainability
disclosure in each size category (small, medium, large, national champions) and
constitute a Council of Sustainability Leaders.
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ii.

The government should facilitate dialogues between investors and companies to
develop mutual understandings of what types of sustainability disclosure is most
valuable to investors.

Recommendation 22:
The federal government should encourage securities regulators and the CSA to direct
companies to use the TCFD sector guidance and SASB guidance when determining the
materiality of climate-related disclosures and when disclosing information about
governance, risk management, company strategy, and targets and metrics within the
construct of their continuous disclosure.

Recommendation 23:
The Expert Panel should recommend an ESG disclosure “safe harbour” to protect duly
diligent directors and officers (possible draft language in red italics):
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIROMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE INFORMATION
1. Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) Information
(1) This Part applies to ESG information that is disclosed by a reporting issuer
other than ESG information contained in oral statements.
2. Disclosure
(1) A reporting issuer that discloses material ESG information must include
disclosure that
(a) cautions users of the ESG information that actual results may vary in
the future due to refinements in metrics to measure risks and
opportunities and identifies material risk factors that could cause results
to differ materially from the reported ESG information;
(c) states the material factors or assumptions used to develop the ESG
information; and
(d) describes the reporting issuer’s policy for updating ESG information.
(2) ESG outlook information that is based on assumptions that are reasonable
in the circumstances must, without limitation,
(a) be limited to a period for which the information in the ESG outlook
can be reasonably reported or be estimated; and
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to
prepare its historical financial statements for the period covered.
(3) This Part does not apply to disclosure that is (a) subject to requirements
in National Instrument 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas
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Activities or National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral
Projects; made to comply with the conditions of any exemption from the
requirements that a reporting issuer received from a regulator or securities
regulatory authority unless the regulator or securities regulatory authority
orders that this Part applies to disclosure made under the exemption; or
contained in an oral statement.
3. Reasonable Basis
A reporting issuer is not required to disclose ESG information unless the issuer has
a reasonable basis for considering the information to be material.
4. A reporting issuer that discloses ESG information must include disclosure that
states the date management approved the ESG information.
5. ESG Financial Information
(1) A reporting issuer must not disclose ESG financial information unless it is
reasonable in the circumstances,
(a) is limited to a period for which the information in the ESG financial
information or financial outlook can be reasonably measured or
estimated; and
(b) use the accounting policies the reporting issuer expects to use to prepare
its historical financial statements for the period covered by the ESG
information or the financial outlook.
(2) The issuer must explain the ESG financial information in the financial
statements and the notes to the financial statements.
(3) The issuer must disclose the date management approved the ESG financial
information and explain the purpose of the ESG financial information and
caution readers that the information may not be appropriate for other
purposes.
(4) The issuer must disclose any year to year change in reporting ESG metrics
used.

Recommendation 24:
The federal government should adopt requirements to require debt and equity
institutional investors and asset managers, including mutual funds and pension funds, to
disclose annually the financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the
company’s measures to reduce them, including how they are implementing a low-carbon
strategy in each component of their activities, and how their corporate and investment
decision-making is contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global
warming.
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Recommendation 25:
The Expert Panel should recommend that the federal government create a Sustainable
Finance Institute aimed at accelerating green finance and a sustainable Canadian
economy, including working with the private sector, regulators, universities, nongovernmental organizations, and green finance institutes internationally to further
develop green finance policy, innovative strategies, data and metrics.

